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This thesis is a retrospective analysis of British social realism. It combines conventional 
academic research with professional screenwriting practice in the genre. By definition, at its 
advent Social Realism employed documentary realist devices to explore the inequalities of 
society with the objective of stimulating socio-political debate about this imbalance and thus 
social reform. However, contemporary forms of social realism have emerged much more 
depoliticised, drawing on similar subject matter but using decontextualised narrative strategies. 
The commitment to truth now seems to consist of an aesthetic, as opposed to a sociological 
imperative. 
 
Historically, class has been a distinctive feature in much of European and World cinema, as it has 
provided an incisive device for contemporary understandings of inequality and social divisions. 
However, class depiction has been more important (and problematic) in British cinema than in 
other western societies for several reasons. Britain was the longest–established proletarian 
society where economic verticality had come to fruition earliest and relatively unchallenged in 
relation to other social divisions such as ethnicity and faith (Abercombie, 2000:147).  Further, 
particular attention has been paid to the working classes of Britain in filmic representation 
because the social divisions that the characters represent “constitute actual or potential sources of 
conflict, which can be articulated for the benefit of dramatic storytelling” (Hallam, 2007: 185). 
However, class has never been the only source of inequality. Race has always been the 
dimension along which inequalities can be identified. How these dimensions relate to one 
another is an important question and one that is investigated in this thesis. However it remains a 
complex exercise; while class and race have remained consistent features in British film, class 
and race inequality has not – what are the factors involved in producing this situation? 
 
This thesis will examine the current films being produced within the British social realism orbit, 
and consider if current narrative and sociological approaches to social realism can still produce a 
politicised viewer. It considers what recent socio-political influences have influenced genre, and 
if current realist films produce an empathy with characters that simply reconciles spectators to 
social issues rather than encouraging them to intellectually engage and challenge them.  
However, in order to commence this investigation there must initially be an attempt to define 
what is social realism and the ways in which the British cinematic offshoot relate to this 
formulation. Social realism is a discursive term employed to describe films that attempt to 
present the effects of political, sociological and environmental factors on the development of 
character through depictions that emphasize a nuanced relationship between character and public 
institutions. Traditionally, this approach is characterised by the ideology of the practitioner, in 
which the filmic text offers a denouncement of the situations presented in the text, and /or a 
reformist or revolutionary political ideology that is insinuated into the narrative by the actions of 
the protagonist or the systemic effects on him/her that suggest that the adverse social 
circumstances could be altered by the introduction of more benevolent social policies. Social 
realism tends to be associated with observational camerawork that emphasises situations and an 
episodic narrative structure, creating ‘gritty’ character studies of urban life.  
In the UK, social realism is commonly associated with ‘kitchen sink’ drama that investigates 
controversial issues such as domestic violence, alcoholism and drug abuse. But not all social 
issue dramas are necessarily social realist in form. Social dramas often focus on individual 
characters and invariably have a narrative structure characteristic of mainstream films; social 
realism is associated with ensemble casts and multistranded narratives with narrational 
motivation dispersed across a range of diverse characters, events and situations.  There is also a 
difference in the treatment of theme. In social issue films, the individual’s problems present a 
problem for society, as opposed to being perceived as a problem created by society as in social 
realism (Hallam, 2000:190).  
 
Emile Zola famously formulated a theory of fictional representation defined as naturalism. 
According to Zola, the practitioner’s objective should be to conduct an anthropological study of 
men and women in a similar form to that of naturalists studying animals, reporting, observing, 
while eschewing judgment on any subjective perspective. The aim was to be as objective as 
scientists, the facts would speak for themselves but only if they were accurately and fully 
presented (Hallam, 2000:5). However, Georg Lukacs problematised this observational approach 
in Writer and Critic, where he declared that this lacks the authenticity of perspective as the social 
experience is “described from the standpoint of a distant observer, when it should be narrated 
from the standpoint of the participant” (Lukacs, 1970: 111). As we will learn from the work of 
Ken Loach, he extended the boundaries of this theory by establishing a character/institutional 
relationship that would contextualise the reality, and marrying this with a definite perspective on 
the issues presented, with an intellectual impetus influenced by the socio-political critique of 
Marxism. 
Social realism has a specific political dimension that travels beyond aesthetics. But how do we 
define what is a politically engaged film? When considering the relationship between one social 
class and another, or the nature of government institutions, we are investigating matters that are 
in part ‘political’. From a certain perspective, politics refers to all aspects of social life where 
there is evident inequality of agency between two or more demographics and there is an attempt 
to either sustain or remedy the imbalance in those relationships. In that sense, politics is 
everywhere (Abbercrombie: 2000: 400). Further, politics refers to the government and its 
institutions that in combination regulate British society, including Parliament which sets the 
context of law, social policy and the civil service that implements them.  
 
The broader question that is being investigated is if there has been a shift in emphasis between 
the idea of structure (i.e. institutions, socio-economic arrangements) and agency (i.e. individual's 
moral failings / decisions) in social realist filmmaking. How to trace the shifting political 
positions and alignments of a specific film genre around much broader changes within political 
economy must be approached from several critical angles. Firstly, this must be approached on a 
sociological terrain, via the grand questions of how society coheres and changes, questions that 
have been addressed by social theorists such as Karl Marx. From this position, an examination 
can be conducted of the defining concepts that relate to the sociological vocabulary of social 
realist cinema – concepts like identity, status, community, class, economy, which are all related 
to one another and have more semantic possibilities than linear, cause-effect filmic language, and 
through which it is easier to comprehend the social process. 
 
Secondly, in-depth consideration must be given to the political process; the dominant political 
narrative of the period, its effects on society and its influence in the cultural economy in which 
the filmic artefact is cultivated; the art that the political circumstances generate. For this to be 
achieved, an investigation is conducted into the ideological character of the New Labour 
government, specifically in relation to class, race, the economy and culture. These are all 
distinctive subjects within the political discourse of New Labour, however the objectives for each 
were carried out, and will be considered, under the political philosophy of neoliberalism. Within 
this philosophy, an examination of multiculturalism is conducted. Multiculturalism under New 
Labour was constructed as a space for racial and cultural differences to co-exist comfortably; 
however, this thesis will consider whether their multicultural discourse led to the cul de sac of 
credible race politics. Relatively, with specific regard to class, Labour rejected class conflict as 
their political ideology, manifest in the language and representation of social policy, employing 
new terms such as social exclusion, hard working families and the underprivileged. Crucially, the 
language of New Labour represented a shift away from the previously held idea that inequalities 
are the product of class society and its relationship with capitalism. 
 
Thirdly, there is an investigation of the cultural policy, which attempted to sync New Labour’s 
economic and social intentions to produce a commercialised British artistic culture. This 
approach accepted commercialism with the idea that social cohesion and commercial revenue 
could be combined in a coherent cultural discourse. This carries the thesis into a textual analysis 
of contemporary social realism and an examination of the effects of neoliberalism on the 
sociological approach to the genre and it’s on screen results. On this terrain, there is a 
consideration of the film policy, embodied in the creation of the UK Film Council, the filmic 
texts and the context in which they were produced, with due regard to the triangularisation that is 
politics, society and culture; if class and race inequality is no longer a party political issue, how 
can it be represented adequately in British film culture? 
 
In the past, there have been a number of individuals responsible for conducting investigations 
into the British film industry, in particular in relation to race and class like those commissioned 
by the government or governing bodies like the Arts Council, the Film Council, the British Film 
Institute, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport; media groups like the BBC and Channel 
4, and as well as of course the academic community. Thus, it is important to state that it is an 
impossible task within the parameters of this thesis to investigate all aspects of the British film 
industry, and all films in relation to social realism and its associated issues. Because of this, the 
films investigated and the case studies have been limited to texts that reproduce problematic 
representations of working class and ethnic minorities and issues of class and race in British 
cinema - Fish Tank (Arnold 2009) and This is England (Meadows 2007). In order to form 
comparisons, there has been a detailed investigation of the work of Ken Loach, dividing his body 
of work into two distinctive parts. His pre and post New Labour films and how the political 
climate has affected the imperatives of his films. In regard to black British film, as we are 
discussing what is a small number of films, for reasons investigated in Chapter 2, there is a 
specific focus on Bullet Boy (Saul Dibb, 2004). 
 
It is undeniable that the 20th century class struggles influenced the social character of the British 
New Wave, a film genre characterised by the depiction of working class individuals and the class 
conflicts that are created when this social group comes into contact with the middle class and 
social exclusivity. However, there has been extensive research already produced in relation to 
this period. Thus, a historical analysis of the cultural and political preconditions for its 
emergence and development was deemed unnecessary for this thesis. Further, the filmic ideas 
introduced in the 1980’s, specifically the emergence of Channel Four and its film making arm, 
Film on Four, and the development of an anti-Thatcherite film culture in Britain have not been 
examined in this thesis for similar reasons. While the polemical nature of the distinctive film of 
this period, My Beautiful Launderette (Frears, 1985) exposed the paradox at the centre of 
Thatcherite entrepreneurialism by conceptualizing it within the class and racial nexus, the 
various ways in which Channel Four came to facilitate this form of British - filmmaking during 
this are explored within the chapter on black British filmmaking. 
 
It is important to note that prior to this investigation, I had little involvement or specialist 
knowledge of what occurred in the British film industry other than the interest of an emerging 
screenwriter/director. I had not experienced personally any type of exclusion in the industry, and 
I did not possess anything more than a basic, observational understanding of the important issues 
and interwoven frameworks within the industry. For these reasons, I was a relative outsider in 
the world of British film. This was not regarded necessarily as a disadvantage though, as my 
position as a relatively detached outsider afforded me a unique position. However, it does prove 
ironic that while measures are being taken to help increase inclusion in film, I, as a black, 
working-class young man, felt the need to modify and restrain my behaviour still further in order 
to gain access. Further, the reality that a black, well-spoken but evidently working class and 
moreover competent young doctoral student was treated with disdain by members of the British 
film industry and intelligentsia on several occasion throughout my research spoke volumes about 
the complexity of the issues surrounding social exclusion in British film industry. 
 
The choice of topic for investigation developed out of a personal fascination with the long-term 
changes noticeable in the social position of British cinema. My first initial research aim was to 
investigate why, despite the numerous schemes and programmes implemented by New Labour’s 
Film Council, working class people of all ethnicities continued to be excluded or marginalised in 
British film, both in front and behind the camera. While this question was primarily related to the 
post 1997 discourse, I was disinclined to limit my investigation to this specific period. I became 
attentive to the possibility that a long-term developmental approach would help to uncover 
answers to questions that related to a relatively recent social issue. In this way, I focused on the 
long-term developments in British Cinema since the mid-late 20th century. Essentially therefore, 
the main motivation was to seek the roots of social exclusion and its effects on political and 
cultural discourse as an explanation for the changing degree of representation and the power 
struggles between social groups in which exclusion emerged, both in wider society and 
specifically in British film. In specific regard to black British cinema, this emerged nearly two 
decades before the actual New Labour cultural policies that informed British film industry 
emerged. 
 
For the purposes of this investigation, over a hundred semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with representatives from various film-related associations and institutions, which represented 
what was felt to be a cross-section of the British film industry. The goal of these interviews was 
to obtain a detailed and thorough comprehension of the various ties of interdependence linking 
members of the British film figuration. Any particular organisation, group or individual that I felt 
had an important stake or role in British film, from the position of academic, practitioner or 
curator or bureaucrat, was approached for an interview. Thus, interviewees were purposefully 
and deliberately selected rather than through any random researching approach; the latter 
technique would not have been relevant in this kind of research.  
 
 
Chapter One:  Beyond the Screen: New Labour, The Film Council and the 
Emergence of BBC Films and FilmFour. 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the impact of the shifting political ideology surrounding British 
social realism and depictions of working class existence in relation to it. It will investigate the 
changes in political identity of the Labour Party and how this affected the triangulation that is 
politics, culture and its effects, and the role both BBC Films and Film Four occupied in this 
triangulation.  
 
British Film Under The Conservatives 
Margaret Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister in November 1990. The post-war consensus that 
had embraced both the mixed economy and the responsibility of governments to bring forward 
social welfare was rejected during her 11-year reign in favour of an emphasis on free markets 
and individual freedom that privileged low taxation, deregulation, restrictions on public spending 
and the privatisation of previously nationalised industries (Brison, 2011: 12). This in turn was 
rooted in a belief in the virtues of competitiveness and individual responsibility that disregarded 
claims of social culpability for social problems, encapsulated in Thatcher’s infamous statement 
that; 
There is no such thing as society. There are individual men 
and women and there are families (McSmith, 2010: 23). 
	  
From this perspective, state intervention to defeat inequality was both undesirable and 
economically dangerous - poverty was related to individual moral failings by the undeserving 
poor, rather than to economic structures and institutional relationships. This thinking relied 
heavily on the ideas of neo-liberalist philosopher F.A. Hayek, who condemned governmental 
attempts at social justice as corrosive of individual liberty (Brison: 2011: 15).  
During the 1990s, the entire landscape of British film and television broadcasting changed 
considerably, both within a political context and in the broader mediascape. Firstly, the direct 
political pressure applied to the BBC from the Conservatives was reduced. This alleviation of 
pressure allowed the Corporation to become much more broader in their remit. This expansion 
and diversifying of their remit shifted them into the direction of cinema, and the BBC began 
financing features in the form of BBC Films (Friedman, 1993:73). 
Until the mid 1980s, Britain had mirrored the practice common to many countries in Europe of 
offering parallel support mechanisms for film as industry and film as culture, justified by a 
mixture of economic and cultural arguments. Film industry support was managed by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and its modus operandi was; regulations against anti 
competitive practices, implementing a national screen quota, a subsidiary for film known as the 
Eady Levy, and a specialised bank for providing film loans in the form of the National Film 
Finance Corporation (NFFC) (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005:421). In regard to its cultural 
dimension, the main agent since the 1930’s was the British Film Institute (BFI) whose 
responsibilities include managing the National Film Archive, delivering film education and 
operating the National Film Theatre (NFT). Crucially, they supported regional film theatres and 
financed low budget feature films specifically for their cultural value. These structures for 
promoting film as culture had developed over time, as a reaction to various pressures and 
imperatives and as a result, while funding and decision making frameworks were homespun, 
they emerged “more sensitive to the cultural value of film than any other bureaucratic system of 
governance could be” (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005:421). 
This slow but continuing process of public intervention in British film was halted in 1985 when 
the Thatcher government dismantled the existing framework for supporting film-as-industry; the 
Conservatives abolished both the screen quota and the Eady Levy and replaced the National Film 
Finance Corporation with a private company, British Screen. However, this policy of industrial 
delegative leadership was abated and the new John Major government responded to the intense 
lobbying from within the film industry by reintroducing a tax concession and including film as 
one of the causes to be supported by the new National Lottery revenue. Further, industrial and 
cultural policy separation was remedied by moving the main civil services objectives for film 
from the DTI to the newly established Secretary of State for National Heritage, within the 
Department of National Heritage (DNH) (Dickenson & Harvey, 2005:421). 
In 1992, the Tory Party under the new leadership of John Major won a fourth consecutive 
parliamentary majority. However, what was significant about this victory was the manner of the 
triumph - this majority was 21 seats, compared with 99 in the previous election victory in 1987 
(McSmith, 2010:152). Despite the Labour Party having been marginally ahead in the opinion 
polls just prior election, the conservatives still obtained 42% of the votes cast, with Labour 
receiving only 34% (Abercrombe 2000: 427).  
The increased focus by John Major’s Conservatives on the development of employable skills in 
the 1990s had the effect of individualising what was a widespread issue experienced by millions 
of people in the country – the collective problem of unemployment. This was coupled with a 
social welfare discourse presented by the Conservatives in the 1980’s, a culture of dependency, 
which implied that those in receipt of state benefits were afflicted with a psychological apathy, 
idleness and improvidence not present in the working population (Abercrombe 2000: 109). The 
actual structural dimension of the unemployment  - that there are insufficient jobs in the 
economy- was translated into the problem and responsibility of the individual affected.  
 
The Re-Emergence of Ken Loach 
This Conservative ideology was not challenged filmically in a way that parralled the work of 
filmmakers in the 1980’s, when a film culture was developed that was counter-hegemonic and 
critical of Thatcher’s Conservative government and its policies in films such as My Beautiful 
Laundrette (1985, Stephen Frears,) Letter to Brezhnev (1985, Chris Bernard,) and High Hopes 
(1988, Mike Leigh). Furthermore, in the 1990s the representation of the working class in British 
cinema was characterised by a significant absence of political intent and adherence to any 
utopian ideology. However, the most political social realist film-maker of this period, Ken 
Loach, re-emerged, creating a body of key films that articulated the effects of what he believe to 
be undiluted, irresponsible government policies rooted in class conflict. Although the power of 
his political alignment within his films is fading, to understand the key elements of British social 
realism and its political shift, we must examine Loach’s films from the 1990s, which focus on 
working-class people in contemporary British society. We will use the work of Ken Loach to 
identify and contextualise this shift by dividing his films into two trilogies; firstly, Riff Raff 
(1990), Raining Stones (1993) and Ladybird Ladybird (1994); and secondly, My Name is Joe 
(1998), Sweet Sixteen (2002) and Ae Fond Kiss (2004). 
Ken Loach’s return into feature film making in the early 1990’s can be interpreted as the 
execution of a concerted, twofold strategy. This strategy was devised in reaction to being 
forcibly dislocated from the British TV industry (Hill, 1999: 255). During the previous decade 
issues of censorship and his alignment with oppositional politics in the form of the Great Miners 
Strike created a industry-wide belief that Loach was too much of a risk; his positioning on the 
radical left of British politics created a sense of him lacking the required balance and objectivity 
to be an acceptable television documentarist (Hill, 1999: 256). A number of his documentaries, 
including one relating to the Miners Strike were either decommissioned or withheld from 
terrestrial broadcasting until the films had lost all topicality and potential social impact.  On a 
second level, his initial attempts to return to feature film making in the late 1980’s were shackled 
as he appeared to potential financers too much a risk to be a commercially viable director (Hill, 
1999: 260). 
Thus, Loach cultivated a new identity, remoulding himself as a European director and launched a 
career benefitting from a new international system of independent production and European co-
funding. Thematically, the focus of his films was now on the effects of capitalist exploitation via 
the global system, as opposed to solely British capitalism (Hallam, 2000: 160). The aspect of 
social criticism in Loach’s films certainly needs to be taken into consideration in an analysis of 
the current climate in British cinema. All his characters are prisoners of their class, income and 
social circumstances. 
Films that hinted at such injustices as unemployment and social marginalisation were bound to 
only be popular amongst a left-leaning audience, especially on the continent, since he came to 
articulate real political, economic and social grievances. This can be attributed to the fact that his 
films alluded to genuine class antagonisms, pitting capitalists and the rich on one side of the 
social divide against the working class on the other. The second part of this concerted strategy 
was to make several relatively low budget films that remained local, and aesthetically linked to 
his early documentary dramas. However, the universality of his working class themes permitted 
the films to take on a greater significance beyond the UK (Fuller, 1998: 67). 
 
Loach’s international films were motivated by the implicitly international  
compass of a Marxist political outlook, in terms of which the working class  
is a global rather than a national identity and all individuals are, in the words  
of Marx and Engels, dependent for the satisfaction of their wants on the  
whole world (Hill, 1999: 268). 
In narrative terms, a typical Ken Loach film of this period will follow the downward path of a 
working class protagonist who, despite his or her best endeavours, is undone by exploitative, 
economic disadvantage articulated through the social institutions, such as the government 
services or schools, who function to assure the reproduction as opposed to the reduction of 
structural inequality. Specifically, the films focus on ordinary, working class and imperfect 
individuals attempting to exist within an unjust social system (Hill, 2000: 261). The formation 
(with Sally Hibbin) of Parallax Pictures in 1990, a small-left leaning company enabled Loach to 
continue the enlargement of his political perspectives. His first two films, Riff Raff and Raining 
Stones demonstrated that he could make films in England that were much more correlated to his 
political convictions without losing his commercial viability in Europe (Hallam, 2000: 172). 
 
Riff Raff was produced as a feature film for Channel 4’s Film on Four, which was established for 
the specific purpose of investing in British independent films with a theatrical distribution before 
being broadcast on television. Located on a south London building site, this film features casual 
workers converting a former hospital building into luxury apartments. Recently released from a 
prison sentence and homeless, Stevie (Robert Carlyle) secures a job as a casual labourer, also 
finding sub-standard accommodation in a semi-derelict council estate. Apart from the scenes 
between Stevie and Susan, the majority of the dramatic action takes place on the construction 
site. Larry (Ricky Tomlinson) takes up the role as the political activist among the builders, and 
attempts to collectivise the casual workforce (Wilson, 1991:61).  Indicative of Ken Loach’s 
political position and critique of the punitive measures Thatcher employed to reduce the threat of 
the ‘Enemy Within’, he is subsequently sacked for trying to create a union.  
 
The observational style of Loach’s shooting is evident in the distance between the camera and 
the characters. Throughout the film, the camera work consists of just two shots, alternating 
between either a medium or long shot. The initial conversation between Stevie and Susan at the 
advent their relationship, which would in normal circumstances be shot in close-up to emphasise 
emotional intimacy, is shot at a distance to create a sense of observation rather than involvement. 
Further, the actors move in and out of a static frame and their dialogue is unstructured and at 
times drowned out by the crowd. With an aesthetic approach to cinematography that employs the 
use of natural light, these cinematic devices contribute to the creation of a naturalism that 
displays no artificiality or stagecraft (Hayward, 2004: 62). 
 
Stevie is depicted as embodying the entrepreneurial spirit of the period in his attempts to 
transcend the limitations of both his class and criminal background by building his own 
underwear business. The gap between him and his girlfriend, the aspiring but unrealistic singer 
Susan is their approach towards achievement within the shifting society of Thatcher’s Britain. 
Loach’s critical treatment of the entrepreneur spirit ruled by a capitalist economy is illustrated by 
these characters; Susan’s failure as a professional singer is a product of both her lack of work 
ethic and her lack of singing ability. Steve displays a much more disciplined approach to 
achieving success, but ultimately rejects his entrepreneurial ambitions, burning down the 
building.  
 
Riff Raff is a polemic reaction to the socio-political change brought about by Thatcher’s Britain 
and it is this political commentary that provides the controlling narrative of the film. Set in 
Thatcher’s Britain of the 1980s, it makes clear references to conservative government politics, 
articulated in the character ‘Tommy’s speech on Tory housing policy and the growth of an 
undiluted entrepreneurial market. The film’s location on a construction site is indicative of a 
British society shifting, demonstrated in the reduction of the welfare state towards a financially 
orientated economy supported by the casualisation of labour. This, in particular is presented in 
the absence of basic, on-site health and safety guidelines and the hazardous, unprotected working 
conditions the workers are exposed to. 
	  
Raining Stones follows a similarly linear main plot; unemployed father Bob (Bruce Jones) 
struggles to find the money to pay for his daughter’s First Communion dress. Accompanied by 
his friend Tommy (Ricky Tomlinson) the story focuses on them devising numerous (and 
ultimately fruitless) money generating schemes. Bob’s unemployment (his van, his only viable 
means of income is stolen at the start of the film) leads him to borrow money from an 
uncompromising loan shark, whose main business is drawn from the residents on Bob’s council 
estate. Bob’s failure to meet the repayments results in a terrifying attack by the loan shark 
against his wife and daughter. Bob brings matters to an end when the drunken loan sharks 
crashes his car and dies after a fight with Bob, who then steals money from his wallet as he lies 
dying in his car.  Bob then runs into the church and confesses everything to his Catholic Priest, 
who persuades him not to turn himself to the police, convincing him that the Holy Spirit has 
forgiven him for his sin. Unlike many of Loach’s films, the story has a more cause and effect 
closing; while at his daughter’s communion we see a police siren approaching his house. 
However it is revealed to the audience that they have simply recovered his stolen van 
(Tuener,1993:50).	  
The film was shot on the Langley estate in Middleton, northeast Manchester. Loach uses real 
location from a moor where Bob and Tommy run after a sheep to get mutton, a pub where they 
sell it, the council estate they live in, the employment office, the night club where Bob gets a 
security job, and the cricket field from which they steal the turf for a client’s lawn; all are 
interwoven into the main story to provide a realistic, detailed observation on the daily struggle 
for working-class people. Similar to Riff Raff, in Raining Stones Loach maintains a camera 
distance from the actors and places being filmed, with a fidelity to the use of an unstable visual 
aesthetic which uses medium close shots with the employing of long focus lenses. Bob’s speech 
about youth unemployment, the Socialist Worker poster featuring as a backdrop in the frame as 
Bob and his father–in-law discuss his financial issues, and the stealing of turf from the bowling 
green at the Conservative Club all have obvious political resonances and these provide a much 
more acute description of the director’s political position and possess more impact on the 
audience consciousness than Bob’s individual, money generating scenes, which while presenting 
the daily vicissitude of working class existence, often seem trivial (Macnab,1995:163). 
Critics repeatedly point out that the work of Loach shares the characteristics of the Italian neo-
realist films, and Raining Stones is especially often compared with Bicycle Thieves (De Sica, 
1948). Not only Loach’s narrative and cinematic techniques to achieve authenticity (subject 
matter, non-professional actors, location shooting, lengthy takes), but also share alternating 
comedy and melodrama. Loach demonstrates filmicly how political discourses and policies have 
a detrimental effect on the lives of people on the periphery, through the narrative.  
Ladybird Ladybird marries a less specific environment with a narrative structure that draws on 
melodrama (Leigh 2002:151). Maggie (Crissy Rock) has her four children taken away from her 
by the Social Services, due to the unstable home environment created by the violent relationship 
she has with her ex-husband Simon (Ray Winstone). On a night out she meets a Paraguayan 
exile Jorge (Vladimir Vega) in a karaoke pub. The film focuses on their developing relationship; 
they fall in love, start living together and have two daughters, although both of them are also 
taken in to care by social services who conclude that their relationship is not conducive for the 
children. We are given a sense that this is a docudrama by being informed at the beginning of the 
film that it is ‘based on a true story’.	  The narrative structure of Ladybird Ladybird is much more 
melodramatic; time between events is reduced to condense their story into a hundred and one 
minute film and creates a much more dramatic, docudrama effect. Maggie’s accounts about her 
separation from her children is incorporated into the story through a series of flashbacks within 
the progression of this new relationship, with Loach employing a ‘voice-over’ technique to 
emphasise Maggie’s perspective (Leigh 2002: 151). There is substance in the assertion that 
Ladybird Ladybird can be compared to Loach’s work in the 1960’s. Cathy Come Home captured 
the same struggle of ordinary people against state institution (in Cathy Come Home, the young 
parents are also declared to be ‘inadequate parents’ by social services and face the prospect of 
their children being taken away). However, although in Cathy Come Home the cinematic devices 
employed are firmly rooted in a documentary aesthetic, by reducing the emotional involvement 
with the characters, Ladybird Ladybird’s flashbacks, married with Maggie’s voice-over, clearly 
differentiates the narrative attitude of these two films. 
The authenticity of experience comes from the film’s proximity to Maggie (Macnab 1994: 14). 
We trace the important incidents of her life; her father’s violence towards both her and her 
mother, her domestic life with her children (all from different fathers), the first encounter with 
Simon and having another baby, Simon’s violence and her escape from him, her period in a 
women’s refuge and an accidental fire which seriously injures her eldest son Sean, and her battle 
with social services in the aftermath of the incident. All this is presented through Maggie’s 
perspective. 
 
This identification with Maggie’s experience works as a powerful melodramatic device, although 
the emotional impact of her experience makes the power of the subjective social analysis in this 
film less effective. However, Loach also redirects the emotional power of this film to disrupt and 
alter this identification. The film’s close focus on Maggie also exposes her abrasiveness. In 
particular, in the court scene where it is decided that Maggie’s children will once again be taken 
into care by the Social Services, her trust in the individual social worker and entire social system 
is betrayed. At this point, Maggie’s efforts to be co-operative with the social services, and her 
diplomacy on the whole, prove futile, manifest in Maggie’s anger and offensive language, in 
contrast with Jorge’s composedness (Munro, 1994:12). This is in response to investing trust in an 
ideologically driven society which ultimately considers her through the prism of a class–biased 
perspective; that of a working class woman of “low intellect and little self control”, who “has 
had a number of partners‟ and “puts her children at risk of violence”. 
	  
Jorge, a political refugee from Paraguay, is, on the other hand, a marginalised immigrant in the 
UK; however, he is highly educated and political, and has an understanding in managing 
bureaucracy. Even after they endure the indignity and injustice of losing their first daughter, he is 
able to persuade Maggie to modify her behaviour in order to allow her to negotiate the social 
system and ultimately get their baby back. She is forced by political pressure to alter her personal 
characteristics in order to tally with the institution’s expectations. Jorge’s rational nature 
provides a clear contrast with that of Maggie’s, whose desire for children seems much stronger 
than her rationality. However, they are connected in a common experience of state oppression. 
Ladybird Ladybird provides us with a melodramatic narrative device by focusing on a female 
protagonist through Maggie’s perspective and creates the conflict of the social victim against the 
undiluted systemic devices of an oppressive, autocratic society.  
Given that class can be understood theoretically, in terms of the way capitalism is organised 
economically, these filmic investigations are descriptively powerful as a platform for the critique 
of wealth inequality, which has immense political relevance. The films give a clear perspective 
on political issues, communicated through the actions of the protagonist. The characters are not 
only the narrative centrepiece, but also annunciate the films political perspective. Riff Raff, 
Raining Stones and Ladybird Ladybird are strong reactions to the socio-political change brought 
about by Thatcher’s Britain, and are specifically presenting the effects of this political change. 
This forms the dominant narrative of the films; this is also a certain continuity from the anti-
Thatherite films of the 1980’s. Loach’s main imperative at this point is a critique of the British 
social system; exposing the flaws in the system which nevertheless operate in a manner which 
systemically oppress the very citizens the institutions are in place to assist	  (Hayward, 2004:5). 
Loach’s commitment to Trotskyite Marxism, demonstrative in his films of this period, also 
differentiates his works from other high-profile British directors of this, or any other period in 
British cinema, and makes his position in British film culture particularly unique; he uses his 
characters to announce specific political points in order for the politics to insinuate itself in the 
narrative. This, coupled with his commitment to a naturalistic style of film-making derived from 
documentary cinema techniques; filming in locations without artificial lighting; using non-
professional actors and improvisation in dialogue (Leigh, 2002: 18). 
 
Loach sought to make film politically effective by creating cinematic events about situations of 
political oppression, often in northern towns, by asking those with direct experience of those 
situations and oppressions to participate in performance. His paramount concern was not art, but 
with representation and creating a consciousness. In terms of ideology they were explicitly 
Marxist, geared towards understanding social reality to the extent that they were discussing their 
way of life. Within his filmic practice, this involved coming into conflict with institutions, their 
concerns, what they were doing, and how they viewed their relation to the wider society. 
 
	  
The Origins of New Labour and the Third Way 
 
At this point, some notable changes were taking place in British politics that would prove to be 
detrimental to the progression of a politicised, social realist filmic approach in Britain. How the 
New Labour ‘Third Way’ project insinuated itself into British culture, specifically in film, must 
be examined through a number of interpretations and conceptualisations, beginning with an 
analysis of the New Labour project and its genesis. Precisely how we interpret it is the issue. 
What is unachievable is a general consensus position. We would struggle to find one beyond the 
claim that there was a huge ideological shift as a result of adapting a particular electoral strategy. 
We can find those who consider themselves to be socialist and hold the New Labour position, 
and those that complicate it further by asserting that the Labour Party was never on the side of 
the working class, and simply assisted the bourgeois state to manage capital. Political scientists 
may describe it as pure electoral politics and making oneself more amenable to Middle England. 
But the shift must be understood in terms of class, and the disregarding of any kind of class 
foundation to politics. 
 
From its inception, the Labour Party has always been a coalition of groups, with a range of 
visions and interests wrestling for priority. For much of the twentieth century, it was a party of 
the working class and the trade union movement, committed to eradicating poverty and the 
exploitation of the many by the few and using state power to achieve this end. From 1918 until 
the New Labour dawn this vision of social justice was symbolised by Clause Four of the party 
constitution which promised:  
	  
To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits  
of their industry and at the most equitable distribution thereof  
that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership  
and the means of production, distribution and exchange, and 
 the best obtainable system of popular administration and  
control of each industry or service (Brison, 2011:2). 
Some may argue that the New Labour project, simplified, was an answer to an inevitable 
problem; how does a social democratic party pursue its agenda in a society where class lines, 
identities and associations are less clear than they were a generation ago? The question that re- 
occurred was would Labour ever win again after 18 years of defeats and the changing 
composition of the working class, fragmented under Thatcher, and free market capitalism. In 
attempting to explain the rightward movement of the Parliamentary Labour Party in the last 20 
years we must analyse exactly what condition the Labour Party found themselves prior to 1994. 
Before May 1, 1997, Labour had not won an election in more than twenty-two years and had not 
secured a significant parliamentary majority in over three decades.  However, despite the 
apparent power of the Conservatives ideological position, by the late 1980’s the Tories were 
experiencing a number of political difficulties and divisions that resulted in the forceful 
replacement of Thatcher by John Major in 1990, and that appeared to present the Labour Party 
with an unexpected chance of electoral success. Neil Kinnock had introduced a series of new 
reforms including the expulsion of the militant tendency, a weakening of the  
Party’s fidelity to redistributive taxation and an undiluted acceptance of  
privatisation (Brison, 2011:4). 
 
This change in party identity, according to those at the Labour centre ideologically, was not 
driven by politicians of any side, but by underlying social change; the rise of the consumer 
society, increasing numbers of white collar jobs, the broadening of property ownership. And 
from this position the policies that increased these trends such as the ‘Right to Buy’ under 
Thatcher were trends that existed anyway, brought about by the structural change in society. This 
created a problem for the Labour Party. Traditionally, it had been a moderate social democratic 
party. It contained a more ideological wing, but it was controlled by moderate trade union 
leaders, backed up by a fairly conservative working class electorate. In addition, the height of 
predictable class based voting i.e. middle class people voting Tory, working class people voting 
Labour in the UK took place in the early 1950’s. Since then there had always been a downward 
trend. Instead voters of all classes were more likely to be open-minded and vote for the party or 
candidate that appeals to them before the election. However, as the working class supporters 
drifted away, at least as active members, the party became increasingly controlled by middle 
class activists who were ideological in nature. This is what occurred in the 70’s and 80’s and led 
Labour into the wilderness. From the Labour centre, the solution to this, started by Neil Kinnock 
and then continued by John Smith and now Tony Blair, was to bring control into the centre, in 
order to cut out these supporters from the decision making process (Anstead, N: 2012). However, 
a fourth election defeat in 1991 suggested to many in the Labour Party that electoral success 
required a much more drastic form of modernisation and a complete reassessment of its central 
principles.  
 
The Commission for Social Justice, set up in December 1992 by John Smith, offered a critique of 
the method of social justice being pursued, arguing that economic prosperity was the best 
guarantor of social equality (Rawnsley, 2001:22). This process of ideological renewal was a 
significant development which sought to challenge perceptions of the Labour Party. This 
historical position was underpinned by a view that social equality and wealth distribution could 
be achieved through increased welfare spending, financed by progressive taxation and sustained 
economic expansion through Keynesian demand management (Cruddas, J: 2011). Labour 
challenged such a model, arguing that adherence to such an ideology was no longer electorally or 
governmentally tenable (Brison, 2011:8). The Commission for Social Justice placed a reformed 
vision of social justice at the core of their strategic thinking. Central to this thinking was 
reconsidering the principles of social justice and its relationship with other economic and social 
goals and policies. These were identified as: 
	  
The equal worth of all citizens, their equal right to be able  
to meet their basic needs, the need to spread opportunities  
and life chances as widely as possible and finally the  
requirement that we reduce and where possible eliminate  
unjustified inequalities (Brison, 2011:7). 
From this perspective, the way forward did not primarily lie with either an unregulated market 
economy or a redistributive tax and benefits system. Rather, it required an investment in welfare 
to promote the skills and opportunities that would enable individuals to manage their own lives. 
The language of the Commission also represented a decisive shift away from the idea that 
inequalities are a product of an unjust class society and in the direction of a new idea that 
individuals should be given opportunities and responsibilities within the existing structures of 
society (Craig, 2008: 66).	   
From the moment Tony Blair became leader of the Labour Party in 1994 and rebranded it as  
New Labour, there existed a universal assumption that he would win the General Election. 
New Labour promised not only an end to 18 years of Conservative government but also a new 
era of social justice based on contemporary need conducive to what they believed to be a shifting 
British society, rather than old ideology rooted in the party’s past. Its manifesto stated 
We are a broad based movement for progress and justice. 
But we have liberated these values from out-dated dogma 
or doctrine, and we have applied these values to the 
modern world (Rawnsley, 2001:18) 
Targeted holistically at the voters of middle England, the rebranding of Labour included the 
removal of Clause 4, which became the lynchpin in the whole strategy of ‘modernisation’, 
although it was Blair himself who replaced Clause Four’s commitment to public ownership, 
stating; 
The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes 
that by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve 
more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the 
means to realise our true potential and for all of us as a 
community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in 
the hands of the many, not the few (Brison, 2011: 5). 
 
Reforms within the Labour Party represented a strategy to attract votes from the middle class. 
Policies to modernise the party involved less tolerance of dissent from the Labour left, 
ideological movement towards occupying the centre of British politics, and distancing the party 
from the trade unions (Abercrombe 2000: 427).   
 
The Labour government was dubbed ‘New Labour’ because it set out to reform social and 
economic institutions through a ‘Third Way’ programme that attempted to bridge the neo-
liberalism of the previous Conservative government, with Tony Blair insisting that the old 
Labour left must ‘modernise or die’ stating that: 
                             
                                  Our task today is not to fight old battles but to show there is  
a third way, a way of marrying together an open, competitive  
and successful economy with a just, decent and humane  
society’(Abercrombe, 2000: 439). 
 
The winning majority in 1997 was the biggest in Labour’s history and the biggest for any party 
since the Second World War. However, what is significant is that the turnout for the 1997 
General Election was the lowest since 1935. Fewer than one in three of the potential 
electorate voted for a Labour candidate. Blair had secured a parliamentary majority of 179, 
but with half a million fewer votes than at the previous general election. New Labour’s share 
of the vote was 43.2 %, lower than both Atlee’s share in 1945, and Wilson’s in 1964 and 
1966. It was even less than in the three elections of the 50’s that Labour lost (Rawnsey, 2001: 
13).  
However, there are other reasons than ideological reform why the British electorate 
thought that the Labour Party was much more likely to manage the economy more 
effectively. The Conservative Party imploded in its fourth term, under John Major, and by the  
mid 1990’s the key markers of their Thatcherite strategy had disintegrated. This was aided by  
an administration that was considered to be incompetent and corrupt; the Tories were viewed  
as being internally divided, and the aftermath of the humiliating expulsion from the Exchange  
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992 (Black Wednesday) resulted in them losing their  
reputation for economic competence. Thus, there was an expectation that Labour would win  
by a considerable margin (Bilson, 2011:32). 
 
New Labour sought intellectual credibility from a number of contemporary writers, and Blair’s 
guru in these matters was Anthony Giddens, who famously coined the term the ‘Third Way’. 
Giddens argued that the massive global social and economic changes had undermined the 
foundations of both neo-liberal and social democratic thought (Giddens, 1998: 22). This, he said, 
made it both possible and imperative to develop a ‘third way’ approach, a philosophical position 
that coupled social democracy’s commitment to social justice with the requirements of the 
capitalist system. Self - actualisation by the individual will benefit  society as a whole. In this 
sense, individual social interests were being advanced simultaneously. Blair attempted to usher 
in Giddens theory by arguing that: 
 
                                  The third way stands for modernized social democracy, commitment to 
social justice and the goals of the centre left, but flexible, innovative and  
forward looking in the means to achieve them. It is founded on the values  
which have guided progressive politics for more than a century – democracy,  
liberty, justice, mutual obligation and internationalism. But it is a third way  
because it moves decisively beyond an old left preoccupied with state  
control, high taxation and producer interests, and a new right treating  
public investment and a new right treating public investment and often  
the very notion of society and collective endeavor as evils to be  
undone (Bilson, 2011:22). 
 
This claim for the Third Way meant that New Labour could combine the best of other political 
traditions. New Labour brought together the economic reforms of Margaret Thatcher and 
combined them with social solidarity (Abercrombe, 2000: 311). Giddens also attempted to 
reconcile the structure –agency dilemma with his theory of ‘structuration’. A simple 
encapsulation of this intellectual influence at work was Blair’s ‘tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of crime’ soundbite, which attempted to reconcile both an agent and structure approach 
(Anstead, N: 2012). But in practice, as with the Third Way, it ended up around one pole of each 
opposition – more neoliberalism than solidarity, more tough on crime than any causes (Wayne, 
M: 2012). 
 
We can take the view that New Labour purported to become a classless project, but we could 
articulate the very same view about numerous socialist tendencies. Certain sections of the Labour 
Party prior to Blair took the same position. However, while we could trace a socialist politics of 
classlessness beyond New Labour, Tony Blair became the first Labour leader to articulate this as 
an ideological view. Centralist New Labour commentators would not describe the project as 
specifically about creating a classless society and many may claim that it is a term that is more 
closely associated with John Major's Conservative administration. However, what New Labour 
rejected holistically was the idea of inherent class conflict as the basis for contemporary politics. 
It can be argued that in taking this approach, New Labour were wholly consistent with more 
historic ideas within the Labour movement, especially those found within the revisionist 
movement led by Tony Crosland. The central tenet of revisionism is that the great economic 
battles had been won in the mid-20th century, and that the more benevolent form of capitalism 
this created allows equality to be pursued within the prevailing capitalist environment (Leach, 
2011:153). During the New Labour tenure, economic growth meant that politicians could 
manoeuvre around issues of class though public services. It was a classic demonstration of 
revisionism in that the class interests could be reconciled by economic growth; social change 
could be regulated within the capitalist environment (Cruddas, J: 2011). Social engineering by 
means of centralised policy became the central tenant of Labour’s modernisation. Thus, New 
Labour’s social democracy manifested itself in micro-policies, either to help people move up the 
social ladder (such as the expansion of the university sector) or to alleviate poverty (i.e. tax 
credits). Accepting and extending the neoliberal strategy, New Labour attempted to marry it with 
a state welfare modernisation programme based on the notion of social inclusion. To overcome 
deepening social divisions, Labour proposed not so much a redistribution of income or wealth 
but a redistribution of opportunities. Whereas the Labour Party has historically considered social 
welfare as a pivotal means of redressing inequalities arising from capitalist system, New Labour 
embraced free market capitalism and redefined inequality as social exclusion from the financial 
and social opportunities capitalism could bestow (Abercrombe, 2000: 440).	  
 
In its undiluted acceptance of the central tenets of capitalism, New Labour presented the idea that 
there was no alternative to the existing hegemony. Britain remained fundamentally a capitalist 
society. By this we mean;  
 
• There is private ownership of the means of production (property, plant, 
machinery, ect) 
• Economic activity is geared to making profits 
• Profits go to the owners of the means of production 
• Workers generally do not own productive property but work for wages 
• The processes of production and sale of goods and services are organised into 
markets, transactions are commodified (Abercrombe: 2000: 441). 
 
It is indicative of the ideological shift of New Labour that The Financial Times, self described  
as a ‘natural supporter of the Tories’, also committed themselves to the New Labour project.  
In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), not an admirer of previous Labour  
governments, praised an ‘excellent start’ aiming to maintain stability and foster long term  
growth while seeking fairness and developing human potential, manifested in Gordon Brown  
announcing an additional £1.2 billion for the health service and £2.3 billion for education  
(Rawnsey, 2010: 49). More indicative was Tony Blair receiving the blessings of former Labour 
leader Michael Foot, whose pro nationalisation 1983 Election Manifesto was dubbed the ‘longest 
suicide note in history’ and marked the last time that Labour would dogmatically pursue an 
overtly leftwing agenda when trying to win power. 
 
Central to the New Labour project was its branding, public perception, and presentation and 
disguising of their policies, with New Labour indicating to the working class that 
no one could be worse off under them than they had been under the Conservatives (Rawnsey, 
2001: 110). Specifically, Chancellor Gordon Brown’s first budget was a change to tax  
credits that intended to make entry into the employment market pay off by ensuring that it  
was more financially rewarding to be in employment, albeit on low income, than to remain on  
state benefits. In effect, the public purse was subsidizing the employers who would not pay a  
living wage. The right wing press praised the budget for its ideological shift from  
previous Labour budgets by encouraging enterprise, entrepenuralship and relatively low  
taxation, while the left wing press praised the budget for its centre -left approach in  
presenting a benevolent form of capitalism in which they permitted the speculative practices  
in the City while helping the less well-off . The budget also gave cash increases of £200  
million to education and 500 million to the National Health Service (Abercrombe, 2000: 158). 
 
There was still a desire amongst a large section of the party for a more avowedly socialist 
government which paid more respect to Labour’s history and spent less time seducing middle 
Britain. However, the pursuit of equality, along with the pursuit of capitalism, was the 
fundamental base of action to promote social change Britain throughout the New Labour tenure. 
This preoccupation meant that those left wing activists within the Labour party were vulnerable 
to the appeals for Labour party unity.  This encouraged them to reject working class industrial 
militancy if and when that might endanger the long-term success of the party. 
 
Employing the power of the media for political purposes was embraced by New Labour’s 
founders, and a closer nit group around Blair and Brown, including Alistair Campbell and Peter 
Mandleson adopted a deliberate strategy for managing the presentation of their policies and 
ideologies (the performance Tony Blair gave in the wake of Princess Diana’s death, particularly 
in his selective addressing of her as the ‘people’s princess’ can be interpreted as a concerted 
attempt to co-op all parts of society into one group). As Norman Fairclough argues in New 
Labour, New Language (2000) this was the first instance of a UK political party treating the 
presentation of their policies as part of the actual policy making process (Brison, 2011:6). 
 
We must now consider the language of New Labour in relation to class. Politicians of the New 
Labour government preferred to appeal to the individual rather than to a particular class, and 
inequality was now being framed as social exclusion rather than a question of class. But labels 
like ‘ordinary,’ ‘hard working’, were euphemisms for class, still locating people in the social 
hierarchy without engaging in direct class reference (Runnymede, 2009: 51). In many ways, 
contemporary political science would identify this description as a truce with the Conservative 
party on class politics, with the argument framed around risk adverse politicians seeking to 
minimise losses and thus gravitating to a relatively small portion of the centre ground. However, 
it was more than a truce. It was recognition of its own defeat in class terms and a form of 
surrender. The Conservative Party had never stopped believing in class warfare. However, New 
Labour did think it was the case so brought an end to that form of language. It was a capitulation; 
a total shift in the conceptual frameworks of New Labour. The term ‘social exclusion’ became a 
way of articulating certain social positions without referring to class. This is relevant to 
examining the ideology and semantics of filmic texts. This includes the question of whether and 
to what extent filmic texts can have inherent meaning or whether all visual meaning is negotiated 
between the practitioner and the audience.  
	  
 
The Politics of Culture: New Labour and The Creation of the UK Film Council 
 
When conceptualing the role of New Labour, manifested in the Film Council, in the de-
politicisation of social realism, what we are dealing with is the question of cultural agency and 
structure – how much can individual politicians and governments shape cultural institutions and 
structures, and how much do filmic practitioners react to them? I will approach this issue from 
the structural side, that cultural institutions were reactive to the political circumstances they 
found themselves in.  As we have seen, from the late 1990’s onwards, some notable changes 
took place within the wider figuration of New Labour policy that impacted the British film 
industry, making the whole system of its governance and organisation more complex, and 
increasingly outside of the realms of control by any single governing body. The most notable 
developments included the increasing focus on film development and the new commercial 
influences in British film, for example, the emergence of BBC Films, Film Four, and the 
establishment of the UK Film Council. 
 
Art and culture in general became a subject of political interest for New Labour, suggested by a 
number of developments on a national scale, and these influenced policy objectives across most 
national governing bodies of art, media and popular culture. Following the 1997 election victory, 
the New Labour government’s first Culture Secretary Chris Smith announced the project under 
the name of ‘re-branding UK’, to transform its national image from the national heritage culture 
to ‘cool Britannia’, which was intended to represent Britain’s creative industries. Theatre arts, 
fashion, design, music, and films; all of which could be co-opted to constitute the main body of 
the UK’s creative re-branding.  
Film policy was one of the areas in which New Labour intervened rapidly and decisively when it 
came into government. New Labour’s economic and cultural arguments became manifest in a 
certain dualism in film policy, whereby the government tended to support film via a rationale 
associated with trade policy – protection and subsidy – and partly by forms of patronage 
associated with cultural capital via policy. Both sets of concerns were executed in relationship to 
the nation, considered as a political entity. Discussions of film policy, past and present, revolved 
around three main themes; that Hollywood dominated the market, that the film trade has 
distinctive economic features, and that the film trade has distinctive cultural characteristics 
(Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 420).	  
From 1997, New Labour followed the trajectory taken by the Major government by keeping film 
within the DNH though renaming this the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). 
Support for film production was increased via tax relief and the National Lottery. In addition, a 
policy review group was appointed and its first publication, A Bigger Picture, marked a further 
amalgamation of culture and commerce through the proposal to create a single, unified body to 
administer all aspects of British film. The emergence of the UK Film Council (UKFC) signalled 
the intentions of the British government to not only emphasise access based around equality for 
all, but to apply neo-liberal, market principles to film production and culture in general. British 
film development from the late 1990’s was influenced by this trend to a considerable extent. 
Within its first 100 days of the new administration, New Labour had appointed the first Minister 
for Film, permitted Channel Four to spend more on film making and introduced a hundred per 
cent tax rebate scheme for production (Murphy, 2000: 43).	  This focus on film industry 
modernisation was in relation to the government’s broader industrial policy. The concerted shift 
towards a more export orientated film industry demonstrated the privileging of large entities that 
compete against each other under the international market.	  	  
In cinema, this resulted in a populist, large budget approach, as opposed to a low budget film 
culture articulated around contemporary social issues (Murphy, 2000: 46). However, Chris 
Smith’s successor, Tessa Jowell, would later criticise this approach, envisioning a much more 
moderated culturally orientated strategy in an essay titled Government and the Value of Culture, 
published in 2004. Here, she defended arts funding on much more cultural grounds: 
“public subsidy produces what the market may 
not sustain – it is almost a bulwark against 
globalised commercialism that might not be 
sensitive or responsive to local and national 
cultural expression” (Jowell, 2004:5) 
	  
A key new development emerged as a result of National Lottery resources being made available 
to arts activities in the mid-1990s. At its advent, this funding was managed by Regional Arts 
Associations across the UK, and this included large awards to groups of film producers 
organised in franchises in England. However, as this model of funding attracted industry 
criticism, a number of government-led working groups were convened and submitted their 
recommendations for a new, centralised system of funding for British film. The New Labour 
government announced its intention of doubling the share of UK box office for British films. In 
July 1997, the New Labour Government created a new tax relief, a 100% first- year write-off for 
the production of all films costing £15m or less. The effects of this tax relief took some time to 
be implemented but eventually proved to have a very significant impact on levels of domestic 
production (Nelmes, 2007:79). The New Labour government began a holistic reconstruction of 
the film funding structure, actioned under the umbrella of a new institution. In July 1998, the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) announced its intention to establish the Film 
Council. What was being proposed was a UK wide body with the chief purpose of ensuring 
public funds were strategically invested in British film. The UKFC assumed control of the work 
carried out previously by British Screen Finance, the British Film Commission (BFC), the 
National Lottery Film Department of the Arts Council of England and the English regional arts 
associations. (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005:422). 
At the time, there was a strong possibility that the BFI would lose its independence and become 
absorbed in the new structure, but its charitable status, royal charter and public membership 
framework allowed the BFI to retain a degree of autonomy, although the majority of its public 
funding would come through the UKFC which acquired control over its board - level 
appointments. In addition, the UKFC exercised its supervisory powers by relieving the BFI of 
two key functions that would later prove fatal to the continuation of an authentic, British social 
realist film culture; support and funding for experimental film production and the responsiblility 
for non-commercial and non-mainstream regional film exhibition (Dickenson & Harvey, 2005: 
422). The UKFC had two overarching aims: 
• To develop a sustainable UK film industry  
• To develop film culture in the UK by improving access to, and education about the moving 
image. 
Following the appointment of film director Alan Parker CBE as its Chairman, the Film Council 
was established on 2 May 2000. Towards a Sustainable UK Film Industry’, the manifesto 
released at its launch, was the first public statement of the Film Council’s industrial, financial 
and cultural aims and initial funding programme frameworks. The New Labour Government set 
13 goals for the UKFC, which were to: 
• Provide leadership and guidance for the industry 
• Act as an interface between the industry, its representative bodies and the DCMS 
• Promote film activity in the nations and regions and ensure that national and regional 
bodies work in concert to contribute towards the UKFC’s goals 
• Improve education about the moving image 
•  Extend and improve access to film culture and film heritage, serving the diverse 
geographical needs of the UK’s nations and regions, and recognising the differing needs 
of rural, suburban and metropolitan locations 
• Support innovative film-making, to develop film culture and encourage creative excellence 
and nurture new talent 
• Support and encourage cultural diversity and social inclusiveness 
• Help maximise inward investment 
• Help maximise exports 
• Attract more private finance into film in order to catalyse the emergence of new structures 
•  Improve the quality of British films and ensure they receive appropriate exposure 
• Promote and encourage use of digital technology  
• Help ensure an adequate supply of skills and new talent.(Film Council, 2000:10). 
The UKFC thus took ownership of almost all aspects of publicly funded film production, 
distribution and exhibition, establishing a variety of national production funds and programmes 
to assist in the development, production, distribution and exhibition of films. The sense of a 
cultural framework for film in England was effectively diminished, and replaced by the very 
different imperatives of an essentially industrial and economic strategy. Further, the cost of 
administering this new public policy for film increased dramatically. This new regime was 
managed by nine Regional Screen Agencies (RSA): Screen East (East of England), EM Media 
(East Midlands), Film London (Greater London), Northern Film and Media (North East 
England), Vision+Media (North West England), Screen South (South East England), South West 
Screen (South West England), Screen West Midlands (West Midlands) and Screen Yorkshire 
(Yorkshire and Humberside). 
These RSAs were established and funded by the UKFC in economic partnership with larger 
regional development agencies (RDAs). Significantly, like the UKFC, these screen agencies 
were created as private companies, operating principally with public revenue but with a very 
limited public accountability. The policy priority for the agencies, under pressure from the 
commercially orientated RDAs, was to enhance business and employment opportunities and 
inward investment and as a consequence, the socio- cultural dimension of work produced, 
incompatible with a holistically commercial framework, was significantly marginalised. Further, 
there was the tendency to see the American - dominated commercial sector as the horizon of 
significance. Thus, the priorities of the RSAs moved public policy away from socio-cultural 
criteria and towards an exclusively market based form of commissioning, production, 
distribution and evaluation (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 423).	  
National Lottery money became the major source of funding for film, distributed by the UKFC, 
which had three key funds with the objective of developing writing, directing and producing for 
film: the New Cinema Fund, the Premiere Fund and the Development Fund: 
 
• The Development Fund aimed to raise the quality of UK screenplays through development 
and support initiatives. The fund supported single development projects, slate funding deals 
with companies who have successfully responded to open tenders for business and creative 
proposals, and the 25 words or less scheme, which offers 12 writers each year a fixed sum of 
£10,000 to develop a first draft script in a specific genre. The annual budget for the fund was 
5 Million (Murphy, 2010:25). 
 
• The New Cinema Fund aimed to finance films that could potentially appeal to a broad range 
of audiences. The fund supported feature films from script stage; pilots; shorts; feature-length 
documentaries. In addition, the fund provided completion and promotion money for feature 
films and Warp X, the low-budget feature film scheme. 5 Million pounds was allocated for 
this (Murphy, 2010:25). 
 
• The Premiere Fund, with an annual budget of 10 Million pounds, assumed a creative and 
business role in the production of feature film, from the development of projects to marketing 
and distribution across the world. The fund aimed to invest in popular, commercially viable 
feature films. It objective was to play a pivotal role in assisting the development of 
sustainable British film businesses capable of long-term growth. The fund was particularly 
committed to establishing strategic involvement in talent-driven projects from European 
producers (Murphy, 2010:25). 
 
In addition, The Film Training Fund with a budget of £1 million a year was created to support 
training for scriptwriters and development executives, and separately to train business 
executives, producers and distributors. According to the Film Council, the main groups excluded 
from the British film industry were ethnic minorities and those from lower social classes, with 
the combination of these features, i.e. ethnic minority adults and youths, presenting their biggest 
challenge and also their largest target group for increasing film participation. It is argued here, 
however, that to understand the issue in these terms was of only limited use. It presents the issue 
in a very monolithic way and also supports dichotomous systems of thinking by conceptualising 
the problem in terms of white vs. ethnic minorities, as opposed to middle-class vs. working-class.  
 
 
Culture Versus Commercialism: BBC Films and FilmFour 
 
For us to understand exactly how New Labour ideology insinuated itself into British cinema, we 
must now investigate the output from the two national institutions responsible for film 
production in the UK; BBC Films and Channel 4’s FilmFour. Firstly, we must examine the 
genesis of these institutions relationship with government, as the relationship’s capacity to 
influence the industrial and regulatory context in which the BBC in particular must operate is 
critical to understanding the neoliberal frameworks that shaped British film from this period. 
 
At this point, we must consider the political character of the BBC and its constitutional status. 
The BBC’s very existence has relied from its advent on a Royal Charter, renewed every ten years 
and subject to parliamentary review of its performance. The Charter specifies the BBC’s 
objectives, functions and financial operations. Further, the BBC is a public corporation overseen 
by a board of governors who operate as trustees to ensure the safeguarding of the broadcasting 
service in the public interest. Crucially, the board of governors are appointed on the 
recommendation of the government. Thus, the renewal of the Charter, the make up of the board 
of governors and its very financing are dependent on the State, demonstrated by the regulating of 
the level of licence fee and any additional income generating activities, all subject to State 
approval (Born, 2005:32). 
 
There were a number of crucial factors that ushered in neoliberal market principles in the BBC. 
The most important motivational force was the action of the government in the late 1980’s in an 
attempt to introduce more competition and ‘deregulation’ into the economy. As far as British 
broadcasting was concerned, the main policy changes were the removal of certain restrictions on 
ownership, the loosening of some of the rules governing the output of commercial television 
stations and moves towards the commercialisation of terrestrial television. The Conservative 
government’s attention had turned to breaking the duopoly of the BBC and ITV, in an effort to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs. To force this efficiency, the government reduced the BBC’s 
finances, granting a much smaller increase to the license fee than the BBC had expected and 
indexing the license fee to general inflation, a lower rate than inflation within broadcasting. This 
was further compounded by starting this indexation from a lower baseline than the BBC had 
requested. The result was by the early 1990’s there was a significant fall in the real income of the 
BBC (Born, 2005:50). 
 
In addition, the Peacock Report, commissioned by the Tories in 1987 had at the time resisted 
Thatcher’s desire to fully commercialise the BBC. However, some of its key findings became the 
foundation of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which would serve to apply these Thatcherite desires 
into both Channel 4 and the BBC, albeit indirectly. The report recommended that licences for the 
ITV regions such as Thames, Yorkshire, Granada and London Weekend Television (LWT) 
should be awarded on the basis of competitive bids in an auction rather than being allocated on 
the basis of the quality of the proposed services. Applicants had to bid a sum to the Treasury for 
what they deemed the franchise contract was worth each year in a ‘blind auction’, with the 
winner determined by the applicant who bid the highest value. This led to fears that applicants 
would bankrupt themselves, or offer cheaper programming so as to be able to finance the bids. 
To introduce competition in advertising, Channel 4 should sell their own advertising, and to 
stimulate competition between broadcasters, the BBC and ITV should buy at least 40% of their 
programing from independent production companies.  
 
The modus operandi of the Conservative government in relation to the BBC was demanding 
efficiency in the use of public revenue, but as a result of the escalating costs and a plateaued 
license fee revenue, there was a need for the BBC to increase  the volume of programming but 
committing fewer financial resources to production. These external factors and the BBC's own 
resource audit in July 1991 indicated that the BBC's critical mass exceeded its production need – 
remaining over-resourced was no longer a viable option for the BBC (Born: 2005, 70). In 
addition, new commercial radio, cable, and Rupert Murdoch’s’ satellite television entrants took 
an increased audience share from the terrestrial channels. This placed financial pressure on the 
existing broadcasting companies to re-assess their expenditure. In particular, LWT head Greg 
Dyke had discovered that, like the BBC, they had no idea of the monetary cost of running 
individual departments. Thus, each part of the business was to be operated as a profit-centre in its 
own right.  
 
It was essentially these principles that New Director General John Birt established at the BBC. In 
response, Birt introduced a controversial internal market system called Producer Choice. The 
idea behind Producer Choice was that each part of the BBC would be run as a profit-and-loss 
operation. Programme producers requiring external broadcast units would be responsible for 
purchasing them from their own allocated budget, to be obtained either from the BBC or from 
the commercial sector. BBC Producer Choice was officially launched at the end of 1991 as a 
"new way of managing resources" (Born: 2005:73).  At the launch, Birt explained that under 
Producer Choice, BBC resources would be managed so that producers would have the right to 
negotiate resource provision themselves, spending both internally or externally. In situations 
where the money was denied to any internal resource as a result of these negotiations, the 
internal department would fail to break even on its targets or resource utilization. Further, if the 
situation could not be remedied within a year, department closures and redundancies would 
follow. As the Tories were unable to privatize the BBC, Producer Choice represented the closest 
ideological step to this, by establishing a 'market' inside the BBC (Born: 2005:73). It was the 
fruition of the cultural revolution that had been threatening the BBC from Margaret Thatcher in 
the 1980’s, embracing internal market principles as part of a quid pro quo exchange for the 
alleviating of political pressure.  
 
However, Producer Choice was regarded by many inside and outside the BBC as an ambiguous 
measure that created the apparatus and the preconditions for privatising parts of the BBC should 
it prove to be politically opportune. As the 40% independent quota began during the 1990’s, 
government policy analysts proposed in the name of efficiency and clarity to fragment the BBC 
into its component parts so that they could trade transparently with each other and in the 
international markets. In this context, Birt’s restructuring transformed the BBC in the “image of 
the neo-liberal recommendations” (Born, 2005: 133) and by the late 1990’s the group effect of 
these developments was to install a culture of undiluted entrepreneurialism throughout the BBC, 
manifest in all areas of its operations, from its programming to its film policy.  
However, commercialism was not holistically governed by economic imperatives. It rooted itself 
in the collective consciousness of those working for the BBC.  In the early 1990’s they created a 
number of external taskforces. One was titled ‘BBC The Entrepreneur’. Its report reveals the 
political expediency behind the wholesale adoption of the vernacular of entrepreneurialism; 
 
Beyond the needs of the consumer, there is a need  
to run with the political tide. Entrepreneurialism was  
a requirement of the 1980’s and will still have an important  
part to play in the public sector in the 1990’s (Born, 2005:52). 
	  
As a result of their continuation of Thatcherism, New Labour found it difficult to articulate any 
positive image of the public sector. When it espoused values of community and social 
responsibility, New Labour conceived public institutions only as a simple variant of business. In 
this context, when the public sector acts it must function as if it were a business or in partnership 
with business; and if it is not working, the remedy is to subject it to the disciplines of private 
management and the market (Born, 2005: 8). Such developments and the increasing emphasis on 
competition and efficiency must be considered in relation to the wider politics of New Labour’s 
neo liberalism. While advocating the public service broadcasting model, because of the 
vicissitudes created by the coexistence of a globally successful public media giant alongside 
powerful private media interests, New Labour’s Culture Minister Chris Smith was driven 
constantly to interject in the operations of the BBC. His interventions seemed motivated by the 
principle that the BBC must be moderated to allow space for the private sector to expand its 
profitability, with concerns over competition taking priority over the continuing viability of the 
BBC. In effect, the New Labour government was attempting to cultivate a ‘public media model 
that would transcend the prevailing neoliberal discourse’ (Born, 2005:10). During the nineties, 
with the reducing real value of the license fee and pressure by the government, the BBC 
developed its commercial activities with the objective of augmenting its income, now operating 
as a mixed economy of public service and commercialism.  
 
In the early to mid 1990’s the BBC Drama group was an enormous, multi-sectioned department 
spanning the most popular BBC Drama, with an annual budget of 200 million (Vir, P:2012). The 
group consisted of four London based departments; Serials, Single Plays, Series and the Films 
Unit. For the BBC, the political message being telegraphed from New Labour was that it was 
required to become more commercial and international in its approach. In response, co-
production and co-financing deals rapidly became established as standard practice, with 
individual departments now able to negotiate with international broadcasters for co-production 
finance. As costume dramas and heritage films attracted more co-production money, this 
growing reliance on the co-production model eroded both the British identity of drama, and more 
crucially, writer/producer autonomy and the capacity for risk taking.  
	  
It was specifically in the Single Drama (Singles) department that the risk adverse editorial 
tendencies were most manifest. With the effect of reduced staff and financial restrictions, Singles 
faced intense pressure to justify this strand of drama and ensure its commercial viability. The 
response to this pressure was to re-establish itself in theatrical film. Following government 
initiatives to expand and commercialise the industry, British film was primed for expansion in 
the late 90’s. BBC Films began to co-produce between five and ten features a year, and by the 
end of the 90’s Singles had absorbed the film industry’s orthodoxy, rising budgets, theatrical 
releases and distribution (Born, 2005:355). This was largely influenced by the success of 
Channel 4’s recently established FilmFour Productions, which in effect took the channel’s 
feature film arm, Film on Four, away from the mainstream of the channel, becoming a stand 
alone business. 
 
Channel 4 was launched in 1982 as a national broadcasting service. Although it was funded 
entirely from commercial revenue, the channel was not simply committed to public service 
broadcasting in abstract principle; it was required under the 1981 and 1990 Broadcasting Act to 
cater for the tastes and interests of audiences not served by ITV or the BBC, to demonstrate 
innovation in the form and content of its programming and to dedicate a proportion of their 
airtime to educational programmes (Channel Four, 1994: 3) 
Unlike other existing television channels that created most of their programming in- house with 
their own staff and facilities, Channel 4 was mandated from its inception not to produce its own 
programmes. Instead, Channel 4 was specifically required to acquire its programming from 
external sources, with a substantial proportion from independent producers, through a then 
pioneering process of commissioning. This commissioning structure allowed even the smallest 
production companies the opportunity to win a major commission, provided the channel both 
wanted the idea and had confidence in the producer and his or her practitioners to deliver it. 
Further, the independent production companies did not need vast resources to prepare the project 
prior to its commissioning; neither was there a requirement for resources for deficit financing as 
in television industries (where the producer can only recover cost and make a profit with 
subsidiary sales) (Channel Four, 1994: 4). Specifically, the reliance on the independent 
production sector also encouraged Channel 4 to pioneer a new hybrid link between television and 
film, so that the channel could support feature films that could be seen via theatrical release first, 
gaining both kudos and financial return before their terrestrial premiere on the channel’s Film on 
Four slot. 
Film on Four was a feature film slot based mainly on co-productions, created by Jeremy Isaacs 
at Channel 4’s advent and run by David Rose, who occupied the role of Head of Fiction. This 
represented the continuation of his work at the BBC. Under Rose, a climate emerged that was 
increasingly conducive to the production of films critical of Thatcherism (Hobson, 2007:37). 
Notably, he had created the space for socio-political drama in producing the BBC’s Play for 
Today, which became a training ground for directors such as Mike Leigh and Ken Loach. Film 
on Four films were both a reflection of and in opposition to the prevailing culture. Films like My 
Beautiful Launderette, High Hopes (Leigh, 1985) and Letter to Brezhnev (Bernard, 1985) can be 
defined as anti-Thatcherite films that were critical of the way in which society was moving.  
Film on Four commissioned about 15 films per year, many of them with co-finance from other 
partners and some fully funded by the channel, with the average budget of about £2 million, and 
the channel’s contributions at 40%.	  	  
The Independent Film and Video Unit, run by its Commissioning Editor Alan Fountain and later 
Stuart Cosgrove, was a unique department within Channel 4 and had a long an admirable track 
record commissioning a wide range of documentaries and low budget dramas. The important 
emphasis was on the word independent. The department encouraged programme makers and 
filmmakers who worked within an independent cultural tradition, through political conviction 
and cultural difference. In particular, flagship programmes like War Cries became a strand for 
social and polemical films.  Beyond this strand, they were able to dedicate a small amount of 
money towards independent feature films, with the vast majority of the departments allocation 
for films with cinematic release spent in co-production with the BFI, with the produced films 
also gaining terrestrial premiers on Film on Four (Channel Four, 1994: 4). 
Film on Four’s focus was on feature films designed for theatrical release, although they also 
commissioned television films. What was significant at this time was that, in keeping with their 
remit, they aimed to ‘provide a clear contrast with ITV, the BBC and the American 
Studios’(Channel Four, 1994:4). Further, they were explicitly clear that they were not interested 
in commissioning ‘stories about the Second World War and costume drama – usually because 
they are too expensive’ (Channel Four, 1994: 4). However, on arrival at the channel in 1987 
replacing Isaacs, Michael Grade was sceptical of Film on Four, believing it did less for the 
channel and simply contributed to nurturing the ailing British film industry. Further, he 
considering film as vanity publishing through expediency, there to make the channel look good 
rather than boost ratings. He observed for instance, that My Beautiful Laundrette, though a 
tremendous hit, did not get a terrestrial screening until early 1987 and returned a disappointing 
£4,000 from US distribution deals (Brown, 2007:189). In addition, figures showed that audiences 
for film on Channel 4 had halved between 1987 and 1991.	  	   
Michael Grade’s arrival marked the beginning of a change in ideology within Film on Four, 
manifest in the appointment of David Aukin, who joined the channel as Head of Drama in 
Autumn 1990, following four years as the Executive Director of the Royal National Theatre. 
This drama department was responsible for films and single plays, serials and series. However, 
he also became the Commissioning Editor for Film on Four. In 1993, three of these films, The 
Crying Game, (Neil Jordan, 1992) Howards End (James Ivory 1992) and Damage (Louis Malle, 
1992) between them won an unprecedented number of Academy Award nominations, three 
Oscars and three awards at Cannes Film Festival. And in 1994, Four Weddings and a Funeral 
(Mike Newell, 1994) became the most commercially successful British film ever. 
From its inception until the end of 1992, Channel 4 was operated by the Channel Four Television 
Company Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
and its successor, the Independent Television Commission (ITC). The channel was funded by a 
subscription levied on the ITV companies, amounting to 13.6% of the previous year’s 
advertising revenue on both commercial terrestrial channels. As a quid pro quo exchange for this 
subscription, the ITV companies had the right to sell airtime on Channel 4 in their own franchise 
areas (Channel Four, 1994:6). When Channel 4 was instructed to sell its own airtime under the 
1990 Broadcasting Act, a very limited safety net was constructed to meet fears that it would not 
be able to attract enough commercial revenue while also fulfilling its distinct public service remit 
(Channel Four, 1994:6). Channel 4 launched a campaign against the funding formula of this Act, 
as the believed the safety net was a redundant insurance policy. The funding formula provided 
that in the hypothetical situation that the channel attracted less than 14% of total terrestrial 
advertising and sponsorship revenue, the first call would be upon the channel’s own reserves, but 
if they were exhausted, the ITV companies would be required to make up any shortfall to the 
maximum of 2% of the total revenue figure (Channel Four, 1994:6) During 1996, Channel 4 
faced the new threat of being privatised by the Conservative government. We must again 
consider the political economy that Chanel 4 existed in; triggered by the 1990 Broadcasting Act, 
the channel became a statutory corporation, in effect owned by the Treasury (Brown, 2007:193). 
Thus, the Government had dismissed Channel 4’s objections to privatisation because the 
payments Channel 4 made to ITV would ensure that ITV would provide a limited guarantee in 
the event that the channel’s advertising revenue reduced.  
 
In the wake of John Major’s implementation of policies to keep the British film industry afloat, 
we must now investigate further how the New Labour government managed the “continuing 
American dominance of the British market” (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 424).	  On 3 July 
1996, Michael Grade wrote directly to Tony Blair, then leader of the Labour opposition, 
declaring his opposition to the privatisation of the channel, emphasising the potential danger of 
being taken over by both European and wider international broadcasters with the introduction of 
new digital services, notably Rupert Murdoch (Brown, 2007: 200). It is notable that since that 
point, three Labour manifestos have included a commitment not to privatise Channel 4 during 
the life of that government (Brown: 2007: 201).	  
 
The cultivating of a relationship between New Labour and Channel 4 would come to fruition just 
weeks after Labour’s landslide victory on 1st May 1997.  In the following negotiations between 
Chris Smith and the Independent Television Commission (ITC) Smith had stated that the 
channel’s programme remit could not be guaranteed under any future shareholder structure. 
However, removing the payment agreements between the channel and ITV would create extra 
resources to enable Channel 4 to be much more competitive in the market. This moderated form 
of neoliberal deregulation was one of the key points in Chris Smith’s negotiations with the ITC, 
stating that in return for dismantling the channel’s financial cushioning from ITV and fully 
exploiting its advertising potential, the channel must demonstrate a major commitment to the 
British film industry, giving preference to innovative, commercially viable projects, and further 
exploiting the international market. This shift was further compounded by Michael Grade’s 
comments in 1997, when he argued that the public service remit that the channel had subscribed 
to from its advent was out-dated and that in effect, neoliberal commercialism “could be 
synonymous with the innovation central to the channels remit” (Born, 2005: 483). This rested on 
the New Labour Third Way ideology that a commitment to public services could be achieved 
within capitalism. The continuation of this - started by Chris Smith - was to bring neoliberalism 
into the heart of the channel. Within Channel 4, this was the New Labour project and its purpose. 
This change in the channel’s identity was driven not just by social change, but by New Labour 
politicians, brought about by a structural change in its economy.	  
On May 2nd 1997, Michael Jackson joined Channel 4 as Chief Executive, leaving the BBC. He 
began dismantling the existing staff structure at the channel, bringing with him a number of 
commissioning executives from the BBC. This marked the beginning of a holistic shift in the 
entire ideology of the channel, moving further away from the core principles of its original remit 
and the personnel who implemented them. Long serving commissioners such as Farrukh 
Dhondy, Head of Multicultural Programing, were replaced by BBC staff like Jasmine Anwar 
(Brown, 2007: 214). New Labour were also eager to appoint their own people in key positions at 
Channel 4. Vanni Treves, a city lawyer, was headhunted for the role of Channel 4 Chairman on 
the premise that Chris Smith was looking for people without specific experience in the media but 
experience in corporate governance, running difficult organisations in the law firms and 
industrial companies (Brown: 2007:217). 
 
Channel 4 were under explicit directions to expand by New Labour to tally with the neo-liberal 
discourse. The government had made a surge towards digital television the key point in its media 
policy and expected the channel to conform. The question was now what content could fill the 
new digital channels. Jackson had identified Film on Four as one of its potentially strongest 
products, so Jackson reviewed the scheme for a subscription FilmFour channel within weeks of 
his appointment. The objective was to reach as big an audience as possible and maximise the 
number of subscribers. In a joint venture, FilmFour Productions, the film - making arm of the 
channel - was established as a separate company, FilmFour Limited, in May 1998. The 
subscription rate was set at £5.99 a month. By Christmas 2009 it had 250,000 subscribers.	  	   
	  
The chief aim of the newly branded FilmFour was to make fewer but bigger budgeted films, 
doubling the investment and attracting international co-production, with a commitment to 
achieving commercial success in America. Chris Smith demanded that the “smaller, small 
budgeted UK films had to be perfect to succeed” (Brown, 2007: 237). What was meant by 
‘perfect’ was transposing a specific, cultivated image of Britain, and shifting away from the 
polemical films that had characterised Film on Four in the previous decade. Ultimately, a film 
will reflect the subjective interests of the people that commission them. Channel 4, especially 
Film on Four, had previously adhered to a specific ideology coupling left wing commissioners 
with practitioners of radical opinion. By this stage however, most of these commissioners had 
left or been replaced by a wave of BBC staff, and a whole new approach to commissioning took 
place. Paul Webster was recruited from Miramax to replace David Aukin as Chief Executive. 
Having previously been a producer at Working Title, where he headed their Los Angles office, 
the emphasis was on films with high production values and a crossover appeal that could attract 
both American co- production finance and distribution.  
The New Labour government were much clearer about the economic goals of film policy than 
the film’s cultural virtues. Chris Smith highlighted the role of these industries as a growing part 
of the economy, noting that these combined sectors generated revenues of nearly £60 billion a 
year, contributed to 4% of the domestic economy and employed over one million people. This he 
argued, with an internationalised market strategy, could create numerous opportunities for 






The New Labour Ideology Within British Cinema  
 
Within the New Labour/UKFC nexus, projecting the nation through cinema became much more 
persuasive in this period through the value of cultural specifity. It is in this broader context that 
cinema was seen by New Labour to make a contribution to the public sphere, where difference of 
experience and could be amalgamated. However, it is argued here that the execution of this 
objective was administered by film company executives whose concerns were not indexed with 
the national audience (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 420). 
By 1999 the British film industry was now swollen with funding by the £17 million annual 
National Lottery contribution to the UKFC. The modus operandi of the three main sources of 
funding – Film Four, the BBC, and the UKFC’s Premiere Production fund, were in tandem with 
the mandate for New Labour’s Britain – the funding of substantially profitable films with high 
budgets, completely against the grain of social realism (Murphy, 2009: 21). If we can define a 
British film as a film entirely shot and funded in Britain and in the main produced for British 
consumption, the BBC, FilmFour and the UKFC were not necessarily interested in British 
cinema per se. As funded by the government, they were obliged to produce an essentially 
Americanised version of film that conformed to the interests of both their paymasters and their 
potential American co-production targets. Screenplays were required to attract both US and UK 
financing and star casting, with a narrative structure to tally with the doctrines of American script 
gurus like Robert McKee, Syd Field and Linda Serger (Murphy 2009: 24). However, in 2002 
FilmFour folded after just four years in operation with losses of £3m in 2000 and £5.4m in 2001. 
These may have appeared to be minimal amounts in Hollywood terms but it represented a 
substantial enough loss for the Channel 4 board to close it down; it had cost £20 million to start 
and by 2002 had lost a total of £14.8 million (Brown: 2007, 236). 
 
Blairism invoked a classless society operating, paradoxically enough, through the hegemony of 
middle class values. In this context, working class identity re-emerges in only a small number of 
films from this period, when also considering that this was a period when domestic production 
figures were particularly high in comparison to the 1970’s (Kirk, 2009: 19). The films in the 90s 
showed two tendencies; the gender anxiety of male characters and the New Labour Third Way 
politics of rebranding the UK (Murphy: 2000: 278). This created the trend of the combination of 
youth drug culture and pop music within film and is followed by films such as Twin Town 
(Kevin Allen, 1997), The Acid House (Paul McGuigan, 1998) and Human Traffic (Justin 
Kerrigan, 1999). However, The Full Monty’s (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) cheerfulness and comical 
characters also gathered audiences to Billy Elliot (Stephen Daldry, 2000), another feel-good story 
from north England’s disintegrating mining towns. Billy Elliot, Brassed Off (Mark Herman, 
1996), and The Full Monty are three prime example of projecting this new national image that 
the New Labour government implemented. These three films share the admiration of the 
bourgeois creative industry, integrating the elements of a London-centric industry into the story 
of unemployed, hopeless, traditional (linked to heavy industry) working-class people. The 
subject matter of social realism was absorbed and transformed into a cultural commodity within 
a global capitalist market. Further, it found diversity in its identity through devolution, which 
made the hegemonic term ‘British cinema’ no longer cohesive (Kirk, 2009: 197). 
 
In Billy Elliot, we can associate the interest in escape and individualism with the New Labour 
project of the formation of the bourgeois subject. In Billy Elliot it is the responsibility of the 
individual to require the knowledge and skills that his liberation requires. From this perspective, 
middle class values are esteemed, and his working class existence, presented in the form of his 
unstable family against the backdrop of the Great Miners Strike is simply relegated to a 
dysfunctional distraction from the man aim. This is indicative of the New Labour emphasis upon 
individualism and de-traditionalism, as well as the rupture with conceptualisations of collective 
class-based cultures. Notably, it’s the young working class individual who occupies the central 
focus of this working class narrative of refashioning. Billy is the exceptional individual amongst 
the working class heathen who can only express himself outside the stifling confines of his 
enclosed working class community. What is expressed in the film is that working class is not a 
culture that is fertile and can nurture, and the good, desirable, true life must surely lay elsewhere. 
It recodes the escaper paradigm to suit postmodern times, to convey the New Labour message of 
meritocracy as the films overriding ideological point of view.  
 
Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996) clearly captured the zeitgeist, the fantasy of a passable class 
barrier. The wish to escape ones class is linked to an obsession with aesthetics, lifestyle, and 
more generally with social and surfaces such as clothing and lifestyle, clearly portrayed through 
the mise en scene of this film. Trainspotting ended up, unwilling to provide an all embracing 
critique of the system in place, reducing the political to a mere personal problem, and then even 
further to a simple moral dilemma. The protagonist’s immoral acts were more clearly defined in 
the film than the actual politics of the society, absolving the audience of socio-political enquiry.  
However, director Danny Boyle explains that while there was no political alignment to the film, 
he was still attempting to bring forward a form of social enquiry. 
Social Realism is a very loose term. Trainspotting can  
still be considered in those terms but its subjective. You  
could have got Ken Loach, Mike Leigh, they all  
could give you a different treatment of Irvine’s story.  
But with their films they are looking into a working  
class experience. I already know it, I’ve lived it. I’m  
trying to get out of it. And it’s through hedonism,  
drugs, sex, alcohol, that’s how people often try to get  
out of it (Danny Boyle, 2011). 
 
Heavily influenced by the incoming post-welfare New Labour, The Full Monty came to 
epitomise the new feel-good, entertaining conception of social realism. The Full Monty was 
produced for £3.5 million and made £51 million in the UK and $48.8 million in USA. In an 
effort to generate money, unemployed steel worker Gaz (Robert Carlyle) rounds up a group of 
men from an unemployment club to transform them into a male stripping group, despite their 
lack of talent, experience or an absence of the physical features required for such work. Unlike 
Brassed Off , a similar comedy themed film about the decline of British industry and its effect on 
a working class community (with a much more sincere treatment of the issue) The Full Monty 
possesses no such political subtext. The film suggests that it’s self-respect that is absent from the 
men’s lives. The white male working class was shown to have diverted their hope from regaining 
political and economic power to restoring themselves and their communities thorough a kind of 
homosocial cohesion, manifested in the performing arts (Kirk, 2009: 199). Further, John Hill 
adds that; 
 
The film may be seen to hold out the possibility of overcoming the 
crisis of masculinity, less by a re-learning of male roles than by 
the re-establishment of the bonds amongst men, particularly those 
associated with traditional male, working class culture‟ (Hill 2000: 185). 
 
The phenomenal transatlantic Box Office success of The Full Monty and Trainspotting was 
partly a result of co-productions with powerful U.S. distributors such as 20 Century Fox and 
Miramax and the massive budget on marketing emphasising them as comedies and stylish youth 
films. Specifically, Trainspotting is an excellent example of collaborating with contemporary 
British pop music, which, in 1990s, was called ‘Britpop’ and gained a worldwide reputation. 
Significantly, these three films employ the use of British pop music (although The Full Monty 
uses 1980’s music and Billy Elliot has a 1960s retro soundtrack), and ultimately the characters 
achieve their solution to their impoverished life styles by achieving employment within the 
creative industry. In particular, in Trainspotting the central character Renton monopolises the 
cash generated from drug dealing to escape Edinburgh and move to London, Britain’s creative 
capital. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In capitalist society where the security of personal ontology is fragile, 
music generally serves as sites of nostalgia for a more homely place,  
a better place; a utopia‟ (Wayne, 2002: 292). 
 
Political meanings in the specific context in the films are demolished and hidden in the 
globalised international economy. These film’s solution to the crisis is found in the far fetched, 
trivial, unrealistic and unsustainable; male stripping, ballet, brass band participation and 
unadulterated hedonism, and all employ the linear, cause and effect ending. Instead of providing 
a class-consciousness and a political perspective, they provide a narrative of searching for an 
alternative and a utopian way to recover the traditional working-class community and 
masculinity which was dismantled by unemployment in the previous decade, caused by the 
economic shift from industrial manufacturing to the service industry and a reversal of the gender 
role. This representation of the working-class (male) community rather than class politics was 
also connected to the issue of commoditisation of the underclass. Crucially, their unemployment 
or drug culture was pathologised, presented as a subculture, a behavioural product, not a socio-
political issue (Monk, 2000: 278). 
While not possessing any kind of political alignment, Nil by Mouth (Gary Oldman, 1997 
develops a dark tension between the working-class couple and has a quite extreme, violent 
representation of an abusive husband wrestling with his inner demons.  While not a trained 
filmmaker, Gary Oldman’s direct knowledge of the working class provided the authenticity to 
this depiction of the demographic. This was achieved by the film’s unsteady cinematography, 
extreme closes ups and location shooting, all created an immediacy to the film and its themes. 
This extended the boundaries of cinematic realism, and at times distorted the line between 
documentary and a work of fiction (Lay, 2002: 28). 
 
While audiences were exposed to this most extreme depiction of working class brutality in Nil by 
Mouth, the British film industry held a new enthusiasm for social realist films. In 1999 Vanessa 
Thorpe wrote an article for The Guardian, titled Reality Bites (again), heralding the new 
renaissance of British socialist films by young directors operating (with success) in the European 
film festival circuit.  
As every one of the more successful British productions 
shown in Cannes this month has paid deliberate homage  
to the hard-bitten tradition of social realism (Thrope, 1999). 
 
Beside favouring the films of well-established British directors like Ken Loach and Mike Leigh, 
there were a developing number of films gaining acclaim at European film festivals including Nil 
by Mouth, The War Zone (Tim Roth, 1999), Wonderland (Michel Winterbottom, 1999), 
Ratcatcher (Lynne Ramsay, 1999), and the emerging films of Shane Meadows. In addition, the 
documentary-maker Powel Pawlikowski’s feature film Last Resort (2000), a story of a Russian 
woman and her son who come to England to apply for political asylum achieved a reputation as a 
highly aesthetic film, while continuing a realist style through the use of a hand-held camera and 






Changes in Ken Loach’s Approach to Social Realism 
 
The late 1990s saw a further development in the relationship with European film production in 
terms of production and distribution. The co-operative financing of low-budget films became 
more commonplace after the establishment of FilmFour. European funding organisations such as 
Eurimages and MEDIA financed many of the internationally recognised British films such as 
Land and Freedom (Ken Loach, 1995), Secret and Lies (Mike Leigh, 1995), and The Pillow 
Book (Peter Greenaway, 1995) (Cousins, 2000: 174). This establishment of UK-European co-
production, provides another critical dimension to the conceptualising of the decline of social 
realism during the New Labour period, and at this point, we must now return to the work of Ken 
Loach to measure the semantic shift in social realism. It was this European recognition, initially 
through festivals and later through this funding model that permitted not only Loach to re-
emerge, but to find a new audience for his films. His second trilogy, beginning with My Name is 
Joe, marked the continuation of Loach’s collaboration with the screenwriter Paul Laverty, who 
had first worked with Loach on Land and Freedom (1995).  
 
It was a tale about the way life is in Britain’s cities 
today (Kitson 1998: 14). 
 
Joe Kavanagh (Peter Mullan) is an unemployed Glaswegian recovering alcoholic who is 
managing a local football team for unemployed youth in the city, with a particular interest in one 
of the players, Liam, and his wife Sabine and four-year-old son. A social worker from the health 
centre (Sarah) who encounters Joe when she visits Liam and Sabine, becomes involved in 
relationship that leads to becoming pregnant with his child.  However, Joe becomes embroiled in 
a drugs deal in his efforts to extricate Liam from his involvement with the local drugs baron 
McGowan, to whom Liam and drug addicted Sabine owe money (up until this point she had been 
forced into prostitution by McGowan to pay the debt). Sarah finds out about Joe’s criminal 
dealings and brings the relationship to an end. In a desperate bid to resolve the matter, Joe 
attempts to quit the drugs job, has a fight with McGowan and his gang, and having now lost 
Sarah, returns to drink in desperation. In his drunken state he is unable to help the despairing 
Liam who, with no was of evading McGowan’s gang, hangs himself from a window in Joe’s flat 
(Williamson, 1998: 58). 
 
We can interpret My Name is Joe as a key point in Loach’s semantic shift of social realism. 
Consistent with his other films of this decade, Loach casts regional, Glaswegian actors/actress in 
this film as part of the process of establishing authenticity of performance. Authenticity in this 
context can be understood not only their dialect and vernacular, but also in the sense of the life 
experience of the fictional situation that the non-professional actors project onto the screen. 
Loach has articulated the importance of including non-trained actresses to achieve the sense of 
realism. 
 
People like Anne Marie bring their three-dimensional world into the film.  
They are the experts and they tell me how it should be. They become part  
of the film, almost like a documentary, weaving their real lives into the  
story (Kitson 1998: 15). 
 
The personal, lived experiences of these actors (Mullan has a father who was an alcoholic) create 
the ‘parallel between the role and their lives’ (Bazin 1971: 24). Melodramatic elements here, as 
in Ladybird Ladybird, encourage the audience’s sympathy and identification with the characters, 
through the melodramatic tensions created by class difference. But this class difference is also 
what tears them apart. When Sarah discovers Joe’s involvement in the drug business, she brands 
Joe as a ‘drug dealer’, associating Joe with children who have been physically and mentally 
damaged by drugs; her point of view is completely rooted in her role of a social worker, 
specifically in her field and one who tries to protect children from drugs. Her attitude and 
morality about the drug business and its meta-effects are holistically positioned in middle-class 
behavioural values and notions of the drugs trade and its relationship with criminality. 
 
Sweet Sixteen, set in Glasgow, tells the story of 16 year old Liam and his battle to extricate both 
him and his mother from their turbulent life with her abusive, drug dealing boyfriend, via his 
own involvement with the local drugs baron. Loach presents Glasgow as a city suffering from 
economic deterioration and endemic drug problems. Loach explores the relationships of Liam 
with his friend Pinball, his mother Jean, his older sister Chantelle, and the gangster Douglas. 
However, the character (and his problems) seems to exist outside any institutional frameworks. 
There is an absence of social workers, and his non-inclusion in the education system is 
unexplained. What the film does focus on is the isolated situation of a teenage boy with these 
relationships, which effectively shape the choices he has to make. Peter Bradshaw in the Guardian 
points out that:	  
 
Compston’s Liam is heart-rendingly naïve in his assumption that  
once he has got enough drug money, he can abandon the trade and live  
with his mother in a vaguely imagined bucolic bliss in this caravan‟  
(Bradshaw 2002: 16-17). 
 
The New Labour rhetoric of an emancipated British identity lead social realist films into a new 
subject-matter, that of ethnic minorities. Although the British Asian community was already on 
the screen in the 80s, East is East (Damien O’Donnell, 1999) presents a comedy of a mixed 
marriage and their children’s antagonous attitude toward their fathers culture in 70’s England. In 
the same way, Ken Loach tackles a contemporary Romeo-Juliet form of love story Ae Fond Kiss 
(2004), but this time it is not the class difference but the difference of ethnicity that is the 
obstacle (Murphy, 2009: 141). In Ae Fond Kiss, Loach relies on an interracial, cross-cultural 
relationship as its central plot. But in contrast to his pre- New Labour work, Ae Fond Kiss 
concentrates on a religio-cultural division. Casim is attracted to a white music teacher even 
though he is involved in an arranged marriage; has a fiancée. During their Spanish holiday, they 
discuss their opposing religions, but this represents a simple, trivial conversation between lovers, 
and reveals non of the real life concerns posed by cross religio-cultural relationships; there is 
nothing political. It’s a Free World (2007) on the other hand, does hint at a fidelity to a social 
realist tradition with adaptation of this new subject matter; economic migrants and its 
relationship with the capitalist system. Throughout the film the audience witness Loach’s 
accusation on the unjust system of global capitalism that draws its victims into an identical 
hierarchical system of exploitation. 
 
Ken Loach’s quintessential cinematic devices remain intact. He retains a fidelity to the use of an 
observational shooting style, with the camera keeping its distance from the characters or objects, 
while the use of hand-held cinematography contributes a documentary aesthetic to his films. He 
continues with the minimal use of music and non-diegetic sound effects and developing an 
authentic and naturalist film aesthetic to portray the working class, through the employment of 
regional talent and non-professional actors remain central to his stylistic approach. Aesthetically, 
all these factors combine to provide each film in this second trilogy with a distinctive, 
documentary approach.	  	  Further, his constant stance against authoritarianism can be clearly seen 
in his description of social workers and the British police, in Ladybird Ladybird, where they are 
represented as unsympathetic bureaucrats disconnected from the vicissitudes of the working 
class experience.	  
However, while Loach’s naturalistic approach remains, manifest in the mixture of professional 
actors and non-actors, the use of regional vernacular and location shooting in natural light to 
deliver a realistic mise-en-scéne, what is in contrast to the films of the initial trilogy is that Loach 
exposed in his films the vertical relationship between the government and the working class, a 
relationship that deprives them of agency. And within this approach, Loach was willing to be 
indifferent to the box office.	  However, the political conflict within Loach’s second wave of films 
has clearly withered. It is argued that his recent films like Looking For Eric (2010) and The 
Angels Share (2012) are stories that show working class life that is tough but offers no enquiry 
into the state institutions that are constantly making that life arduous for his protagonists. The 
political institutions that shaped his character’s actions are no longer a central feature in the 
narrative. While Ken Loach’s characters have always charted the erosion of the working class, he 
does not sentimentalise the plight of the characters. His characters decisions are not simply just a 
matter of personal morality but forced upon them by the socio economic situation (Kirk, 
2009:182). The working class characters behaviour, good or bad, are simple products of the 
socio-economic situations that they are located in. However, these economic situations, 
previously manifest in the relationship with the characters and the state institutions, is a 
continuing absence in Loach’s films (Hill, 2007: 182).	  We can attribute this to the compromises 
that Loach makes when developing his projects with his production company, Sixteen Films. 
UKFC, the BBC and Film Four, the three main sources of funding for Loach’s films (along with 
his European funding) no longer allow such transgressions as direct class conflict with the state 
institutions in their films. What we experience is a moderated version of political engagement. 	  
Another key factor is also the reliance of Loach on his screenwriters, and it must be stated that 
the scripts penned by Jim Allen “incorporate a higher degree of political argument” (Kirk, 
2009:183). However, the decrease in political alignment manifest in Paul Laverty’s scripts is 
symptomatic of more than just individuals – the shift from Allen to Laverty also represents a 
generatio - political shift, even though Laverty is clearly politically committed to progressive 
causes (Wayne, M: 2012). Loach’s contemporary social realism does not seek to reform any 
particular oppressive political system as such. This social realism stays above the fry of socio-
political and ideological conflict, and hence, can command the guilty applause  (and patronage) 
of the liberal middle class press and film inteligencia. But this approval comes at a cost.  Loach’s 
social realism now promotes the division of political decision-making and its effects on society. 
Filmicly and conceptually, films shift energy and intention away from thinking via visible 
political and institutional frameworks and into the socio-cultural domain in which social 
inequality is defined by delinquent behaviour, cultural abstractions and financial improvidence. 
Ken Loach films drew its power from its association with the political left. His paramount 
concern was not art, but with representation and creating a consciousness. However, he now fails 
to bring his social concerns and his damnation of the government policies that shape the 
oppressive frameworks of the public institution to the centre of his films.  
 
 
New Interpretations of Social Realism 
 
The importance of the depiction of working class characters in British cinema and their 
subsequent depoliticisation during this period provides an indication of what was transpiring 
politically. With the advent of a new era of filmmaking in Britain, the filmic responses to both 
the American film market and New Labour’s political influences became manifest in the 
portrayal of the British in film, negotiated between a depiction based upon an Americanised 
notion of Britishness and working class characters either framed around escapism or 
demonstrating the very worst behaviour of the criminalised British ‘underclass’. Thus, working 
class existence emerges in popular consciousness not with any particular accuracy, specificity of 
detail or political alignment, but through the conceptualisation of a particular strand of 
behaviour. Apparent working class behaviour is so exaggerated that the actual reality of the 
conditions that create this behaviour is either ignored or distorted, but ultimately of no 
paramount concern.  
 
The political ideology that had penetrated the nation was met in film by a notion of working 
class masculinity devoid of potency. The previous cinematic treatment of the proud, upstanding 
working male was replaced by an irresponsible, violent, casually racist, improvident working 
class male, and this became firmly established as a new character in British cinema. In Lock, 
Stock, and Two Smoking Barrels (Guy Ritchie, 1998) Love Honor and Obey (Dominic Anciano, 
1998), Gangster No.1 (Paul McGuigan, 2002) Snatch, (Guy Ritchie, 2000) The Business, (Nick 
Love, 2003) Outlaw (Nick Love, 2007) The Football Factory (Nick Love, 2000) Sexy Beast, 
(Jonathan Glazer, 2000) Rise of the Footsoldier, (Julian Gilbey, 2007) Green Street (Lexi 
Alexander, 2005) and London to Brighton (Paul Andrew Williams, 2006),	  the working class 
male became a violent caricature of working class criminality, relocating the working class in the 
pubs, clubs, football stands and council estates. While these films ask questions about the civic 
activities and roles and relationships between working class individuals, their narratives never 
delve into the deep causes of the issues they raised. The working class is reconfigured within the 
spectacle of middle class entertainment, defining this identity through criminality, eroded 
housing, unemployment, imprudence and negative morality (Monk, C: 2000: 156). 
Though the filmmakers of the 2000s did not holistically ignore the social problems of the day, 
their conceptualisation of working class existence was deeply influenced by wishes of the 
government via the film industry, who did not want the audience to look too deeply into the 
causes of poverty, inequality and criminality, let alone seek a remedy. Contemporary social 
realism is limited to those things that are, at least conceptually, compatible with the hegemonic 
political system. One can depict someone behaving in a certain way. But this leaves us with a 
fairly short scope for potential political debate. Social realism of this period straddled these two 
approaches; it sought to present us with a host of extreme social ills and anti-social behavioural 
choices of the working class and ethic minorities, while leaving the antagonic political systems 
and the systemic structures that usher in these ills intact. It is within the concept and the 
framework of critical concern summarised above that we will now investigate the films of two 
contemporary British filmmakers who’s work, on the surface, appears to represent both working 
class characters and issues; Shane Meadows and Andrea Arnold. It will be revealed how the 
aesthetic style of these films develop while corresponding to the subject of social realism, and 
how these three examples symbolise the depolitisitation of the genre. 
 
 
Case Study: This Is England 
 
This is England (Shane Meadows, 2006) is a semi-autobiographical film based on Meadows’ 
experience during his childhood in the East Midlands. Meadows attempts to create an 
understanding for the racism of his characters. Speaking retrospectively, Meadows explains his 
own involvement with far right politics that formed the basis for the story; 
 
It’s very easy to see what can happen when you’ve got 3 million people  
on the dole and right-wing politicians start doing talks in town halls and  
everyone’s looking for someone to blame. Don’t get me wrong, I didn’t  
sign on the dotted line, but I did sit and listen to these people and was  
thinking: Maybe this is the way. I was being told that people were sneaking  
into the country on boats and were living 50 and 60 in a house. I knew no  
better (Shane Meadows, 2007). 
 
 This Is England is a coming of age story about a young boy (Shaun) who, in a quest for 
acceptance, becomes involved in the far-right activities of a racist gang.	  	  Symbolism is a key 
device employed by Meadows to emphasise the loss off innocence and the sense of belonging 
Shaun is in pursuit of. When Shaun accepts the Union Jack from Combo, he is without realizing 
it also accepting not just the friendship, acceptance and sense of community that the gang offers; 
he is also embracing the principles that Combo represents: the far right politics of the National 
Front and a violent hatred of immigrants. The level of this hatred however, is oblivious to Shaun 
at this stage. 
Meadows claimed that This Is England’s objective was “to repulse people against violence and 
racism‟, attempted by constructing its narrative around Shaun’s point-of-view. However, this 
extracts all critiquing and condemning of the racism of the period. Combo and his racist gang’s 
abuse towards Pakistani boys on the street and the violent robbing and vandalism of a local 
newspaper shop run by another Pakistani immigrant are all represented not as vitriolic racial 
abuse unacceptable in any circumstance or time period, but as a casual rite of passage for their 
new recruit. The true meaning of the racism is concealed by the innocence of Shaun, his 
liberation, his sense of belonging, and his admiration of the older gang members. The scene in 
which Combo racially abuses and violently attacks Milky finally brings both the film and Shaun 
back to reality and the issue of racism; however, considering the conversation between Combo 
and Milky just before the incident regarding Milky’s family, it is an attempt by Meadows to 
create a sense of ambiguity to Combo’s far right politics and racism. In this context, it appears 
his racism comes purely from his psychological complex toward Milky’s stable domestic 
situation, forcing Combo to violently exorcise the demons from his own dysfunctional 
background, almost mitigating his behaviour. However, the speed in which we are taken from 
Combo socialising with Milky, racially abusing him before beating him almost to death, and then 
the instant sense of remorse appears unrealistic and lacking in plausibility.  
The film places itself in 1983 through the employment of media footage of the politics of the 
time. In the opening scenes, iconic footage from the 80’s such as the Rubik cube sensation, 
Margaret Thatcher, and crucially, the Falkland’s War footage, creating the context within which 
the story takes place (the protagonists father is a soldier in the war) These are edited in sync with 
The Smith’s "Please, Please, Please, Let Me Get What I Want". This marrying of visual and 
audio stimuli is used to transport the audience back to the early 80’s, contributing to the nostalgia 
of the mis-en scene. There does exist an alignment between Meadow’s filmmaking aesthetics 
and classic social realist traditions. However, his use of historical film footage to provide a sense 
of place and time, the deployment of music and the varying camera techniques, weaving in and 
out of traditional social realist cinematic devices gives his films an almost fantasy quality. While 
at an aesthetic level This is England appears to depicts the socio-political condition of the 80s, 
This is England contextualises itself by its depoliticised narrative, with the only indication of a 
politics integrating itself in the film occurring in the opening scenes in inserting highly political 
news footage of the 80s. This straightforward technique to establish realism works with his use 
of 80s music as a soundtrack. Meadows’ style towards film-making; location shooting, local 
non-professional actors, working-class subject matter; is all as consistent as that of Loach, 
alongside his standing as a regional independent film-maker. However, what remains in contrast 
is Meadow’s commitment to the visuals. His use of slow motion, monotone colour and 
metaphorical shots allows the film to further develop the subjectivity of protagonist. However, 
by setting the film as a story of a boy in search of belonging, Meadows dilutes the level of 
political themes that the film presents. In This Is England, while the character of Shaun 
brilliantly symbolises the innocence that can be endangered by others during difficult economic 
periods, Shane Meadows work is testimony to the predicament of a filmmaker who appears anti 
establishment but lacks any well-defined ideological alternative in the current climate.  
 
Case Study: Fish Tank 
 
Fish Tank presents 15 years-old Mia (Katie Jarvis), who is fed up with living with her sexually 
promiscuous mother and younger sister on a council estate in Essex. Her unsettled emotion 
towards her family leads her into a sexual relationship with her mother’s boyfriend whilst 
developing a rather delicate bonding with Billy (Harry Treadaway) at a traveller’s caravan site. 
Fish Tank is filmed in the Mardhouse Estate. Made in Dagenham (2010) was another film that 
was released during the same period, both depicting working class characters in the same region. 
One has a nostalgic, romantic notion of the British working class existence. Fish Tank however, 
is about the disintegration of the working class and of housing stock. The housing becomes an 
actor, affecting the patterns of acting. Paralleled with Made in Dagenham, here are two films 
seeking to depict a working class existence within a generation, disenfranchised through Labour. 
 
Fish Tank is not completely unendurable. The film sets out from the social and geographical 
content dear to Ken Loach’s earlier social realism; the disappearance of the working class, the 
crippling of a family through unemployment, the harsh climate and the presentation of the 
people, and the redemptive elements to the film. The state of Mia’s face is used to help the 
audience comprehend where the story is within the timeline. Arnold consistently employs close-
ups on the characters to draw visual attention to the protagonist’s emotional state. The scenes of 
the new, low-rise housing complex that Mia and her family inhabit serve as significant moments 
in the film in the creation of an aesthetic contrast of mise-en-scéne.	   
 
 
So why is Fish Tank so mediocre? So disconnected from reality? The problem is in the 
communication, and the process of its storytelling imperative, which is lacking in affective 
reality, intention and intensity, reducing the film to the level of liberal scapegoating of the white 
working class. In addition to the quality of the narrative, we will need to focus on the way the 
issue are framed, the mis-en-scene, and the premises followed though. The conflicting elements, 
as well as the imperatives of this kind of cinema, constitute the main problem in relation to this 
film. The subject matter seems convincing as a denunciation of Britain’s working class and its 
apparent moral decline. The cause of these ills are not investigated, since class conflict remains 
outside the filmic space, and beyond what is acknowledged in British political sphere.  
 
Fish Tank’s approach provides a series of huge disadvantages in the context of the working class 
in the public consciousness. It enables the audience to immediately blame the victim, not the 
perpetrator, of any social disadvantages that could be brought up for debate. Poverty can be 
blamed on the poor and unemployed, pregnancy on the young and feckless. The problem with 
the depolitisised displays in social realism is that it creates a notion that can be reproduced 
forever, and in that fashion giving it the appearance of truth simply by the power of its repetition 
when filmic evidence fits already entrenched preconceptions. Disadvantage, in this sense, is a 
behaviour-based component. Women who cannot afford to have children should not have them. 
People who can work should do. Young children should remain in school. We are given an 
eroded work ethic, lack of educational aspiration, an inability and  unwillingness to control ones 
children, increased single parenthood, promiscuity, criminal activity and physical violence.  
 
Which is why there is something particularly offensive about the speed and ease into which Fish 
Tank takes us. Instead of probing beneath the surface for the underlying causes of the pathologies 
of poverty, its moves instead to inadvertently demonise the poor, which contributes to the right 
in blaming them for making bad choices, as though good ones were plentiful and immediately at 
hand. Through this, if we do not demonstrate the positions that create poverty, and focus instead 
only on the individuals currently occupying them, all that can happen, as in Fish Tank, is that the 
individual will escape, but the position of the poor will still be there, to be occupied by the next 
generation of the underclass.  People will rotate in and out of poverty, but the poverty will 
remain intact. 
Further, and related to this point, Arnold deprives her working class community of agency. They 
are victims of a system, with little or no control of their own lives. This approach is suitable 
when they are presented as individuals in relation to institutional frameworks. However, this 
creates a particular problem when we encounter events where her characters do make choices, 
and in isolation from the institutions i.e. the assaulting of a girl in an early scene, the kidnapping 
and attempted drowning of a child in the third act (a scene which echoes of the 1993 James 
Bulger murder). As such, people who do choose to partake in such behavior are no victims of a 
defunct political system; they are solely responsible for their own behavior and social position. 
The audience is offered no scope for a greater understanding than that. Thus, it is difficult to 
subscribe to Arnold’s assertion that the film alludes to class reality.  
 
Thirdly, the whole narrative is held together by set pieces, anecdote and rumor, with no real solid 
evidence of working class behavior. As such, the filmic result is over-simplifications and 
stereotypes cherry picked to support a not very strong conclusion.	  The engines of institutional 
oppression are conspicuously absent in Fish Tank. Leaving so much off screen, the film avoids 
an analysis of the situation from inside the experience of the characters, defining them externally. 
In this sense, she has denied the audience the connection between the socio-political realities of 
this existence and the images on the screen. In response to the accusations levelled at Fish Tank 
in a letter to Sight & Sound, stating that the film “offers little insight into social relations, 
precisely because it isn’t grounded in reality, ” and accusing the film of  “self-satisfied issue-
skirting”, Arnold stated; 
 
I write what I know about, what I understand. Usually when I start  
writing, I don’t have an intellectual idea about it, I just write about  
the characters as truthfully as I can, using my imagination. I always  
think from the image or from the character outwards. And usually  
the image has got a character that I can then go and explore  
(James, 2009:45) 
 
Nick James, Editor of Sight and Sound defended the film by stating; 
 
Without a doubt both Red Road and Fish Tank come from the British  
social realist tradition. But it’s a more semi-poetic strain arguably than that  
explored by Loach, who is nonetheless the godfather of Arnold’s generation  
of British filmmakers (James, 2010: 2). 
	  
However, it is impossible to subscribe to either statement as all the difficulties that disconnect 
the protagonist and her family from society are absent.  In this sense, she denied the audience the 
connection between the socio-political realities of this existence and the images on the screen. 
The film is work of an almost social scientist nature, an anthropological expeditionist who 
describes and analyses the cultural values and supposed psychological characteristics of working 
class Britain with no dissection of the contemporary problems of Britain’s working class in 
relation to society, policy and economics.  
As in all contemporary social realism, the landscape of Fish Tank is an abandoned inner city 
area, a satellite housing estate built to rehouse those displaced by earlier urban regeneration 
schemes, projects built to house migrant labour industrial towns where the industries that once 
provided jobs and relative affluence have moved to new locations. Social housing is no longer a 
normal entitlement for people who cannot afford to buy. It is a last gasp resource for the very 
low income and benefit receiving section of the working class. The average income of owner 
occupied households is 2.8 times that of social housing households. More than three fifths (63%) 
of social housing renters are economically inactive. Therefore, such excluded environments are 
the most visible and evident forms of exclusion (Runnymede 2009:46). However in Fish Tank, 
these elements, conceived to produce a realist aesthetic, fail to affect the negative vision of 
council estates and residents that inhabit them; the council estate fits nicely into a political 
agenda that already treats the environment as a natural habitat for theft, benefit fraud, 
delinquency and improvidence.  
A whole new version of working class behaviour in Britain, one that has little relationship with 
political, social and economic status emerges in Fish Tank and Arnold misleadingly conflates the 
idea of the working class with the ‘underclass’. Contemporary accounts of the white working 
class in British film narrow their focus to look at the very disadvantaged sections of the category, 
the lowest educated and those living in areas of the highest unemployment. While she has 
attempted to depict part of the British community on the periphery, in the manner that she has 
presented her characters as members of the underclass, as group however defined, they are in 
fact not synonymous with the working classes. Indeed, it is rather synonymous with the non-
working class. Marx obviously would recognise this group as the lumpenproletariet, while in 
English history we would recognise the distinction between the respectable and non-respectable 
branches of the working class, or deserving and undeserving poor in Conservative discourse. The 
problem for Arnolds's depiction is that she has done nothing to present the causes of this 
distinction. 
 
Class Representations within British Politics and the Film Industry 
The broader issue is this shift in emphasis between the idea of structure  (i.e. institutions, socio-
economic arrangements) and agency (i.e. individual’s moral failings/decisions) in British socio-
political filmmaking, a shift that has reduced reality to a conflict between working class 
characters and their behavioural decisions.	  Working class existence emerges in popular 
consciousness not with any particular accuracy or specificity of detail or political alignment but 
through the conceptualisation of a particular strand of behaviour. The protagonist’s immoral acts 
are more clearly defined in these films than the actual politics of the society, absolving the 
audience of any genuine socio- political enquiry that disregards cause and effects.  
Much of the contemporary interest in social realism is in the behavioural characteristics of a 
category of person (the working class), which is still an unknown quantity, and the subject of 
fascination to the majority of middle class people who dominate our cultural (film) institutions, 
both in the positions of commissioning and filmmaking. As we have read in this chapter, at times 
social realism has hinted at a comprehensive ideology, but for most of the part it shies away from 
anything resembling a specific political statement, in keeping with its all inclusive aspirations. 
As a result however, social realism tends to be piecemeal. It facilitates discrete social issues 
without an account of the worldview underlying political, economic and institutional conditions 
responsible for bringing the issues about. The assertion of social inequality and political 
irresponsibility takes place in isolation from the political ideology, political institutions, and 
social relationships with them that could make any statement meaningful.  
 
 
We must again consider the political shift of the Labour Party. In all instances but in particular in 
1997, the Labour Party, while approaching the election that year presented itself as more modern 
and progressive than its Conservative opponents and convinced itself that it was following its 
own pre-election thinking when in office. The very retreat from the class rhetoric of Labour 
reformism, and the abandonment of the central policy planks of the Foot/Benn leadership during 
the years of opposition opened the way to the untrammelled absorbing of the Labour Party into 
the control structures of British capitalism. The result, as seen in 1997, was that where one could 
not distinguish a Labour MP from that of a Conservative even by their views, policies and 
rhetoric. In such a situation, it is no accident that the class content of the Labour leadership 
aspirations should drain over time, not at least because of its manifestations of working class 
aspirations, which create problems for them in their dealings with the City and with organised 
business. As politicians in power they depend for their success on the ability to find the common 
ground between opposing class forces. Failing that, they ally with the financially stronger class 
(Coates, 1975: 173). 
Out of the logic of the their own politics Labour leaders are drawn away from their class 
perspectives and their class roots and emerged highly sensitive to the requirements of the 
capitalist structure that they face, “increasingly socialised in the norms of parliamentary 
gradualism, increasingly prone to define reality from a managerial standpoint, increasingly 
reluctant to mobilise or radicalise their own working class electoral base and increasingly willing 
to use state power at times of state crisis directly against the material interests of the working 
class they claim to represent” (Coates, 1975: 174). Yet it is no accident that the Labour left has 
not created such mass support for itself. For the only way in which that mass support could have 
been created would have been if the Labour left had been prepared to take up unambiguously 
hostile positions against its own party leadership by mobilising the industrial power of the 
working class for political ends. Yes, there were reforms in the provision of welfare services and 
the maintenance of higher living standards and education. But even these piecemeal reforms did 
not seriously diminish the pattern of inequality in British society (Rawnsley, 2010: 776).  
 
During the New Labour administration, it was deemed more appropriate to consider inequality as 
occurring between individuals rather than along dimensions other than class, and maximised the 
term ‘social mobility’. Social mobility refers to the movement up and down a system of 
hierarchically ordered economic and social positions, a term employed by New Labour to avoid 
engaging in direct class language. Social mobility bears upon another central social process – 
that of class formation and class solidarity. This was expedient to New Labour as their central 
belief was that high degrees of social mobility would reduce class conflict; solidarity and 
common identity would be difficult to sustain if there is significant movement between classes 
(Brison, 2011: 131). However, British studies have always defined this hierarchy as a system of 
classes.  
Part of the problem is the contemporary British definition of working and middle class. We do 
find definitional differences with academics from across socio - political and socio-cultural 
traditions. As such, our conception of class here tends to be grounded more in the Marxist 
understandings of class structures. There are of course many other definitions and 
understandings of class built around differing economic, cultural and social conceptions. In the 
US, the term middle class covers anyone who is economically self-sufficient (in other words, 
what we in Britain would regard as the skilled and semi-skilled working class). In the UK, 
because we have traditionally seen the middle class as the antithesis of the aristocracy (i.e. they 
could very rich, but they remained middle class because they didn't have a specific lineage or 
pedigree), we possess an image of the middle class as being very wealthy. In the context of a 
contemporary analysis of social positioning, it is dangerous to set-up a simple dichotomy of 
middle and working class lifestyle and frame an argument around them, since contemporary 
class identity is very fluid and complex (Anstead, N:2012) But does this mean to say that under 
these complex circumstances filmmakers can have nothing clear to say about the class relations 
in contemporary British society? Of course not. But it does suggest that what we have to say may 
not be correlated to the genuine language of class and race politics. It requires a rethinking of 
narrative methods that privilege style and surface realism over concrete social engagement.  
 
The problem also lies with the contemporary understanding of class as a concept within British 
cinema. As stated, there are several major theoretical and political trajectories to the 
understanding of class as a concept in the UK, and in the context of this thesis, we approach this 
conceptualisation through Marxism, which prioritises the role of exploitation and struggle in the 
making of classes and hence social relations. Class is about relative inequality, and is an 
“inherently comparative concept” (Miliband, 1972: 44). It is not just about what one group has, 
or where it stands in society, but about what it has in relation to another social group. Therefore, 
class is an antagonistic relationship. Firstly, because of the relationship between those at the 
bottom of the social ladder and not just the classes above, and the systemic constructs that 
prevent those on the periphery from reducing the economic distance between those social groups, 
manifested in the government institutions that implement reductive public policies. Secondly, the 
relationship is antagonistic because it is always based on a concerted system of exploitation and 
control (Runnymede, 2008: 36). 
We can analyse the shifts that have taken place amongst the ‘left’ in British society, specifically 
in relation to political criticism. Historically, the left has been particularly adept at accusations of 
betrayal aimed at the Labour Party; in other words, producing governments that do not live up to 
commitments made whilst in opposition and failing to meet expectations of their supporters. 
Broadly, these disaffected supporters have taken two forms; the middle class intelligentsia and 
traditional supporters (working class). What is significant is the political centrality of Labours 
intellectual opponents in constructing the critique, as opposed to working class opponents 
(Anstead, N: 2013). This is also reflected in a tendency of non-working class directors shaping 
narratives focusing on this very demographic. The working classes continue to have access to 
relatively low levels of the kind of material, cultural and psychological resources that aid 
successful entry and establishment within the film industry.  
 
At this point, it is conducive to also consider the class positions of the key stakeholders in the 
British film industry. The influence of middle class ideology with specific regards to arts and 
culture also reached into the increasingly middle class-dominated film industry in the late 20th 
century. It was in the public and independent schools that the middle-class culture code came to 
predominate and this was followed by a shift towards middle-class dominance in the film 
industry. Recruitment, career consolidation and pathways to promotion continue to be 
disproportionally the preserve of those from elite and established backgrounds – private and 
independent schools and Oxbridge. The educated ethos excludes those of lower or no formal 
education (or lineage) from occupying key decision-making roles within the film industry.  
 
 
Good contacts remain the dominant method of securing employment in the British film industry. 
Many people take on internships or unpaid work to develop their contacts and secure work. In 
the 1980s, only 5% of the total British film industry workforce had completed unpaid work in the 
industry, compared to nearly 50% by 2000 (Bhavnani, 2007: 61). Clearly people from lower 
income backgrounds are disadvantaged as a result of this practice. During qualification courses, 
over half of white students had work experience in the sector, compared to 28% of minority 
ethnic students. In research into minority ethnic groups’ independent production companies, one 
third of the organisations had used unpaid workers, this being more common among minority 
ethnic employees (Bhavnani, 2007: 61). For example, preventing interns in the film industry 
from being paid meant only those that could afford to live without an income (the middle and 
upper class) gained invaluable internships within the film industry. This, of course, gave this 
demographic the opportunity to establish superiority and dominance both in front and behind the 
camera. In this way, the upper and middle classes have able to dominate both the strategic 
thinking and the creative output for decades in a British film industry that remains inherently 





The middle class, of all political positions, retain an uncomfortable fear, “bordered on eugenics”, 
of the uneducated working class. This produces an “authoritarian social structure” that is 
reproduced in our institutions (Cruddas, J: 2011). Specifically, The BBC’s employment culture is 
weighed down by its history of social biases, and its inherent inability to respond to the late 20th 
century reality of Britain’s multi-ethnic and minority populations (Born: 2005:197). As in the 
previous decade, where criticisms of class and regional bias were to the fore, there remain 
sections of the public systemically alienated from the BBC. Thus, script editors, screenwriters, 
directors and producers come from a too narrow and nepotistic circle, shaping the creative output 
in terms of subject matter and the representation of issues and minorities. They should they be 
recruited from other areas of life, to feed new experiences into the editorial process (Born, 2005: 
332). This lack of working class representation has meant that this group has not been allowed to 
fully participate in politics of British film, nor to organise themselves in where they could voice 
their concerns nor publicise their views visually through a middle class dominated film industry. 
It its precisely because the BBC claims universality that it needs urgently to address these issues.   
 
Since 1982, Channel 4 has invested over £350 million in British film (Brown, 2007: 232). 
However, the collapse of the first incarnation of FilmFour was the result of the pursuit of an 
Americanised, studio system British cinema at the expense of its original film remit. Paul 
Webster’s objective was not to supply the needs of the channel but to compete in the broader 
movie market and to create a business. As FilmFour was a limited company and separate from 
the main channel, it did not fall under Channel 4’s original remit. Further, once it did fall under 
direct control from the channel when relaunched as Film Four Productions in 2006, Channel 4’s 
license to broadcast included a programme policy statement that demanded a minimum number 
of broadcasting hours are dedicated to serving those on the periphery of British Society, and in 
only a few certain areas, such as education, news and current affairs. The Channel 4 remit did not 
specify every area of its programming to appeal to minority audiences, only a suitable proportion 
(Brown, 2006:198). 
 
Webster claims that FilmFour was not a failure financially; he blamed the "overall situation" - by 
which he means a failure of the parent company to understand film financing, coupled with the 
advertising downturn. The business reopened in 2006 with Tessa Ross, formerly Head of Drama 
for the BBC Independent Commissioning Group, at the helm three months later, working with 
smaller budgets and a change of commissioning strategy. What Paul Webster originally 
attempted at FilmFour was to turn it into a standalone business that was not subsidised in effect 
by the television channel. It proved too arduous, not least because the relationship between a 
broadcaster and a film company will always prove complex as the broadcaster will always want 
the filmic product programming immediately for terrestrial release. Webster stated that: 
 
It's important to make films that travel. You can't make films that just 
appeal to the UK market, because you're forced into making films of 
such a small budget that the demands are too rigorous of an 
audience - and then you're driven into an art-house ghetto. There 
are, of course, exceptions like Mike Leigh but I think there's a greater 
consciousness of making a film connect to an audience (Allison, 2008). 
However, in trying to compete with Hollywood, Webster showed a catastrophic ignorance of the 
history of the British film industry, which is littered with the corpses of film companies that tried 
to break into the American market (Wayne N: 2012).   
 
BBC Films, set up during the Producers Choice era to maximise profitability in the international 
market, has not produced a body of films that can really be understood as representing the broad 
views and positions occupied in contemporary British society. Whilst they have had some 
success in bringing alternative voices and stories to the British public in independent and big 
budgeted films like Bullet Boy (Saul Dibb, 2004), Billy Elliot, Fish Tank, Made In Dagenham 
and the continued support of Ken Loach’s work, for all that has been argued in this chapter of the 
trends that took place at Channel 4, the BBC Films productions remain significantly distinct 
from Film4 produced films in terms of the representation and treatment of both working class 
characters and the subsequent issues that should arise from these narratives. The dominant trend 
is for a British heritage style of film culture with American co-production (with varying 
approaches) depicting middle class characters and concerns in films such as An Education, (Lone 
Scherfig, 2009) We Need To Talk About Kevin (Lynn Ramsay, 2011) The Mother (Roger 
Mitchell, 2006) Notes on a Scandal (Richard Eyre 2006) The Duchess (Saul Dibb, 2008) and 
Revolutionary Road (Sam Mendes, 2008). This is reflective of both the narrow pool of talent that 
the BBC draws its screenwriters, producers and directors from and an inability to bring to the 
public a wide range of films that speak to all members of society. The few films that attempt to 
allude to some sort of social reality (Fish Tank, Bullet Boy) are depoliticised lest they bring the 
nation into disrepute.  
 
The pursuit of commercialism and transatlantic success has rendered socially conscious 
programing that featured heavily on the BBC in the form of The Wednesday Plays, Play for 
Today, and television series like Boys from the Blackstuff  (Alan Bleasdale, 1982) relics from a 
distant past. The BBC Charter can be interpreted by many as a commitment to impartiality in 
terms of the need to represent certain aspects of the broad British life. However, in no 
meaningful sense does the BBC demonstrates its impartiality about class or political perspectives 
- it has a most definite perspective on this (Abercrombe, 2000: 379). It is precisely because the 
BBC is publicly owned and paid for by the TV License that there is a demand for a wider 
representation of characters, classes and themes in their production.  
 
The UKFC was established with a limited, subjective range of interests, and the incompatibility 
of trade interests and public interests were either unconsidered or disregarded. It is argued here 
that the New Labour government, manifest in the UKFC placed too much a reliance on trade 
interests and the American film industry. The very process of devising and establishing the 
UKFC was conducted without any detailed parliamentary or civil service scrutiny, as no bill was 
presented to parliament regarding the creation of the new film body. Further, the review body 
that informed New Labour’s film policy was composed of film industry company executives, 
and it was as a direct result of this body’s recommendations that the DCMS created the UKFC, 
and delegated it all responsibilities for film (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 425).	  
The UKFC’s board members were appointed by the government, with it being given the status of 
a non–departmental public body funded by the DCMS. From its formation, it was drawn up 
almost entirely from a very small network of film and television industry senior executives, with 
thirteen of the fifteen members drawn from the upper echons of the film industry with one seat 
occupied by the BFI chairperson and one to an educationalist. Crucially, none had any expertise 
in non-mainstream cinema and two were members of the Motion Picture Export Association of 
America (MPA). These appointment decisions seemed to prioritise trade interests over public 
interests, further distancing themselves away from notions of a British Independent film culture 
that could provide the space for socio-political filmmaking (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 426). 
The appointment of the film director Alan Parker as the UKFC board’s First Chair reinforces this 
argument as Parker was an outspoken advocate of big budgeted transatlantic productions and 
financial partnerships. Further, he was critical of both British independent cinema and the 
functions the BFI. Therefore, both in its formation and is key personnel and objectives, the 
UKFC represented the interest of mainstream, American orientated directors, producers and 
distributers. The controversial nature of the funding decisions, which were operated not by a 
cultural framework but by executive committee (effectively civil servants mirroring an American 
studio system, the index of this was that the board members were now commanding studio 
executive salaries) led to the Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television (PACT) demanding 
that each fund manager involved in the decision making process should be given a limited tenure 
in their roles (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 427). 
 
The cost of the UKFC to the public, revealed by Gordon Brown in 2004 when the information 
was drawn via parliamentary interrogation, showed that support to the film industry since 1997 
was £2 billion. As well as via direct funding, this figure was also achieved through the tax 
concessions made available to filmmakers funded through UKFC. These were provided under 
section 42 of the Finance Act of 1992, and until 2004, under Section 48 of the Finance Act of 
1997, to support productions under £15 million budget. In 2004, the budget was raised from £15 
to £20 million (Dickenson and Harvey, 2005: 425). These tax allowances were put in place in a 
concerted effort to ensure the British film industry imitate the Hollywood studio system of 
production. However, it is argued here that the objective was to compete, not against Hollywood, 
but against potential European and global rivals for Hollywood co-production investment.  
In 2010 UK General Elections, none of the parties achieved the 326 seats required for an overall 
majority. This resulted in a hung Parliament as no party was able to command a majority in the 
House of Commons. While a coalition government was established between the Conservatives 
and the Liberal Democrats as a result the Tories, led by David Cameron, won the largest number 
of votes and seats and was thus invited by the Queen to form a government. One of the first acts 
of this coalition was to abolish the UKFC as part of a wider cost-cutting drive by the DCMS. In 
response to this announcement the UKFC Chair, Tim Bevan, one of the UK’s most commercially 
successful film producers stated: 
Abolishing the most successful film support organisation the  
UK has ever had is a bad decision, imposed without any  
consultation or evaluation. People will rightly look back on  
today's announcement and say it was a big mistake, driven  
by short-term thinking and political expediency. British film,  
which is one of the UK's more successful growth industries,  
deserves better (UK Film Council, 2010:1). 
 
The abolition of the UKFC drew further criticism from representatives of the UK film industry 
and from abroad, with director and producer Mike Leigh paralleling the decision to "abolishing 
the NHS". The DCMS announcement abolishing the UKFC also stated a desire to create a "less 
bureaucratic relationship" between the Government and the BFI (UK Parliament, 2010). This 
suggested that the BFI could be involved in administering the objectives undertaken by the 
UKFC.  
 
The UKFC Annual Report published in March 2010 declared that the UKFC spent £8.3 million 
of its grant-in-aid funding of £37 million on its operational costs (UK Film Council, 2010:11). 
Jeremy Hunt MP, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport defended his decision to 
abolish the UKFC by declaring that "stopping money being spent on a film quango is not the 
same as stopping money being spent on film” (Thorpe, 2010:1). Further, he implied that the 
UKFC was guilty of maladministration with public money, stating that “the Film Council spent 
24% of the grant that it received on its own admin and we asked ourselves if there was a better 
way to support the UK film industry than having a large number of executives paid more than 
£100,000 and an office in LA” (Thorpe, 2010:1). 
 
UKFC distributed more than £160 million of National lottery money to over 900 films (Vir, 
2012). However, the UKFC’s vision of talent development during this time was very much 
crouched in the short term and lacked foresight. It is suggested here that the films funded by the 
UKFC were produced with little understanding or consideration of the broad British public. 
Despite the UKFC growing in economic power during its lifespan (the UKFC itself received 
grant-in-aid from the Government, which in 2009/10 amounted to £37 million, a £7 million 
increase from its 2008/09 grant. The total Lottery income for 2009/10 received by the UKFC was 
£34.2 million) (UK Film Council, 2010:11) providing institutions and filmmakers with enhanced 
opportunities to bring to fruition their development plans, they became more answerable and 
accountable to the New Labour government that invested in them. While commercially a 
triumph, the constraints of working within the competitive film industry perhaps prevented the 
UKFC from adopting a suitable and complete historical and developmental approach in regard to 
the kind of films they financed. Instead of looking to the past in order to help explain the present 
and to predict the future, they came to look at the present and towards the future. From this 
perspective, however, their attempt at representing, and extending the accessibility of film to all 
parts of society were understandably flawed, and this will continue to undermine the British film 
industry’s attempts for future planning so long as they ignore the class aspects in British film. 
Thus, a more complete analysis of British film was undoubtedly required, as part of a concerted 
programme to expand representation and implement change in the future. 
 
Despite the RSAs, the concentration of the UKFC within the South East has also created a 
regional bias that has influenced the number of films produced that represent a politicised 
working class. If we consider the great working class intellectuals and arts projects (to name an 
obvious example, the Everyman Theatre, the British New Wave writers) they came from 
regional industrial cities. There remains the idea of the working class intellectual in these areas, 
but this is not the case in London. This can be attributed to the concentration of capital to the 
City of London in the last 30 years. So we are seeing a geographical shift in British film culture 
as well – namely, as London has come to be more culturally and financially dominant (and other 
cities have declined), a very London-centric view of class and identity has stymied the success of 
other film projects, which might have had a stronger class identity (Anstead, N:2012) 
 
During the UKFC tenure the film industry lacked the shared quest to explore our nation's 
complexities. The industry also displayed an in-built distrust of the filmic auteur - depriving 
us of a European-style stream of autonomous writer-directors who both entertain and 
critically reflect on their society. So there was nothing left but to maximise on the common 
language the British film industry was developing with Hollywood. American production in 
the UK did provide employment for British film industry workers, and in return the 
American studios were given a 20% tax credit by the British government. However, the 
worldwide profits do not get taxed in the UK, as they were financed by American 
corporations. Further, UKFC subsidised the American film industry by paying for digital 
projectors in over 200 British cinemas. As independent British films aspiring for theatrical 
release in reasonably sized theatres required 35mil celluloid prints, this appeared to be a 
demonstration of the UKFC’s commitment to the exhibition of low budget feature films, as 
digital projection was much more economically viable for independent filmmakers, 
producers and distributers. However, the majority of the projector servers were installed in 
the cinemas’ main, 500-1000 seater theatres, where highly commercial American films such 
as Quantum of Solace (Marc Forster, 2008) and Avatar (James Cameron, 2009) were 
screened, as opposed to the smaller theatres. This rendered this practice as unsuitable as it 
benefitted only American studio productions and British independent films would not be 
able to fill these theatres, and as a result were deprived of a potential audience.  
 
Criticism can also leveled at the UKFC’s Prints and Advertising Fund, created to provide money 
for extra prints of non-mainstream and commercially focused British film. However, £175,000 of 
UK public money was given to mainstream US distribution companies like the Weinstein 
Company, a subsidiary of Universal, for their British release of Where in the World is Osama Bin 
Laden (Morgan Spurlock, 2008). Fox US were also given £154,000 for the UK release of the 
Rolling Stones documentary Shine a Light (Martin Scorsese, 2009). 
UKFC statistics, published on 20 January 2011, stated that British films made over £1 billion 
at the box office in 2010, up 2% from 2009. Investment in new UK film production reached 
£1.5 billion across 119 films in 2010, a new record for the British film industry. Further, 
some of the most original and challenging films of the past decade were funded by the 
UKFC: Better Things, Bright Star, The Constant Gardener, Gosford Park, Red Road, 
Another Year, and The King’s Speech. The UKFC's Microwave fund, administered through 
Film London, allowed British independent filmmakers working on a less-commercial terrain 
to receive mainstream development, funding and distribution for their films. But it would be 
questionable to look upon the UKFC as committed promoters of independent British cinema 
when so many of the projects they funded or co-funded were failures, both commercially and 
critically. Grown Your Own (Richard Laxton, 2007), Sex Lives of the Potato Men (Andy 
Humphries 2004), Mrs Ratcliffe's Revolution (Bille Eltringham, 2007), Inside I'm Dancing 
(Damien O'Donnell 2004), Anita & Me (Metin Hüseyin, 2002), Three & Out (Jonathan 
Gershfield, 2008), Straightheads (Dan Reed, 2007), Long Time Dead (Marcus Adams, 
2002), Donkey Punch (Oliver Blackburn, 2008), Franklyn (Gerald McMorrow, 2007) and 
The Cottage (Paul Andrew Williams, 2008) are all British films (all comedies and horror 
films) that received UKFC funding yet performed disastrously at the box office as a result of 
bad decision making in regard to their commissioning, development and distribution. This 
created a much more conservative approach to funding independent British film as budgets 
have become smaller and much more focused on potential commercial hits. Further, 
hundreds of other projects the UKFC funded didn't make it past the development stage. Even 
the Microwave scheme, which challenged producers to make a feature for £75,000 suggests 
that British independent cinema became a mere footnote in the wider UKFC narrative of 
transatlantic commercialism. In his 2010 film UK Film Council: Out to Lunch? 
filmmaker/producer Chris Atkins suggested that the UKFC disregarded British independent 
film projects as they would not generate direct profit. 
 
                                              If the UKFC invested in a hit film, they as a business would  
recoup the money back. But their investment in new  
British cinema did not increase with this surplus value, with  
the money going back into the UKFC coffers. This practice  
is why they backed commercially promising films (Chris Atkins, 2010). 
 
Thus, success was measured only in terms of inward investment and recoupment. In his 
statement on 26 July 2010 Jeremy Hunt said that:  
Abolishing the UK Film Council and establishing a direct  
and less bureaucratic relationship with the British Film  
Institute would support front-line services while ensuring  
greater value for money. Government and Lottery  
                                         support for film will continue" 
(UK Parliament:2010). 
 
On 29 November 2010, Conservative minister for culture Ed Vaizey confirmed that the BFI will 
become the "flagship body for film policy in the UK"; and the BFI would be selected as the 
distributor of film Lottery money via secondary legislation. He also announced that lottery 
funding for UK film will increase from £27 million to more than £40 million by 2014. In 
response, Amanda Nevill, Director of the BFI said the organisation would need to "change quite 
fundamentally from the board down to bring in new people and new skills into the additional 
organisation to do that" (UK Parliament:2010). 
 
The weakness here is that the British film industry, despite years of public funding and 
government tax breaks is still not self sufficient, and will continue to have a reliance on public 
money for its survival. This means that there will always be a socio-cultural demand on any 
structural framework that the film institutions implement. However, the economic considerations 
on what is essencially an industry will continue to be privileged and with that in mind, its no 
surprise that cultural worth will suffer. Prioritising the cultural value of film, as with British 
social realism, would require a radical change in ideology. The BFI are now in a position to 
deliver a broad and varied film culture and the objective of sustaining a British film industry, 
providing that culture, and not commercial viability, is its principle goal, as the economically 
dominant American cinema model, pursued by the UKFC, proved unable to reflect the varied 
complexities of a multicultural, class driven Britain. 
 
The effects of the organisational, economic, social and political changes in both British society 
and the film industry have corroded a socio-political film culture. We need concrete 
investigations of substandard housing, class discrimination, and police harassment and abuse 
motivated by racial animus, the visual exposing of the antagonistic relationship between the 
lower and upper class who, as well as using their privilege to access to state resources, reinforce 
vertical relations and discourage horizontality. The language of social realism  doesn’t capture 
these distinctive injustices. Instead, that language emphasizes some of the ills working class 
people face and ignore more other, more lasting harms. In fact, describing the plights of the 
working class in terms of behaviour, consistent with the liberal, left of centre mandate may even 
contribute to liberal patronage and ventriloquism. Films such as Fish Tank are bound to be 
popular amongst a left leaning audience, however this can be attributed to the fact that the film 
does not alluded to real class antagonisms, pitting capitalists and the rich on one side of the 
social divide against the working class on the other. For the liberal middle class, there is no 
stimulus for investigating the ambiguities of their own privileged position.  
However, shifting from current trends to holistic political attack may be an improvement in term 
of substance, but can be regressive in terms of a cinematic experience for an audience. The 
extension of contemporary social realism into new territory requires writers and directors to 
change not only their defining concerns and issues but also the narrative choices they make. The 
need to entertain is as paramount to the craft of filmmaking as is to inform an audience, and what 
needs to be created is a body of films that present social concerns within a plausible and dramatic 
narrative that will draw in and hold an audiences attention throughout the film. 
Further, in the current conjuncture in which neoliberalism has become hegemonic, with New 
Labour accepting uncritically the tenets of capitalism and the Coalition government extending it, 
commercial success will rarely achieved by filmmakers wishing to allude to political reality 
rather than popularism. Again, the aspect of social criticism in in Loach’s films needs to be taken 
into consideration. However, this has been made possible by Loach’s long standing relationship 
with both the BBC and Film Four, and his ‘heritage’ status within the industry that permits 
Sixteen Films to be indifferent to the box office.	  
British cinema in the Labour years seemed to evade the big questions in British society. The 
euphoria and feel good factor was everywhere in films like the Full Monty which more or less 
told the working class that you should be joyful despite unemployment. This should have been 
anathema to filmmakers of the left (Murphy, 2010: 223). This national cinema needled at the 
false optimism of the times. This appealed to a new audience, no longer motivated by utopian, 
left wing imperatives but consumed by a need for political correctness born out of expediency in 
a post- Macphersonist social climate. 
When political issues are presented as if they were choices of morality, the balancing of political 
decisions that are central to social realism becomes lost in uncertainty and, more crucially, 
misrepresentation. There have been genuine attempts at representing the working class in recent 
films such as Tyrannosaur (Paddy Constantine, 2011) and Ill Manors (Ben Drew, 2012). But 
these approaches still use the rhetoric of class behaviour, increasingly shifting focus from 
systemic obstacles to individual irresponsibility with ones life. This distorts the public policy 
decisions that shape these behavioural choices, permitting a narrow analysis to displace wider 
political concerns.  
 
To genuinely make sense of the problems of the working class, we need to understand how 
social change and long-term shifts in economic structure have affected class inequalities more 
generally. This requires films that give a clear perspective on political issues, communicated 
through the actions of the protagonist. To re-attain this communication, all the frameworks of 
escapist, voyeuristic social realism must replaced by a cinematic form that attempts to tell the 
truth and such for a language capable of sending a social message to the spectator. It must be a 
summons for action that not only expresses society, but also actively participates in it. Public 
policy criticism is not just the domain of oppositional parties and newspapers. Film can be more 
than just a visual experience; it can be a sight of a realistic portrayal of society, it affects political 
imagination, shaping, and to some extent extending the kind of social change that can be 
achieved. This is why we find comprehensive, detailed, filmic political engagement compelling. 
We need to look to the details of political institutions, and public policy. Sometimes film can 
play an important role in influencing these political discussions, but effectiveness is usually a 
matter of effective representation. Of course, the real discussions must take place in Parliament. 
In one sense, film is a tool for making people take note. British cinema requires a continuous 
body of films that explore the experience of the working class, of how their social exclusion 
affects them and how they deal with a sense of powerless ness and lack of self-esteem. The 
protagonist is not only the narrative centrepiece, but annunciates the films political views via the 
character’s actions in reaction to state institutions.	  	   
	  
The failure to understand the different ways of conceptualising class inequality and behaviour 
has produced an inconsistent genre, without narrative attention to the political discourses that 
frame them. If we are to challenge the perception of working class in contemporary British 
cinema, then filmmakers must operate at different narrative levels, a New Social Realism, 
bringing their concerns visually in the classrooms, the institutions, as well as the wider socio-
economic context. This calls for a politicized filmic practice that extends beyond the surface, 
aesthetics and the clichéd behavioural set pieces of the working class protagonist that seeks to 
interrogate wider patterns of inequality.  
The Conservatives and New Labour have long identified the importance of how issues are 
framed and presented, and so must the filmic practitioner. Someone on welfare can be described 
as the casualty or the agent of his or her own poverty. Which of these two notions that prevail in 
the film essentially usher the political responses and the level and shape of social consciousness. 
If the welfare dependents are victims of systemic inequality, then government intervention and 
rethinking is required. The implications on government policy need to be expressed clearly in the 
cinematic storytelling, as does the tangible evidence justifying the specific social issue. If they 
are victims, it must be filmically demonstrated, as does the victimiser. For this filmic 
demonstration to be effective, there can be no leaps in the narrative that carries the viewer from 
the issue to the outcome, with no treatment of one issue in isolation to the systemic structures 
that cultivate it. What we are experiencing is the culturalisation of what are primarily political 
conflicts, providing voyeuristic material to an educated liberal middle class audience. Social 
realism is afflicted with the weakness of socio-political thinking, and must change in order to 
respect valid political concerns.  
If there is any place where political irresponsibility should be exposed filmically it is here, in 
Coalition Britain; the limits on living standards for the bottom of society, the recapitalising of the 
banks and the increasing of income taxing as a result while offering tax cuts to the wealthy and 
deregulation to the private sector, the dismantling of the university sector which places an 
impossible price on education for all but the upper middle class – isn’t is against precisely these 
sorts of systemic structures that the traditions of filmic political engagement, laid down by 













Chapter Two:  Not in the Frame: The Emergence of Black British Political 
Filmmaking and its Broken Relationship with Social Realism. 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the ways in which 20th century immigration in the post-Second 
World War period and subsequent race struggles influenced the burgeoning socio-political 
character of ethnic minority filmmaking in Britain. An examination is conducted of the ways in 
which black filmmaking was characterised by its politicized account of British life and how post-
Macpherson multiculturalism via a New Labour discourse helped depoliticize this film content. 




Post War Immigration into the United Kingdom 
 
Several plausible reasons can be proposed to explain the contemporary depoliticization of black 
British filmmaking, and the inability of the British film industry to create a lasting black British 
film culture, one with a fidelity to the realities of 21st century Britain; a lack of sufficient 
funding, an absence of historical knowledge and racial awareness, the by-products of state 
multiculturalism, and the persistence of unequal access for certain sections of British society.  
 
The gradual demise of the British Empire and the economic effects of World War Two coincided 
with the first major influx of immigrants from the Caribbean, Indian and later, African 
subcontinent. During the war, the British government had accumulated huge debts, particularly 
to America. In addition, the destruction caused by bombings created an urgent need for new 
housing. As a result, the British government actively encouraged mass immigration from the 
countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth to fill shortages in the labour market. The 
1948 British Nationality Act provided British citizenship to all people of the Commonwealth 
countries, including full rights of entry and residency in the UK (Craig 2008:17).  
The Empire Windrush arrived at Tilbury on 22 June 1948, carrying 493 passengers from 
Jamaica, these passengers being the first large group of West Indian immigrants to the UK after 
the Second World War. While the largest proportion of this African-Caribbean immigration (and 
ones to follow) in the UK were of Jamaican origin, other nations such as Trinidad and Tobago, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Barbados Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia and Dominica 
settled in London. (Fryer 2003:22). Although Afro-Caribbeans were invited into Britain via 
immigration campaigns created by successive British governments, the new arrivals were to 
endure prejudice, discrimination and extreme racism from white Britain. This experience was to 
signify Afro-Caribbeans’ antagonistic relations with the wider British Society. As a result, while 
there was work available in post-war Britain in industries such as British Rail, London Transport 
and the National Health Service, early immigrants found private employment and housing denied 
to them on the basis of ethnicity. Trade unions, seeing immigrants as a threat to their own 
employment security, would refuse Afro-Caribbean workers help and counsel and pubs, clubs, 
and churches would bar black people from entering. As housing was in short supply following 
the wartime bombing, this led to some of the initial conflicts with the already - present white 
community. This continued into the 1950s, and riots erupted in other cities including 
Birmingham and Nottingham (Fryer 2003:23). In 1958, under the influence of the racism and 
intolerance incited by explicitly anti-immigration movements including Oswald Mosley's Union 
Movement and the White Defence League, violent attacks in the West London area of Notting 
Hill by white ‘Teddy Boy’ youths led Afro-Carribeans, in an act of solidarity, to the creation of 
the annual Notting Hill Carnival. This change in the ethnic composition and the conflicts it 
generated in Britain became the catalyst for the socio- political implications that were to follow 
in British cinema.  
 
The Beginning of Race Representation in British Cinema 
Small shifts began to appear in relation to black cinematic representation. Three films, produced 
during this period, investigated the issue of race in Britain. The cultural impact of these films 
cannot be assessed without taking into account the form in which they were presented. Racial 
issues were invariably contained within a filmic formula, which became identified as the ‘social 
problem’ genre, using the conventions of the thriller and the police procedural. While this 
narrative approach ensured that the issue of race was accepted by the audience, the potential 
cultural impact was not so much to create an understanding of immigrant communities’ cultures 
and practices as to dramatise the white population’s intrinsic fear of the other, married with a 
subtle plea for tolerance. Thus, unsurprisingly, none of the films of this period – Pool of London 
(Basil Dearden, 1951) Sapphire (Basil Dearden, 1959), and Flame in the Streets (Roy Barker, 
1961) specifically interrogated the socio-racial hierarchies in place in 1950s Britain. Pool of 
London became one of the earliest films in British cinema to bring to the screen the issue of 
prevailing racial intolerance and prejudice. Johnny, a black merchant seaman, becomes involved 
in an interracial relationship against the backdrop of docklands criminality. As stated, while this 
was the first instance of interracial relationship in British film, race featured as an issue, as 
opposed to the theme in the context of an otherwise non-racial narrative. Bodily contact between 
the lovers is kept at a minimum and anything further would have been seen as breaking social 
taboos. It was not until the race riots in Notting Hill in 1958 that issues concerning race relations 
became core themes in black British filmmaking. 
 
Flame in the Streets is distinctive in terms of the early films presenting ethnic minority 
characters in the way it links the personal with the political in a singular narrative, interweaving 
both class and race. Made just two years after the Notting Hill Riots, the film is an unequivocal 
liberal filmic statement for racial tolerance. The core of the film revolves around Nell, whose 
morphing from a dedicated housewife to an overt racist is challenged by her daughter’s 
relationship with a black teacher. Basil Dearden, the director, attempted to expose the passive 
racism of her husband Peter by paralleling the personal conflict between his wife and daughter 
with the professional conflict; as a trade union representative he succeeds in introducing his work 
colleagues to the idea that a black co-worker can occupy a management role despite the disquiet 
that his difference has generated from the white workers who see an integrated workforce as a 
threat to their own job security.  Having succeeded in persuading his work colleagues to accept 
the advancement of ethnic minorities in the workforce, he struggles to display a benevolent 
attitude towards his daughter’s relationship with a black man in the face of abhorrence from his 
wife. In marrying trade unionism with notions of equality that extend to ethnic minorities, the 
idea of a collectivized working class that, represented in the anti-racist character of Johnny, can 
transcend racial difference is given a filmic treatment for the first time in British Cinema. 
 
These films came to prominence during the British New Wave period; however they have 
historically been detached from this movement, with the films of Anderson, Richardson and 
Reisz deemed as more sophisticated, less homespun and of greater aesthetic quality. Films like 
Sapphire, Victim (Basil Dearden, 1961) and A Place to Go (Basil Dearden, 1963) preceded and 
paralleled the work of the ‘angry young men’, a synonym for the British New Wave films that 
had been adapted from plays written by young playwrights who shaped their narratives around 
working class characters.  However, in clearly demonstrating the courage to deal with race, these 
films displayed greater bravery and fidelity to the realities of immigrant life and a political 
awareness than their supposedly more innovative, educated and talented colleagues (Kirk 
2009:73). 
 
Sapphire tells the story of a young pregnant student who has been the victim of a vicious murder, 
with her white boyfriend being the prime suspect. As the police investigation deepens, the police 
conclude that the murder was racially motivated, and it’s only when the victim’s brother comes 
into direct contact with the family of the accused that the pathological hatred that his sister holds 
for black people is exposed, and through her vitriolic tirade of racial abuse directed at him, the 
murderer is incriminated. Dearden manipulates the flow of tension within the narrative through 
fragmented revelations about the character throughout the story, leading up to the film’s climax. 
Dearden takes a liberal position on racism through the pairing of two contrasting police officers, 
one a covert racist and the other displaying understanding and benevolence to London’s ethnic 
minorities. The two characters strands of thought compete against each other and inform the 
narrative trajectory. Despite the liberal imperatives of the director, the film is not without 
subscription to the stereotypes and prejudices of the period. Civic racism goes unchallenged by 
the characters and in the use of the London jazz music scene, inhabited by blacks, as the source 
of criminal activity seems to pathologise the very themes that are being brought to screen. This 
was problematised by Nina Hibbin, writing in the Daily Worker (9 May 1959), who had 
expected a much more polemical confrontation with the racist hegemony of the period: 
 
"You can't fight the colour bar merely by telling people it exists.  
You have to attack it, with passion and conviction. Commit  




Hibbin’s comments describe the problem of merely displaying social, or in this context racial 
conflicts and prejudices without critically engaging with them. The result produced very little 
stimulus in raising levels of consciousness that could advance the director’s argument into those 
areas where they may be socially effective. In the course of the British New Wave, these filmic 
investigations into the prevalent racial tensions are thin, and this reluctance of the British New 
Wave films to confront the existing racial conflict of the period is no more evident than in 
Saturday Night Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960) where minority ethnic issues are invisible, 
despite these themes being a feature of the book (Bhavnani 2007: 131). 
By 1961, over ten years after the arrival of the Empire Windrush at Tilbury and despite the 
British government undertaking systemic measures to greatly reduce immigration (until the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, all Commonwealth citizens could enter and stay in the 
United Kingdom without any restriction) approximately 172,000 people had immigrated from 
the West Indies, with a further 83,000 people from the Commonwealth settling in the UK 
between 1968 and 1975 (Fryer 2003:26). While the majority of blacks found residence in the run 
down inner cities of London, Birmingham and Manchester, significant communities also settled 
in other areas, such as Bradford, Nottingham, Coventry, Luton, Leicester, Bristol, Leeds, 
Huddersfield, Sheffield, Liverpool and Cardiff, in particular areas like Brixton, Harlesden, 
Tottenham, Dalston, Lewisham and Peckham in London, West Bowling and Heaton in Bradford, 
Chapeltown in Leeds, St Pauls in Bristol, Handsworth and Aston in Birmingham and Moss Side 
in Manchester (Fryer 2003:27). Asian immigration extended to the old mill industry towns of 
Salford, Burnley, Blackburn and Bolton, where the industry was in decline, jobs for new arrivals 
were scarce and social integration non-existent, creating a ‘group density’ effect, in which new 
arrivals grouped together in an act of solidarity and protection from the prejudice of the citizens 
of the host nation, who felt a sense of invasion. The Labour governments of 1964-1970 
responded positively to these concerns, and in 1966 the then Home Secretary marked an official 
move towards multiculturalism, defining this not as a flattening process of assimilation, but of 
equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance 
(Thomas 2011: 58).  
 
Case Study: Pressure 
By the early 1970’s, television had become the dominant medium for representing British race 
relations, predominantly in the shape of sociological documentaries investigating the numerous 
aspects of apparent immigrant existence. However, as the commissioners, producers and 
practitioners involved in devising and making these programs were all white, these programmes 
tended to pathologise and particularize the ethnic minority experience, rather than providing 
insight, education and new perspectives on the subjects. Thus, it took over 20 years for the 
British film establishment to recognize the potential in ethnic minority filmmaking, when 
Pressure (Horace Ove,1974) became the first film by a black director to be fully financed by the 
BFI (Mercer 1988:17). Arguably the most important filmmaker to lead the way in depicting 
black culture, Trinidadian born Ove’s film tells the story of a black teenager Tony, torn between 
the Trinidadian roots of his immigrant family and his own British identity.  
Tony, young, black and educated, struggles to assimilate into mainstream British society despite 
his credentials. His unemployment directs him to his brother’s politicised approach to black 
identity, and while not holistically subscribing to this discourse, his marginalisation (in the shape 
of police brutality and estrangement from his white friends) exposes him to the reality of British 
life for young black men and his adherence to a more politicized solution. Cinematically, the 
devices employed by Ove derive heavily from the work of Ken Loach from the previous decade; 
the handheld camera provides instability to the frame that contributes to the sense of tension and 
urgency. More crucially, the use of natural vernacular specific to Afro-Caribbeans and the 
uninterrupted flow of the dialogue creates immediacy to the film that is closer to documentary 
film practices than a narrative account of racism. With themes similar to that of Babylon (Franco 
Rosso,1980) Pressure draws on the controversial and oppressive ‘suspicion’ laws that allowed 
the Metropolitan Police to target and harass innocent young black males in urban areas of 
London, and brings to the screen the deeply embedded racism of much of the surrounding white 
community in London (Newland, 2010:85). 
 
To understand the film’s cultural impact, some contextual elements associated with its release 
must be taken into consideration. The film was produced outside the mainstream film industry – 
the funding given to Ove from the BFI was initially intended to finance a short film. At this 
specific time, the BFI had no concentrated strategy for cinema and finances in place to ensure the 
cinematic release of feature-length films. Completed in the summer of 1975, the film did not 
receive theatrical release until January 1978. The delay was also attributed to the apprehension of 
the Metropolitan Police about its filmic content; specifically, concerns were raised about a scene 
featuring a police raid on a Black Power meeting (Hassan 2011). The filmmakers were told at the 
time that the film had the potential to incite racial unrest (Hassan 2011). Pressure’s cumulative 
impact, however, has been more long lasting: the film is universally cited in cultural scholarship 
as the breakthrough polemic for black British cinema.  
 
Made just two years after Pressure, Black Joy (Anthony Simmons, 1976) was another significant 
point for black filmmaking in Britain, with the film being the first to feature an all black cast.  
While not overtly political at first glance, the film in the main depicts its troubled characters as 
making the best of their lives within an existing oppressive socio-political framework as opposed 
to seeking an alternative existence. This stance can be interpreted as an implicit political 
statement in itself.  And while not without fault, Black Joy made race the central concern of the 
film and its location in Brixton had considerable allure as it was set in one of the few districts 
that retained the kind of working class culture director Simmons recalled from his childhood, 
albeit an Afro Caribbean as opposed to a Jewish one (Newland, 2010: 81). 
 
Thatcherism and Political Responses to Racial Tension in Britain 1970 - 
Throughout the late 60’s and 70’s, white Britain had continued to argue fiercely over the British 
political attitudes towards race, against a background of complete silence from those most 
directly affected by existing and forthcoming political discourses in relation to the issue. These 
policies involved on the one hand, the redrafting of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 
1972, which stated only holders of work permits or people with parents or grandparents born in 
the UK could gain entry into Britain in an attempt to significantly reduce immigration from 
Commonwealth countries, and on the other, the Race Relations Act of 1976, the establishment of 
the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to police it, and policies specifically designed to 
recognise and celebrate minority cultures and contain anti-racist politics in the UK (Fryer 2003: 
232). However, it was not until the early 1980’s that Britain’s ethnic minority communities 
themselves would finally find a voice that could be heard. It can be argued that this voice was 
one that found resonance in reaction to the existing racism in Britain, as opposed to through a 
multicultural practice that was put in place to ameliorate the very racism that oppressed them 
(McSmith 2010: 168).  
This racism that emerged in 1970’s Britain was constructed through a rejection of immigration, 
built on the momentum captured by Enoch Powell in his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech on 
20 April 1968 in which he warned of what he believed would be the consequences of continued, 
unregulated immigration to Britain. Conservative leader Edward Heath sacked Powell from his 
Shadow Cabinet the following day, and although by the late 1970’s Powell was no longer a 
Conservative MP, his influence over-shadowed the party, covering all who shared with his views 
on immigration in the form of the infamous Monday Club (McSmith 2010: 207). Although no 
member of parliament was an active member of this collective, its fierce influence on the 
backbenches of the Tory party meant that whatever means the government adopted to regulate 
immigration into the UK were labelled insufficient by the Club’s extreme right wing 
expectations (McSmith 2010: 208). Concurrently, rising neo fascist organisations like the 
National Front were demanding all people of non-white skin colour should be forcefully 
removed from Britain, but having yet to be elected, and in an effort to seduce disillusioned 
liberals, Tory policy simply could not be that draconian. The Tory manifesto of 1979 stated that:  
                                             We will help those immigrants who genuinely wish  
to leave this country, but there can be no question  
of compulsory repatriation’ (McSmith 2010: 209). 
	  
However, some years later, a now in power Margaret Thatcher stated: 
People are really rather afraid that this country might be  
swamped by people of a different culture. The British  
character has done so much for democracy, for law, and  
has done so much throughout the world that if there is any  
fear that it might be swamped, then people are going to be  
rather hostile to those coming in. We are a British nation,  
with British characteristics. Every country can take some  
minorities, and in many ways they add a richness and  
variety to this country. But the moment the minority  
threatens to become a big one, people get frightened  
(McSmith 2010: 214). 
 
Thus, the immigration debate was never actually about immigration per se, it was in fact about 
race and identity. This was coupled with the default rhetoric that the UK was overcrowded and 
could hold no more immigrants, a notion utterly divorced from reality – more people emigrated 
during the 1970s and 1980’s than were permitted entry. Thus the UK population remained static, 
being 55.9 million in 1971 and 56.4 million in 1981 (McSmith 2010: 217).  
 
In this racialised climate, there were very few opportunities for ethnic minorities, particularly the 
550,000 immigrants of West Indian heritage, to establish careers. Generally, to be black was to 
be unemployed or underemployed, to live in substandard accommodation in inner city council 
housing and to attend the very worst, oversubscribed and underperforming state schools. The 
growing number of Asians that were paradoxically succeeding in Thatcher’s climate of 
narcissistic entrepreneurialism were denied recognition for their efforts and remained on the 
periphery of society. During recession, ethnic minorities were hit the hardest, with 
unemployment amongst black people up to 82.5% in February 1981 (Fryer 2003: 441). To be 
young and black also meant living with the perpetual risk of arrest on the slightest pretext and 
the frightening prospect of white racism, either civic or systemic. A Home Office study at the 
time concluded that while blacks were 36 times more likely to suffer racism than whites, the 
police had since consistently failed to address this issue with any genuine conviction (McSmith 
2010: 218). 
 
The first demonstration of change was a campaign called Scrap Sus, which came to prominence 
in the late 1970s. The Metropolitan Police has been maximising the 1834 Vagrancy Act, which 
effectively granted omnipotence to them in allowing them to stop and search civilians on the 
mere suspicion that they may be planning criminal activity. In 1978, 3,800 were arrested on this 
pretext, the vast majority being black (McSmith 2010: 218). The campaign against this legalised 
practice became so forceful that one of the very first legislations introduced by the incoming 
Tory party was to repeal the Vagrancy Act, to the dismay of the Monday Club backbenchers. 
This triumph introduced blacks to the idea that they no longer had to withstand police 
harassment and active mobilisation could lead to a degree of social change.  
Black British culture had been shown before on the cinema screen before Babylon. Black Joy 
featured an all black cast, and was filmed on the streets of Brixton. But, like Black Joy, Babylon 
was the work of a white director, Franco Rosso. The film follows a group of young black reggae 
sound system artists in reacting with defiance and retribution to the everyday racism they 
encounter. Their resistance is also articulated through their politicised music, in particular, in the 
final scene where they barricade themselves in a warehouse to prevent a police raid. What is 
significant is that the original Babylon script, written by Martin Stellman was initially 
commissioned as a Play for Today, until the BBC refrained from producing it on the grounds that 
the treatment of the subject of racial discrimination was potentially inflammatory within the 
existing political climate (Newland 2010: 95). 
 
It was then financed by Mamoun Hassan at the National Film Financing Corporation, primarily 
backing the film with £297, 525, with an additional contribution of £16,537.50. A deal was then 
negotiated by producer Gavrik Losey with Chrysalis records to provide further funds in 
exchange for 8.5% stake in the equity of the film, with Chrysalis committing an initial £30,000, 
bringing the total budget to £375,000, being the only film financed by the NFFC that year 
(Newland 2010:97). What was also significant about the films funding is that Hassan had agreed 
to provide 83% of the funding for the film; under normal practice, the NFFC would provide just 
30% of the films budget (Hassan, M: 2011). The film was shot by a highly regarded 
cinematographer Chris Menges who, having previously shot Kes (Ken Loach, 1969) and Black 
Jack, continued with that very camerawork that lent Kes its social realist quality. 
 
Babylon was controversially awarded an X certificate by the censor, James Freeman. His 
rationale was both patronising and pathologising; black youths would feel anger, resentment and 
further alienation from mainstream society. Through the realistic instances of institutional racism 
in the form of police brutality and depictions of racist abuse suffered at the hands of resentful 
neighbours, Freeman believed that black youths may see that retributional violence against 
whites was their only option available in withstanding racism. Thus, the film made a total of £91, 
204.26 (Hassan 2011). In effect, the certificate reduced the film’s exposure to members of the 
black community who potentially could be galvanised by the films message of defiance. This 
also indicated that the film establishment identified the poignancy, power, and threat the film 
posed to the status quo.  
 
Although Babylon set out to accurately tell the story of everyday racism within the narrative of 
south London black youth culture, the actual filmmakers were not black. This fact makes it 
difficult to talk about the film in terms of black British cinema. But the filmmakers clearly felt 
that the fact that they shared the views of the immigrants in the city allowed them to transcend 
race. The final scene in where the police’s attempt to close down the party is met by resistance 
was not simply a metaphor; it was a call to arms to repel state oppression.  
 
Burning an Illusion (Menelik Shabazz, 1981) can be considered as deriving from Babylon, 
although its narrative trajectory shares a greater co-relation with Pressure. Pat, a young, 
intelligent girl from London rejects aspirations of assimilating into a comfortable bourgeois 
existence and becomes absorbed in black politics after her black boyfriend is sentenced to prison 
for reacting violently to police brutality. What was being articulated through this narrative and 
others belonging to this cycle is that assimilation into mainstream British society for ethnic 
minorities is futile within the existing racially oppressive climate, and a politicised approach to 
black identity is the only way to effectively bring forward social change, although this will result 
in a life on the periphery. A significant feature in the film is how Shabazz locates his female 
protagonist at the centre of the narrative, as opposed to secondary characters on the fringes of the 
story as is often the case in films about the black experience.  Further, Shabbazz bestows the 
characters a degree of agency; they are not solely political figures in a polemic filmic statement. 
The characters and their motivations exist and advance within the narrative frameworks of a love 
story. 
These films herald the possibility of a new type of relation of representation between blacks and 
the hegemonic white society. The films were made possible by a grant-aided sector independent 
of the mainstream industry (primarily created by the British Film Institute Production Board). 
The concentrated energy that pervade both Pressure and Burning an Illusion, as well as their 
formal freedom, would not have survived a commissioning process by the established, white 
gatekeepers of the mainstream film industry. Unfortunately, the grant-aided sector did not have 
the resources to give the films anything but a limited theatrical release, which was limited still 
further to screens that could show only 16mm rather than the standard 35mm films, so their 
potential socio-cultural impact was severely reduced. The few breakthrough movies depicting 
racial tensions and the black community authentically did not become anything like a cultural 
movement in British cinema. 
 
The Greater London Council and the Emergence of Channel 4 
The 80s proved to be the key breakthrough period for Black British film-makers, not merely in 
breaking the barriers of stereotypical representation of Black characters and culture, but in 
finding their own voice to express and debate issues affecting black communities from a black 
perspective. However to further understand the socio-political content of Black British 
filmmaking, we must contextualise this in relation to the uprisings in Britain in the early eighties.  
On six occasions in less than five years up to September 1980 officers of the special patrol group 
SPG poured into Brixton, setting up road blocks and making early morning raids and random 
street checks without consulting local liaison groups or elected representatives, or even 
informing local police before dispatching officers in.  Sooner or later, some confrontation 
between the police and local black youths were inevitable (Vinen 2010: 88). On 11 April 1981, 
some of the most notorious rioting in the history of the UK took place in Brixton, an area that 
became a synonym for marginalized black urban culture. The previous day, a crowd of 40 black 
youths rescued a colleague from a police car, bloodied from being involved in a fight. Believing 
he had been the victim of police brutality, a standoff proceeded, and forced police reinforcements 
to withdraw. This prompted an explosion of violence. In the 6 days prior, the police had 
launched Operation Swamp 81, where 10 squads of about 5-11 officers swarmed Brixton’s 
streets every night between 2pm and 11pm for a week during which 120 plain clothed officers 
stopped 943 people, arresting 118 of them. Shops were smashed and looted, cars burned and 
bricks and petrol bombs thrown. 279 police officers were injured, 145 buildings were damaged, 
and 82 arrests were made (McSmith 2010: 223). Later in the same year, further unrest occurred 
in Handsworth in Birmingham, Bristol, Moss Side and Toxteth. The public inquiry led by Lord 
Scarman, published on 25 November 1981, declared that racial disadvantage was a simple but 
shameful fact of current British life (Vinen 2010: 89). 
While Scarman’s enquiry recognised the problem of disproportionate policing, it rejected any 
charges of institutional racism, blaming the riots on the African Caribbean’s supposed 
predisposition towards criminality, youth delinquency and single parent families. Unconsidered 
was the effects of the 1981 British Nationality Act that restricted the rights of the spouses, 
mostly the husbands, of already immigrated families to settle in Britain (Fryer 2003: 294). His 
recommendations were that government involvement should take the form solely of 
implementing a multicultural solution to unemployment and substandard education. Previously, 
charges of racism were widely regarded as an unhelpful accusation – unjustifiably inflammatory 
and engineered as part of an underhanded strategy developed by ethnic minorities in competition 
for attention and government resources.  However, Scarman’s report became the genesis for a 
comprehensive, grounded political programme of accommodating cultural minority needs with 
the sole objective of neutralising aggressive anti racist disquiet (Vinen 2010: 90). 
The actual political climate became conducive for certain government initiatives to be 
implemented within the media establishment.  The filmmakers who emerged during this period 
did so as a result of the civil uprisings in the early 1980’s in London, Liverpool and Bristol. 
Broadcasters and television crews attempting to report on the unrest in the country’s most 
deprived regions were returning to the newsrooms with vandalised cameras and no tangible 
footage as, being a different race to the inhabitants, they were singled out and denied access. 
What resulted were the first instances of a concerted effort to open the door to the employment 
of middle class black filmmakers at the BBC, ITV and other regional broadcasters such as LWT, 
Granada and Yorkshire TV, on the premise that the ethnicity of the reporters and filmmakers 
would allow them greater, uncontested access to the scenes of the urban unrest. There was a rush 
of the employment of black journalists in the documentary and factual departments, who then 
formed black media workers organisations and collectives (Henriques, J :2011). 
 
This process of black access was implemented by the radical Labour administration of the 
Greater London Council (GLC) from 1982 until its abolition, as a result of central government 
legislation, in 1986. Led by a far left politician called Ken Livingstone, who was just 33 at the 
time, the GLC’s equality agenda was unparalleled. Beyond mere expediency, the GLC took up 
justifiable demands for black representation in political decision-making and created a new phase 
of local democracy involving constituencies previously marginalized from mainstream party 
politics. At its cultural level, the GLC also inaugurated a new attitude to funding arts activities by 
regarding them as stand alone, cultural industries in their own right. Both these developments 
proved important for the burgeoning black independent film sector (Mercer 1988: 35). By 
essentializing black cultural initiatives either by direct subsidy or through training and 
development policies, the GLC marked a break with the piecemeal and often patronizing ‘ethnic 
arts categorisation.  In 1982, the GLC sponsored a conference to re-evaluate black artists access 
to media production, where they were critically targeted by black artists because of the way they 
felt they underfunded their creative endeavours. More crucially, it seemed that they privileged 
white producers when representing black issues to the public (Mercer, 1988: 35). 
 
While many artistes benefitted from funds generated by the GLC, there were still some black 
organisations that would not come to an institutionally sponsored event; it was compromising 
their political position.  Race Today and Race and Class both refused money from the GLC as 
they wanted to retain their independence (Vir, 2012). Others did not want to be labelled as 
‘minority artists’, with the notion of being viewed as minor angering many black artists afraid of 
being marginalised as problems to be nurtured and guided in British society. They challenged 
this idea of multiculturalism, which essentially collapsed separate artistic and cultural forms into 
one without real consideration for individual difference. What must be recognised is that 
multiculturalism was not demanded by ethnic minorities - what was desired was cultural 
recognition, equal access to the means of film production and wider representation in the 
industry. They wanted funding and access to the mainstream arts institutions. However, the 
multicultural discourse within Britain’s cultural institutions represented an attempt to pacify 
potential artistic attacks on the hegemonic forms of racism prevalent at the time. Thus, state 
multiculturalism proved to be the velvet glove over the iron fist of anti racist filmmaking, with 
multiculturalism’s role being to negate all forms of racial thinking despite the overwhelming 
evidence. 
 
The newly established Channel Four were also criticized for not taking greater strides to address 
black audiences through shows such as Black on Black, and Eastern Eye.  There was a need for 
shows to be counter hegemonic, portraying a different picture of the black experience to ITV 
shows like Love Thy Neighbor, Mind Your Language and Mixed Blessings, which displayed 
racist stereotypes of black people in Britain. The GLC and Channel Four responded by setting 
aside funds for training black youth in their chosen mediums, with the objective to develop a 
film language that could specifically address the black experience in Britain  (Mercer 1988:36). 
 
Another objective of the GLC was around policy and strategy. This involved creating research 
papers, which explored options for implementing pressure on arts institutional policy making. 
The GLC wanted institutions like the BFI and the National Theatre, who applied for funding 
through the main Arts and Recreational Funding Group, to demonstrate how they would make 
their funding, employment, and programmes cater for black and Asian artists and communities. 
At the time they had no policy on black British filmmakers, or artists. There was no 
programming on international Black cinema. The GLC’s grant giving powers allowed them to 
make demands on representation in front of and behind the camera and equal opportunities. The 
broader objective was not to assimilate into institutions such as the BFI, but to create a black 
audience, who could engage in dialogue with the emerging black filmmakers and to participate 
in the workshops. Parallel to this, they wanted to use the power of film to tell their stories. They 
had seen the African Americans films of Charles Burnett and Heidi Graham and had been 
influenced by them.  
 
Parminder Vir, who was Head of the Ethnic Arts Unit, had organised the Black Film Festival in 
1981 during her tenure at the Commonwealth Institute. She teamed up with the NFT to bring 
black filmmakers from America to Britain for the festival. Her objective was to continue this 
approach within the GLC. In 1983, as a follow up to the festival, she organised the Third Eye 
Film Festival of World Cinema. This moved the emphasis away from solely black American 
cinema to that of Cuba, Chile, and India. It was a two-week programme of films and filmmakers 
on a GLC platform at the Bloomsbury Theatre. As these events all occurred in the first half of 
the 1980s, assisted through exposure to create a British audience for Black film, this exposure 
encouraged a number of independent UK film production companies to form such as Penumbra 
Productions and Annecy Films.  
 
Devised by the Association of Film and Television Technicians (ACTT), the Workshop 
Declaration was one of a number of reforms in the early 80s with the objective of redressing the 
increasing class and racial divisions in Britain. The Workshop Declaration was a ground-
breaking agreement made in 1982 in consultation with the English Regional Arts Associations, 
the Welsh Arts Council, the BFI and Channel Four, identifying the alternative practices of the 
workshops and encouraging them to make a cultural, a social and crucially, a political 
contribution to society. This declaration was at the time considered a radical step for what was a 
traditionally narrowly focused union, and established specific working practices in the non-
profit, cultural sector. Collectives of four or more full-time members whose funding derived 
from public revenue and who engaged in non-commercial work on a not-for-profit platform 
could be enfranchised by the workshops and given aid for a period of up to three years, thus 
liberating them from the arduous and time consuming task of searching for insecure short term 
funding from the mainstream arts institutions (Baker, 1996: 112). 
 The Workshop Declaration was decreed to include distribution, educational activities and the 
provision of film and video equipment, alongside production work. It also provided full-time, 
frequent employment for practitioners working in each workshop. A crucial requirement was that 
the franchised workshops should be drawn from outside the mainstream of film and television 
culture - with a particular focus on ethnic diversity and a commitment to socio-political issues.  
 
The GLC began to apply pressure to the ACT union (now BECTU) to change their policies on 
membership and representation. In order to secure employment the film industry union 
membership was required, which black people could not obtain because they did not have the 
relevant experience or credits. The GLC took on the unions and forced change by pushing young 
black filmmakers into the workshop sector, which got public funding for community use. This 
enabled them to gain credits and achieve union representation. The GLC approached four 
collectives, Black Audio Film Collective (BAFC), Sankofa, Ceddo and Retake, and they adopted 
the workshop model as a way of achieving union recognition. Rules were changed in order to 
fund these collectives. In particular, Black Audio Film Collective were able to finance 100% of 
their first film, offices and equipment.  
 
Again, we must consider the political context to understand the urgency demonstrated by the 
GLC in funding these film workshops. The GLC were a tiny island in a sea of Conservatism. The 
political pressure they were under from the Tory government meant that they had a very limited 
window in which they could achieve a cultural impact. In 1984, GLC became aware that they 
were about to be abolished, giving them just over a year to get as much done as possible before 
the March 1986 closure. What they wanted was to leave behind legacies that would sustain 
beyond the GLC closure. Within the GLC, the strategy was now to distribute as much money 
externally as possible and to push through funding applications. An Afro-Caribbean sub 
committee was created to ensure that applications were viewed and considered by black and 
Asian people. A further objective was to ensure that black artists got to perform and exhibit their 
work at all GLC events. It was not merely expediency; it was the politics of society at this time 
that they were expressing, where the crucial goal was to get the money into the hands of those 
filmmakers that they had identified. Their budget had begun at £300,000; by 1985 it was 
£4,000,000 (Vir, 2012). 
 
The rationale behind these GLC funded workshops was to empower emerging black filmmakers 
by bestowing them with the means of establishing an autonomous production structure, 
permitting them to explore original filmmaking aesthetics and discourse that differed from the 
standardising and co-opting pressures of the dominant commercial market. These workshops 
marked an essential stage in the evolution of black and Asian British filmmakers towards self-
definition and self-expression.  In order to measure black workshop films’ impact at a cultural 
level it is first necessary to understand their political economy. The filmmakers were expected to 
be experimental, as opposed to achieving commercial success. They formed a component of a 
wider politico-cultural policy in which the imperative was to empower ethnic minority voices 
and permitting them to determine their own stylistic approach and discourse.  
However, the most crucial factor in the emergence of black filmmaking into the mainstream was 
the establishment of Channel 4 television in 1982. Channel 4 was conceived in terms of an 
extension of the boundaries and parameters of filmic and televisual representation, in terms of 
subject matter towards the periphery of British society and finding appropriate devices for this.  
At its advent, the brief was to represent the diversity of British voices. They were comparatively 
open to political pressure and had a particular remit, differing from the BBC, much more diverse 
in its programming and representation (Henriques 2011). Programmes devised specifically for 
black and ethnic minority filmmaking development emerged in the 80s via Channel 4’s regional 
workshops, with Sue Woodford appointed as the first commissioning editor for multi-cultural 
programming. The 1982 Channel 4 launch brochure declared that: 
 
Channel 4 will portray Britain as the multi-racial society it  
is, encouraging different ethnic groups to speak to us, entertain  
us, tell us how they perceive the world we share (Hobson 2007: 26). 
 
Sue Woodford continued by stating that: 
 
Black communities in the UK are very angry and they have very  
tough things to say about British society and the way the system  
works. If black film is to be authentic and actually acceptable to  
a black audience then it must have black involvement in the  
investment, the production, the casting and scripting, the editing  
and the receivership, that deals with issues at the forefront of the  
black community as opposed to the liberal white concerns over  
black identity and issues (Hobson 2007: 26). 
 
On the back of this declaration, she set up training schemes and courses, with the objective of 
generating a bigger production base in the future. Woodford saw this as an important component 
of her remit as she discovered the existence of a shortage of professionally trained black or Asian 
people working in television. In an effort to reverse the this lack of representation in TV, 
affirmative action was used to create behind the camera positions for people from ethnic 
mintories on her commissioned programmes. Crucially, existing film organisations like Ceddo, 
Black Audio Film Collective and Sankofa remained largely amateur and voluntary-run 
collectives, yet were identified as important locations for the implementation of Channel 4’s 
demanding talent development objectives, as they provided a direct link to the very ethnic 
minorities they were targeting. 
 
As the channel had no production facilities of its own and independent companies produced 
all of its output, the independent filmmakers identified Channel 4 as a means to bring 
controversial work to a wider audience, as well as securing funding for alternative practices. 
The station was decreed to facilitate programming for minority audiences by the Broadcasting 
Act of 1980, and as members of the Independent Filmmakers Association were present on the 
Production Board, the independent film and video artists possessed a degree of influence in its 
overall direction and shape. Channel 4, with its particular remit gave the parties the required 
funding to seal an agreement to the benefit of the independent film and video sector. The 
channel, which in usual circumstances commissioned on a per-programme basis, agreed to 
provide sustained funding for selected workshops. Channel 4 assisted in helping shape and 
implement the workshop agreement. Of immediate significance was that Channel 4 valued the 
cultural and socio-political ideologies of its targeted groups, allowing the collectives to 
operate on a purely creative terrain whilst crucially, the agreement stipulated that the film 
collective, and not the commissioner would own sole copyright to the work (Baker, 
1996:116). 
The close relationship between the groups and the Channel was conducive to achieving a clarity 
and unity of ideas, through Channel 4’s regional workshops led by the Commissioning Editor for 
Independent Film and Video, Alan Fountain. The workshops financed a tangible, organisational 
relationship between mainstream institutions and young filmmakers who, conscious of the socio-
political conflicts of the period, could exercise their own socio-political viewpoint through the 
aesthetics of film. Channel 4 gave Black Audio Film Collective, Ceddo Film & Video 
Workshop, Retake, and Sankofa Film and Video the creative platform to distribute their 
perspectives to the mainstream public. The shared objective was to train blacks and Asians with 
skills for entry into the film and television sectors. It was not just aesthetics and a stylistic 
approach that united these collectives with Channel 4, but politics, ideology and a community of 
political ideas, manifest in a collective desire to develop a filmic practice, which attacked the 
dominant representations of black experiences. There existed a consensus that Britain's black 
community had been miss-represented by the media and that the time was right to produce 
fresher methods of framing the black and Asian experience. There also existed a distinctive 
energy and urgency within the collectives because they had previously been forced to operate on 
the periphery of both the film industry and British society. 
At the time, while many believed that Channel 4 would provide a rare opportunity for the 
broadcast of black and ethnic minority film, there were fears that political pressure from the 
Conservative government might inhibit more polemical work from being broadcast. However, 
this era produced the most politically and aesthetically uncompromising Black films, which 
attacked racism at a time when increasing frustration and anger with discrimination and police 
brutality led to riots in Brixton, Birmingham and elsewhere, and it is believed to be a major high 
point in black British black expression through film (Diaware 1993: 66). Black Audio Film 
Collective interrogated colonialist representations in projects such as Expeditions, and Images of 
Nationality before producing Handsworth Songs - a documentary which presented the 
Birmingham suburb’s riots in relation to the turmoil of Thatcher-era oppressions. Sankofa, set up 
in summer 1983 by Martina Attile, Maureen Blackwood, Isaac Julien and Nadine Marsh-
Edwards, produced key films such as Who Killed Colin Roach, Territories and The Passion of 
Remembrance, a drama which investigated homosexual identity and experience in the context of 
race, providing a varied perspective on contemporary Black experiences. In addition, Black 
Audio Film Collective and Sankofa undertook education activities and film programming as well 
as production; having gained wider audiences with the help of Channel 4’s funding initiatives 
that promoted multiculturalism, it was imperative to leave the avenue open for future black 
filmmakers and moving image collectives to emerge. These initiatives included 16mm 
workshops for black women, the results of which were broadcast on the Channel. 
While the funding provided by Channel 4 was initially directed towards the workshop sector, 
by the mid 1980s a more concentrated film and video culture had a presence on the channel, 
with opportunities created for filmmakers in the slots made available by The Eleventh Hour, 
which during its run broadcast programmes devoted to the films and videos from the 
workshop movement.  The creation of this plurality on TV, specifically provision for 
politically aligned ethnic minority film and video, eventually influenced the BBC, which as a 




New Labour and the Language of Diversity 
In September 1985, police stopped an unemployed twenty four year old named Floyd Jarrett in a 
car in Tottenham, wrongly believing that the car was stolen. They then came to his home on the 
Broadwater Farm Estate, looking for stolen property. His mother, Cynthia, who weighed 20st, 
was prepared to co-operate but an argument broke out and she was pushed, falling and dying of a 
heart attack. On Sunday 6th October her relatives led a peaceful protest march towards 
Tottenham police station. However, by 9pm it was clear that the area was on the verge of 
erupting. A police officer was later shot, and at around 10:15, PC Keith Blacklock was 
surrounded and stabbed to death. At this point, Conservative MPs called for the restoration of the 
death penalty (McSmith 2010: 225). While this riot did not weaken Tory party policy, those who 
wanted to improve the circumstances of Britain’s ethnic minorities turned to more constructive 
methods. The Labour Party began to feel the presence of very determined black activists. Patricia 
Hewitt, who had become Neil Kinnock’s press secretary in 1983 was lobbied by a small 
contingent of recently elected members, two being Sharon Atkin and Diane Abbott. They 
persuaded her that the way to get around the reluctance of black and Asian communities to 
engage in activities dominated by whites was to create separate groups for them - in effect, 
ethnicising them (McSmith 2010: 227). 
By the mid 80’s, when films like Territories (Isaac Julien, 1984) and Passion of Remembrance 
(Isaac Julien 1986) gained international acclaim, it was apparent that a new film vernacular had 
been cultivated that shifted the narrative away from race relation discourses and into direct racial 
confrontation, with the objective of bringing to screen the racial antagonisms experienced by 
blacks in British society. The solidarity that developed amongst blacks and Asians during the late 
70’s and 80’s because of the racist policies, policing and marginalisation, created a pressure that 
needed an outlet, and that became a creative outlet.  
By the late 80’s, immigration was no longer the political issue it had previously been. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union discredited the idea of any alternative to free market capitalism. 
Thus, the Tories were more concerned with maximising British prosperity in the global market 
and the threat to British sovereignty posed by the European Union. The Monday Club remained, 
but its influence was now minimal and the political class had now turned away from such overt 
expressions of hostility towards ethnic minorities, with the new Prime Minister John Major 
attempting to ensure at least one black Conservative MP would be elected in the next election.  
A key policy that the outgoing Prime Minister pushed through that would leave a lasting legacy 
on the direction of the British film industry was the British Broadcasting Act of 1990. In 
particular, the 1990 Broadcasting Act and a change to Channel 4’s funding agreement in 1993 
were significant in shaping the Channel’s future; the financial stability afforded to Channel 4 by 
its unique funding mechanism meant that it had no immediate concerns over attracting a majority 
audience. For ten years it had the unique luxury of establishing itself with any programmes 
which it wished to provide, because it was not configured as a commercial channel. With the 
levy from the ITV companies removed, the reality that the Channel was not financially 
independent and now in direct competition with the BBC shifted its emphasis from creating 
controversial programming for minority Britain to that which allured mainstream Britain to the 
channel. This had particular ramifications for black filmmakers who had benefitted from nearly 
ten years of financial support from the channel – ethnicised filmmaking was no longer Channel 
4’s paramount concern.	  
In regard to the changes that took place after this period, there is no general consensus beyond 
the claim that there was a huge ideological shift at Channel 4. There is a debate here between 
academics and commentators who favour what in this context can be described as a de-alignment 
thesis (wherein the relationship between Channel 4 and its original remit has broken down 
because of the acceptance of commercialism, to the detriment of ethnic minorities and the 
working class) and those who subscribe to a re-alignment thesis (where the working class and 
ethnic minorities have become depoliticized through changes in living standards and the 
expansion of the middle class, and there is no longer a need for the original remit to be adhered 
to. But in the context of the triangulation that is politics, film, and its effects, the shift must be 
understood in terms of the class-race nexus within neoliberalism. 
However, despite these changes, black filmmakers continued to explore themes of race and 
exclusion in films such as Young Soul Rebels (1991, Isaac Julien). While there are numerous 
flaws in the script, in particular the attempts to amalgamate themes of race, sexuality and 
national identity, the film represented a continuation of the politicized films of the previous 
decade, and in using the characters’ relationships to provide the political commentary in the film, 
it demonstrated a standalone artistic statement of how existing racist practices continue to arrest 
the development of ethnic minorities in Britain. However, Young Soul Rebels signaled an end 
point in the development of the black film culture from formal and discursive exploration within 
non-mainstream films, towards a more populist, traditional narrative cinema with the sole 
intention of attracting wider audience. Well-received at the Cannes Film Festival, where it 
garnered a Best Film award from the French Society of Authors, the film was a commercial 
failure in the UK because it was not successful in crossing over to the emerging black youth 
market.  
 
The film was not heralded by the industry as a triumph for British cinema, but conversely to 
many, as an anathema. The desired image of Britain was of heritage and tranquillity, and there 
was no space for black filmmakers to effectively forge careers in the film industry, or even get 
their work to a wider audience. The Foreign Office declined to fund black British films at the 
1992 Carthage Film Festival specifically because they were deemed not likely to be 
representative of the kind of British cinema, and the British society that wanted (Murphy 2000: 
198). Devoid of funding as a result of changes in the cultural policies of local authorities, 
including the Greater London Authority (whose grant awarding framework differed from that of 
the GLC) and disregarded by the increasingly commercially-orientated Channel 4, many 
workshops that emerged in the 80’s were dissolved during the 90s, leaving a temporary but 
significant cultural void in black self-representation through cinema (Vir 2012). It was not until 
the mid to late 90’s that cultural institutions emphasis clearly shifted to ‘open doors’ for those 
specifically from ethnic minority backgrounds. They began to incorporate wider political aims 
into their own objectives, using terms like ’equality, ‘diversity’ and ‘underprivileged’, which 
mirrored the developing New Labour rhetoric. 
 
From the 50’s there were a series of shifts in dominant political discourse from assimilation to 
multiculturalism to racial equality, with further shifts during New Labours time in office.  
Throughout the 70’s and 80’s, the default critique from the right of multiculturalism had been 
that it is a corrosive of national identity. In Tony Blair’s vision, diversity without integration 
within Britain constituted a genuine threat to social cohesion unless it could be subsumed to a 
civic integration model defined through a nationalist perspective of a desirable and undesirable 
diversity, stating that: 
                            Integration is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values, it  
is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying  
British values. It is not about what defines us a people, but as 
Citizens (Rawnsley 2001: 300). 
 
Within this rhetoric, multiculturalism needed to be reconfigured as a form of liberal nationalism 
(Rawnsley 2001: 300). Thus, diversity as a form of governmentality is publically and officially 
aggrandised but only in methods and forms that define its self-interest within the government’s 
self-interest. But to understand the genesis, motivation, and effects of New Labour 
multiculturalism, we must first consider it as the by-product of Post- Macpherson-ism. Once in 
power, Jack Straw, in his role as Home Secretary, commissioned an inquiry into the murder of 
black teenager Stephen Lawrence, which the Conservatives had previously refused to do. On 22 
April 1993 Lawrence was stabbed to death while waiting with a friend at a bus stop in, 
Woolwich, South London in an unprovoked attack motivated by racial animus. The Metropolitan 
Police were heavily criticised for their conduct of the investigation. After fifteen years of 
campaigning by Stephen's parents, Straw announced a Judicial Inquiry in July 1997 to be led by 
Sir William Macpherson. The findings of what was known as the Macpherson Report, published 
on 24 February 1999, asserted that the Metropolitan Police investigation into the murder was 
"marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of 
leadership by senior officers” (Thomas 2011: 65). Macpherson made 70 recommendations with 
the objective of eliminating racist prejudice and disadvantage in “all aspects of policing." The 
Macpherson Report also asserted that the recommendations of the 1981 Scarman Report had not 
been implemented. More crucially, while the Scarman report concluded that "institutional 
racism" was not a reality in Britain, the Macpherson report concluded unequivocally that the 
police force was "institutionally racist" (Craig 2008: 112).	   
 
Not only did this report create the context for subjecting the police to Race relations legislation, 
the Macpherson Report informed the 2000 Race Relation Amendment Act which effectively 
required public authorities to adopt a much more structured and proactive stance against 
discrimination and race equality in the workplace (Rawnsley 2001:212). Specifically, this act 
introduced the potentially groundbreaking Equality Impact Assessments for all public bodies, 
requiring them to demonstrate that they are actively combating racism and promoting equality of 
opportunity and good race relations in all areas of their employment practices and service 
provision (Thomas 2011: 66). 
 
One of the major objectives for New Labour was the reversal of this trend of discrimination 
through social inclusion and opportunity. Tony Blair mainly chose to focus on education, 
employment and cultural activity, with culture in particular being seen as a viable means of 
regenerating urban areas and providing employment. The Government’s central belief was that 
an apparent black monopoly on oppression could be corrected by artistic involvement. Providing 
cultural solutions to apparent cultural problems would, it was hoped, have the triple effect of 
dampening the voices of second generation migrants contesting state racism, increasing 
employment and reducing poverty and refocusing delinquent energies into something tangible 
(Bharvashi 2007: 67). In wider society however, poverty for the poorest in society that had 
increased during the Conservative government of the 80s and early 90s, continued unabated.  
Policy moves towards multiculturalism appeared largely rhetorical and were seen by critics as 
naïve and liberal in their casual assumption that racism was holistically based on personal 
ignorance of the cultures of the ‘other’ (Thomas 2011: 67). There was also a belief that the 
multiculturalist policy approaches to race relations in previous decades had deepened the divides 
between ethnic communities. The key principle of the new community cohesion work was that 
of activities bringing people together through culture, specifically the arts, rather than political 








The UK Film Council and Diversity Within British Film 
The New Labour project represented a comprehensive, grounded political programme of 
accommodating cultural minority needs with the ultimate objective of neutralising aggressive 
anti racist disquiet. However, ensuring equality in terms of education and employment outcomes 
and in community facilities for ethnic communities took priority over concerted, political 
movements against racism. This was in effect a benevolent and essentially paternalistic 
perspective, but this more permissive, liberal view prevailed. The UKFC was formed in 1997, 
and signified the New Labour government’s intention to intervene in the organisation of film to a 
growing extent. It’s main aims initially were to provide facilities and encourage participation on 
a wide community level, but the suggestion that they continued to regard cinema as serving 
particular political and societal functions was most clearly highlighted in the main locations and 
target groups of their increasing intervention, targeting the ‘disadvantaged’ of the inner cities. 
During this period, the recognised disadvantaged groups were identified as women, ethnic 
minorities, and people with disabilities. Whilst funding provision came to be set aside for the 
development of participation in all of these groups, it was towards ethnic minorities, specifically 
those from the most economically deprived sections of society, where the need for access was 
particularly identified (Bhavnani 2007: 70). 
The continuous exclusion of ethnic minorities became one of the most problematic issues for the 
UKFC during this time. This was manifested in their two main objectives: i) to develop ethnic 
talent, and ii) to change the culture of British film, essentially to target audiences from all 
backgrounds whom they wished to attract. To achieve more ethnic minority participation, British 
film had to broaden its appeal to these diverse sections of the population, namely the lower 
classes, many of whom were of an ethnic minority. Because the industry was considered as being 
the preserve of middle-class, white, middle-aged men and women, and further because the Arts 
Council were essentially the custodians of public revenue via its funding from the National 
Lottery, the UKFC viewed ethnic minorities as crucial in their plans, and ethnicised film 
organisations and collectives became the target for several development proposals.	  
Government authorities and New Labour began searching for ways to replace the out-dated 
discourse of multiculturalism adopted by the GLC, manifested by compartmentalised and 
ethnicised arts funding with a more contemporary mode of identifying difference that had the 
potential to be reconciled with a focus on cohesion. The change in emphasis also involved 
advocating moving away from the single group support to initiatives that encouraged these 
groups to become less singular and more amalgamated. As a result, the Arts Council partnered 
21 film industry organisations in devising a Leadership in Diversity forum and created the first 
ever Equalities Charter for film, and subsequently the Equalities Charter for Film Programme for 
Action. The Charter pledged six clear aims including:  
 
• identifying the barriers to the industry 
• encouraging communities to enjoy film culture 
• welcoming employment from all communities 
• encouraging all to remain in the industry 
• developing and adopting equality and diversity polices  
• taking steps to increase on-screen diversity (Bhavnani 2007: 78) 
 
The Film Council’s five board members, Alan Parker, Stuart Till, Tim Bevan, Paul Webster, and 
Parminder Vir took diversity agenda into the Film Council, mainstreaming black film talent and 
ensuring at least 1-2 black officers within the Diversity Sub-Committee in the New Cinema 
Fund. In October 2000, out of a paper Vir wrote for the Board, the Diversity Agenda emerged, 
which in turn resulted in the appointment of a Diversity Officer, Marcia Williams (Vir 2012). 
From the early 2000s, the Film Council initiated a number of schemes to widen participation, 
remove barriers to participation, eradicate social exclusion and change the culture of British Film 
& TV, with social being racial, rather than economic, meaning that in line with the growing 
concern for ethnic inclusion in film, ethnic minorities alone became a focal point for film 
diversity attention. While this resulted in schemes and opportunities being made available for 
ethnic minorities from low-income areas, the white working class generally were not part of a 
wider development plan for the British film industry. Because this policy targeted the ethnic 
identity, as opposed to the economic status, from this position the class-discrimination argument, 
which suggests that people are excluded simply because they are in fact working class, can be 
legitimised. Essentially, it seemed to imply a dichotomous mode of thinking, whereby the 
experiences of blacks and of whites were regarded as mutually exclusive. 
There existed a fundamental problem with this discourse. In explaining social exclusion in 
British film culture in relation to one’s race, they conceptualised the issue around simple 
dichotomies, solely between whites and ethnic minorities. This distinction is found not only to be 
inaccurate, but also false; it presents a distinction cultivated to divide society into sections that 
are not entirely exclusive and quintessential - it assumes that exclusion is a cultural rather than a 
class reality, and that it is holistically race that dominated peoples exclusion, rather than class.  
 
The violent urban disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the north of England during 
the summer of 2001 were the most serious outbreaks of disorder in Britain since the inner city 
disturbances in the early 80’s. The disturbances were seen as symptomatic of much wider 
problems with the state of ethnic relations nationally.  The analysis of the 2001 riots provided an 
opportunity for policy makers to advance a new dialogue in race relations, adding a further 
dimension to New labour’s conceptualisation of multicultural Britain (Thomas 2011: 60). It 
seriously downplayed specific causal factors for the disturbances, such as far right racist political 
agitation. In ignoring these facts, this position had pedigree in the New Labour Third Way 
ideology that governments had no specific role in combating racism through anti-racist policies, 
and creating the space and environments within our public institutions for social cohesion and 
the efforts of the individual could be deployed as the new priority for race relations. 
The emergence from the late 90’s of a government that took an interest in film, and opportunities 
for financial assistance from the newly-established National Lottery brought new demands on 
British film governing bodies, especially those who wished to compete for grants. Funding came 
to be offered as a quid pro quo exchange for proposals to remove barriers to participation and 
promote racial inclusion within British film culture. Increased competition for funding facilitated 
an extension of interdependency ties between film and their representative governing bodies. The 
issue of racial inequality was neither raised nor deemed of paramount concern to dominant 
groups like the BBC at this time. So, up until the late 20th century this was most certainly not an 
issue of social or political importance. The competitive struggles for dominance between BBC 
Films & Film Four led to numerous unintended consequences, which influenced the general 
direction in which black British films developed. The BBC, for example, were forced to be 
competitive with other governing bodies on an economic (and more crucially) a representational 
level, as well as in terms of attracting commercially viable scripts. Thus, they also underwent a 
distinct internal morphing, as a result becoming much more diverse and focused on inclusion. 
Principally, these structural changes were implemented by coercion; the consequences of the 
wider social processes. However, the marginalised groups themselves had little power to label 
their own exclusion as a problem, and the power of groups acting on their behalf, if there were 
any, was comparatively small. Essentially, they had insufficient power chances to effectively 
challenge their marginalisation cinematically and, as such, it was not until the very end of the 
20th century before the inequalities within British film industry gave substantial cause for 
concern. 
 
The early 90’s had seen the flourishing of Hollywood films commissioned from African 
American filmmakers as the major studios such as Universal Pictures and Warner Bros. 
recognized the commercial potential of this tradition of independent filmmaking practice. 
Amongst the well known films of this type are the series of ‘ghetto’ films depicting guns, crime, 
violence and black youth subculture exemplified by Do the Right Thing (Spike Lee, 1989), New 
Jack City ( Mario Van Peebles, 1991) and Boyz In the Hood (John Singleton, 1992 ). Many of 
these films were dubbed ‘crossover films’ because they mix the cinematic techniques garnered in 
independent practice with mainstream generic values (Hallam 2000: 86). 
This was clearly the wider ambition for Bullet Boy (Saul Dibb, 2005) Life and Lyrics (Richard 
Laxton, 2006) and Rollin’ With The Nines (Julian Gibley, 2006) with the former being dubbed ‘a 
British Boyz in the Hood’. However the difference is that there is a strand of African American 
independent filmmaking that adopts contemporary realist practices, using strategies that openly 
engage with the lived realities of urban life to depict the psychological, economical and social 
consequences of racism and marginalization on its characters. This is a distinct and crucial 
feature absent within the British offshoot.  
 
In the light of social-reform policy throughout the early 2000’s, film was seen as a vehicle 
through which the process of ethnic minority socialisation could be made more fluid, with 
cinema regarded as important in teaching young people in particular life skills and educational 
objectives. It is unsurprising that removing barriers to participation and preventing the social 
exclusion of particular groups from participating in film also became objectives for the BFI, ITV 
as well as the BBC and Channel 4. However, it is important to note that the objective was merely 
to include, rather than to develop ethnic minority talent in ways that would allow them to display 




Case Study: Bullet Boy 
 
A spate of knife and gun crimes amongst sections of the black working class youths in areas such 
as North West London, Hackney and parts of South London, including several widely publicised 
murders on the St Raphel’s and Stonebridge Park estates in Harlesden revived issues of black 
alienation in the public consciousness. ‘Postcode wars’, a term used frequently to describe 
conflicts between youths from particular districts of London, was one of the supposed causes of 
the violence. Youth involvement in the drugs trade was also considered a prime factor. As a 
result, the Met Police, somewhat controversially, set up Operation Trident with the sole aim of 
investigating crime within the black communities. This racialising of crime seemed to suggest 
that the police regarded black on black violence as a standalone form of criminality, and as 
reflected in wider society, entitled to only a reduced focus. 
 
As black-on-black violence soared, the British film world felt it was ready for something 
authentic and passionate, worthy and different. The middle class media approached the issue of 
black crime and culture like it was an intellectual issue in abstract thought. The Film Council 
seemed to have a desire for the sights, sounds, smells and tastes of the urban world and all its 
connotations. If the semantics are to be considered, ‘Urban’ really meant crossover. The 
aesthetics, rather than the sociology, was now the focus. It could be assimilated, categorized, 
commercialised and made profitable. However, the choice of film was constantly congruent with 
the tastes of a middle class, educated audience looking for forms of entertainment that offer 
something different from the normal Hollywood fanfare or British heritage film. 
Developed and financed through the BBC’s drama department with an additional financial 
contribution from the UK Film Council’s New Cinema Fund, Bullet Boy was directed by a white, 
middle class filmmaker, Saul Dibb. The film was an attempt at a social realist treatment of the 
milieu of disenfranchised black British urban youths: sequence shooting, and the deep focus 
cinematography, with an obedience and fidelity to real time, as well as the employment of 
natural lighting and the hand held, almost cinema verite camera action employed to generate 
spontaneity, are all used to marry cast and location together and give the impression that the 
fictional situations emerge spontaneously from the real social context.  
Under the supervision of the BBC Films producer Ruth Caleb, who had a reputation for 
producing improvisational television drama, the film was made using workshop techniques. This 
strategy was essential to achieving a cultural impact among young viewers, both black and white, 
by credibly rendering their lifestyles, behavioral characteristics and vernacular on screen. At a 
cultural level, as well as its box office gross of £450,000 and positive reviews, it prompted a 
constant stream of requests by schools and art house venues across the UK for educational film 
screenings. The film also achieved good distribution abroad, being selected for the Toronto 
International Film Festival and winning a Hitchcock d’Or at the Dinard Festival of British Film. 
The filmmakers clearly felt that they could use a quasi- social realist cinematic approach to bring 
forward this issue as evident in Verve Pictures press release for the film: 
Its naturalistic representation of characters, time and place,  
and its use of authentic language have drawn comparisons  
with milestone British films like Ken loaches Kes and  
Horace Ove’s Pressure (Sin, 2008:1) 
 
However in the main, Bullet Boy is not even tangentially about socio-political commentary. Gun 
crime has been explained as a cultural problem without any reference to sustained and structured 
inequality. Within Bullet Boy, criminality has been framed in relation to the perceived 
behavioural and cultural characteristics of a specific racial group; social policy is not shown as 
responsible for Ricky’s predicament – it’s the individual’s inability to make suitable life choices 
which is to blame, and it entails no relationship between the state and ethnic minorities.  
By rooting themselves in documentary aesthetics, they were attempting to observe characters 
through a window; however, this resulted in them defining their subjects from the outside. The 
onscreen result is a series of clichés that fall short of the images they were looking for, 
portraying mere probes and clichés rather than characters with their own history and weight. 
They present a character whose problems with race and class seem non-existent. It de-
contextualises the drama and offers a social backdrop for individual relations. A political film is 
not only one directly concerned with recognised political power structures, but is also likely to 
be, at least at surface level, critical of those structures. 
However, the film appeared to have contributed to the development of a new contemporary sub-
genre – the black youth-orientated film. Films within this sub genre portray a bleak inner city 
and a youth culture in which drugs, gun crime and youth delinquency are a daily reality. Bullet 
Boy was quickly followed by a number of films that claimed to deal with issues of black crime 
and gang subculture in London, presented through a number of themes such as the underground 
music scene or the drugs trade, such as Life and Lyrics, Rollin’ With the Nines, Kidulthood 
(Menhaj Huda, 2006) Adulthood (Noel Clark, 2008) and Shank (Mo Ali, 2010). The film world’s 
embracing of the urban film represented the worst form of white liberal guilt for the oppressed 
‘other’. Blacks had been making and featuring in films for decades with few critical column 
inches dedicated to it. Suddenly, when these films were made with the endorsement of New 
Labour, the BBC and Channel 4 they were aggrandised as being innovative and culturally valid. 
It was an arrangement that seemed to satisfy everyone; the liberal Channel 4 and the left wing 
liberal middle class press that were equally ashamed of Britain's aristocratic, colonial past, and 
the BBC desperate for absolution for decades of marginalising black arts and to avoid the 
perpetual fear of losing part of its licence fee to Channel 4. However, as the BBC and Channel 4 
fought to become the avatar of British urban film culture, blacks themselves became not the chief 
contributors or the consumers, but the mere objects of middle class imaginations, steeped in pre 
conceived notions and anecdotes from both British liberal and right wing press. Their job was 
merely to feature, but not to theorize, strategize or steer it. More crucially, because of the 
concentration and composition of films like Bullet Boy, Kidulthood, and various TV dramas with 
ethnic characters, there was an inordinate pressure on each film to be representative, and say as 
much as possible in one filmic statement. However, this had a marginalizing effect that seemed 
to reinforce rather than ameliorate the otherness of the subjects. In addition, the various left, 
liberal and middle class media’s obsession with the self - gratifying practices of respect for 
cultural difference found a particular expression in this form of multiculturalism in the way black 
films have been embraced, and a seductive property of multiculturalism is the cultural validity it 
affords the liberal middle class (Lentin and Titley 2011: 180). However, approaching all cultures 
as equal, in the sense of equivalence as opposed to equality – and hence open to criticism 
remains the key flaw in the historical and current critiques of black British filmmaking, 
demonstrated in the critical response to Bullet Boy:  
                            A shockingly stark and gritty portrait of what life is like for 
a young black man growing g up in urban London and all  
the trials and tribulations that go with it. If you need a reality  
check, then this is a must see movie (Hannigan, 2004:1). 
 
What gives the film such topical punch is the devastating portrait  
that it paints of the gun culture that has crept into our inner cities.  
Dibb’s social drama is unsparingly frank; it’s an important and  
impressive debut (Frith, 2004: 1). 
	  
The reluctance of film reviewers to openly criticise black filmmaking has hindered the 
development of an improved aesthetic, and in this case sociological quality of black cinema, 
which can only be achieved by exposure to a universal criteria that is unaffected patronage, 
hyper-liberalism and the fear of charges of racism. 
At this point, we must also unpick 'black filmmaking' as a term. Sarita Malik describes the term 
black British film as the films “which draw on the manifold experience of, and which, for the 
most part are made by film-makers drawn from the Asian, African and Caribbean diaspora”, 
referring to the fact that by the 80s ‘black’ became an adopted umbrella term (Malik 1996: 203, 
204). They did not come as empty vessels, they came with deep cultural practices and traditions 
and stories. They had to assume this label as this was what the institutions gave them, the prefix 
of black was sufficient. It was not just the colour of skin, it was the political position and where 
they stood in relation to the institutions. Saul Dibb is white, as were the producer, writer and 
director of Babylon. Babylon however effectively highlights both civic racism and institutional 
racism in the form of police harassment and brutality - unlike Bullet Boy, which attempts to 
investigate themes present in Babylon like youth unemployment and gun crime with no depth of 
analysis into the systemic causes of these issues, rendering the film thin and clichéd. 
 
Within this permissive climate, a sense of expectancy existed amongst black and ethnic minority 
filmmakers that a lasting black film culture could finally find its stride. A default charge against 
essentialised funding and cultural programmes preserved for ethnic minorities was that those 
producers and practitioners involved in the decision making process have lacked the cast of 
mind, effective organisation skills or even the interest to effectively develop a lasting black 
British film culture despite the scale of the opportunities they were offered, and have failed to 
maximise the compensatory power afforded to them. However, while provisions were made for 
ethnic minority inclusion in the form of film education and workshops, evidence suggests 
minority ethnic groups had difficulties in accessing funds for feature film development and 
production, rendering the numerous schemes put in place by the Film Council abortive. Of 106 
applications to the Film Council’s New Cinema Fund 2007, the application response rate 
amongst ethnic minorities was 38%. Our of the total applications, only 4% of awards went to 
minority ethnic applicants (so less than one in a hundred) 26% went to women (27% response 
rate) and none to those with a disability (8% response rate). The Premiere Fund’s 99 awards 
comprised 3 % to ethnic minority applicants (response rate 58%), 27% to women (36% response 
rate), and none to disabled applicants (response rate 16%). Minority ethnic applicants received 
8% of the 409 awards from the Development Fund’s (response rate 60%), women took 30% 
(response rate 50%) and people with disabilities 7 % (response rate 15.6%) (Bhavnani 2007: 
145). From this evidence, it can be argued that if a marginalised and minority social group are 
identified for the purpose of cultural development, it is likely the very schemes and programmes 
implemented, and ultimately the results of the intervention will in turn be marginal and minor. 
A study of minority ethnic film professionals’ views undertaken by the BFI in 2000 showed 
there was considerable discontent with the film establishment of the UK. Respondents felt that 
the BFI was dominated by white middle-class men and women who were seen to have a limited 
understanding of minority groups and their cultural needs. They also believed there to be a lack 
of investment and staff involvement in both black and Asian affairs within the BFI. In response, 
the BFI took steps in the years that followed to set up film festivals on both African and black 
film in the form of the African Odysseys programmes and made concerted efforts to develop and 




The Class/Race Nexus in British Film 
The late 1990’s saw a spate of films that depicted the decay of working- class masculinity and 
men undergoing crises with the loss of manufacturing industries like Brassed Off  and The Full 
Monty. Regional working-class identity is viewed as relatively stable but in decline and this 
makes it easier to export the British image abroad. More crucially, ethnic characters are virtually 
non-existent; the few who are present remain on the periphery. The few attempts to incorporate 
ethnic characters in films depicting the working class suffered from a lack of fidelity. In Secrets 
and Lies (Mike Leigh, 1996) a young black professional woman decides to seek out her 
biological mother after the death of both her black foster parents, discovering that her mother is 
in fact white. While the film attempts to distort the traditional colour coding of black and white 
social standings (her mother is part of the white working class, while she represents the black 
middle class) what is absent in Secrets and Lies is awareness – Marianne Jean Baptiste’s 
performance as a mixed race character is devoid of plausibility as her ethic composition is in no 
way mixed race. In addition, as the narrative is not told from a black perspective despite the 
black character being central to the story, it could be suggested that the ethnic character has been 
created to supply visual interest to an otherwise white film.  
Anti-racist politics have had a both mutually beneficial and antagonised relationship with state 
multiculturalism. While opportunities have been created via a cultural discourse for ethnic 
minorities, within this embrace between the multiculturalists and their experimental subjects, 
credible testimonies and dialogue of mainstream racism of the present day are muted. 
Multiculturalism manifests itself in cultural equality, as opposed to socio-political equality. The 
core of this argument is that culture, be it in the form of ethnic or national, remains a commodity 
that can both be made profitable and provide a cultural validation to those who implement it and 
those who subscribe to and consume it. However, political equality offers no such dividend. The 
notion of a political equality implicates the government in that existing inequality in its various 
forms has continued unabated despite its evident detrimental effects, and exposes the 
government as wilful allies of the status quo (Craig 2008: 122). Political transformation is 
changed to a cultural transformation. In this context, multiculturalism under New Labour can be 
understood as a replacement for a failed political project, manifested as an enthusiasm for 
difference. 
The legacy of this New Labour discourse is that inequality has become understood almost 
exclusively through the prism of race and ethnicity, contested through multiculturalism.  
However, this disregards the existence of a multi-racial working class.  Politically, the interests 
of this multi-ethnic working class is not seen as having a place in the classless multiculturalism, 
with the focus being on building an ethnic minority middle class by engineering diversity within 
the leading professions (Jones 2011: 78). Further, the term ‘white working class’ suggests that 
people of ethnicity cannot be considered as working class, occupying the position of the other. 
 
This discourse can explain the absence from much of British social realism from the 90’s 
onwards of the presence of ethnic minority characters. It could also be suggested that the reason 
why a overtly political filmmaker such as Ken Loach has never investigated issues of race and 
inequality from a black working class point of view is because he may feel unqualified to do so 
as a white director.  Significantly, it is only in Aye Fond Kiss that Loach focuses his camera 
towards an ethnic minority community, and John Hill has repeatedly highlighted the absence of 
non-white characters in Loach’s work (Hill 1999: 204).  
 
However, in the context of social realism, if the director approaches the issue from a Marxist 
perspective this would enable him to transcend the racial dimension, as those Marxist 
perspectives on class form the higher universal category. In theory, the former contributes to the 
development of a false dichotomy in the way that historically the British government 
compartmentalise the working class by racial definitions in order to undermine the potential for 
the collectivisation of working class people’s interests and experiences.  
It is possible that there may be other reasons why a director does not feel they can work through 
the issues that would link the particular (race) to the more general (class) in a cinematic work of 
art - which is different to theorising the issue. It is possible that it is more prosaic, and Loach has 
never had the opportunity to direct a story/script that would accomplish this objective. His 
dependency on his scriptwriters, predominantly Jim Allen (white) and after Allen’s death Paul 
Laverty (also white), could also suggest the issue is more correlated to how the scriptwriters feel 
about the class-race nexus. 
Both explanations are equally plausible. While race and class are (or can be) related, there is 
axiomatically a world of difference between them. Even as a middle class Oxbridge educated 
white male, Loach has no problem in observing and analysing (often Northern) working class 
culture. Maybe one could speculate that even if he doesn't 'belong' in this milieu, it is something 
he is familiar with and is comfortable commenting upon it. However, when it comes to observing 
and analysing black culture, it is something with which Loach has had no real connection and 
does “not feel comfortable with” (Loach, 2011). 
 
“I find ‘race’ such a miss-applied word; I’m not comfortable  
with that phrase. I’m interested in the collective experience,  
be it Irish or Spanish or black, or anything. But contemporary  
black culture is very distinctive, I’m old, I’ve no direct  
experience of the lives they live. I would not be comfortable  
with it.” (Loach, 2011) 
 
From this, while Loach can recognise that a collectivised working class exists, there is still 
something of a fear that white directors making films about black culture would be seen as crass 
and lacking in understanding and/or authenticity no matter how good or bad the film might 
actually be. In addition, the vast majority of Ken Loaches films and films that fall under the 
social realism umbrella in general tend to be set in Northern towns and cities - 45% of non-
whites live in London alone. So in one sense his films ethnic composition accurately reflects 
many parts of England presented in his films. However, what has been cultivated is an ideology 
that cannot stand firm under the weight of scrutiny considering that Britain’s history of migration 
is of immigrates assimilating into an existing class structure at working class level, if we 
consider that ethnic minorities make up 35% of the retail workforce, while 14% of public 
transport drivers are ethnic minorities (Alexander and James 2011:17)..Domestic workers are 
nearly two thirds likely to be of black or ethnic minority origin, while unemployment amongst 
blacks remains above the European average. Exposure to poverty is still overwhelmingly 
organised by race. If you are born black and poor, your chances of remaining poor remain 
significantly higher than if you are born white and poor. This is because race – for all the 
piecemeal years of race equality legislation - still acts as the chief barrier to equal access to the 
opportunities of British life. Ethnic minorities still lack the kind of filmic representation that 
reflects the reality of 21st century working class Britain.  
The essential problem also exists in determining whether the genesis of British racism actually 
resides in the very nature of the class system, or in the racism and its associated practices which 
pervade British culture. British society is unequivocally unequal, with those on the periphery of 
society having many interwoven disadvantages. Economically, immigrant groups and ethnic 
minorities form part of this working class structure, often in occupations which predominantly 
position then at the very bottom of the hierarchical structure. They, therefore, share a socio-
economic disadvantage with those historically considered to be of the white working class. 
Further, the demands from the capitalist economy for additional workers in the post war climate 
resulted in those from the Commonwealth being employed in traditional low paying working 
class jobs, forming a substitute band of labour that functioned to keep real wages low and 
disciplining those already in work by creating a potential reserve work force who, eager to 
assimilate into their new society, will occupy any role available (Abercrombie 2000: 253). From 
this perspective, the social class position of ethnic minorities is functionally conducive to the 
requirements of the capitalist socio-economic structure. Thus, contemporary ethnic disadvantage 
is essentially a function of the British class structure. Widespread racism remains within certain 
sections of the white working class groups, through the political process of pitching this 
demographic directly against ethnic minorities in the race for employment and housing. This 





Problematic Approaches to Diversity 
 
The cuts made by the Coalition government towards the arts sector in 2010 signaled the end of 
essentialised funding to black and ethnic minority arts. And with issues of race and identity 
returning to public consciousness, adequate consideration must now be given to whether a 
distinctively ‘black’ identity still exists. What needs to be dismantled is the naïve rhetoric that a 
single film or character can ventriloquise for an entire socio-ethnic community. When an artistic 
practice is ethicized, it is instantly marginalized, pushing it further away from the mainstream 
into which is it trying to assimilate. This is the conundrum; films and filmmakers want to be 
recognized as different but still want it to be accepted wholeheartedly into mainstream British 
cinema. 
 
What must be recognised is that in terms of film and television, black is essentially a politically 
constructed category, and fixing a hegemonic version of what it means to be Black British is a 
long established ideological maneuver and like all ideology, such discourses attempt to organize 
people’s behaviour and their perception of themselves. In this context, questions about black 
representation become problematic, as it implies a homogenous body with a single set of 
interests. But that black and ethnic minority cultural homogeneity has become fragmented by 
issues such as class, gender, sexuality and region. Present identities are heterogeneous, and black 
Britain is internally divided and less cohesive than the white middle or upper classes. Black 
culture is multiply constituted and can no longer be reduced to a singular formation around 
which a fixed identity can be constructed. Thus, a one - tone approach to behavioural conduct 
cannot form the standard to which an entire race can be amalgamated into a filmic 
representation. This is the existing problem; the need for a film culture that displays ethnic 
minorities as assimilated, prosperous and with social and economic agency, and a cinema that 
recognises existing systemic inequality and oppression amongst a black working class. This is 
where film and TV writers, directors and producers are often found wanting. Evidently, diversity 
quotas do not take into consideration not only the divided identity of black Britain, but also the 
antagonistic relationship that exists. The black middle class will reject negative depictions of 




post racial British society, but also in order to distinguish themselves from the black working 
classes below. 
 
Ethnic minorities formed a cohesive group in conflict with Thatcherism, and in particular and 
challenging both this authority and the white middle class film industry, through cinema, helped 
make them stronger and more cohesive, as they collectivised in opposition to the oppressive 
frameworks in Britain in the 80’s. However, through multiculturalism and the race to assimilate 
into middle class society via New Labour rhetoric, that very black British identity has become 
much more individualised, less cohesive and more internally divided. They now lack the 
solidarity of the previous generation and therefore, possess insufficient power to collectively 
mount an adequate and effective challenge to the current hegemony. 
 
Much of the films mentioned in this chapter refrain from outlining a coherent political imperative 
precisely because of the daunting task it represents within the narrative. There has been (and 
remains) an irregular representation of black, and other minority ethnic groups in UK films. A 
large proportion of this representation, however, can be interpreted as tokenistic gestures that 
were unlikely to have any serious cultural impact on the evolving racial and cultural realities of 
post-war Britain. What we have witnessed via state multiculturalism is the depoliticisation and 
culturalisation of social and political life. Equally, black films in Britain are more concerned with 
how closely they approximate socio-cultural (as opposed to socio-political) realities, where 
credible issues of racial inequality and discrimination created by systemic frameworks fail to 
insinuate themselves anywhere in the narrative.	  Explaining social exclusion in cultural terms 
provides a decidedly inaccurate illustration of a much more complex social landscape.	  	  Current 
cinematic and televisual discourses still do not provide an adequate and in-depth explanation of 
the inequalities produced in societies in which the racialised continue unabated to be the targets 
of institutionalised discrimination and scapegoating.  
Admittedly, a key difference is presence. The 80s saw the growth of black British film, as 
independent workshops provided the environment for young Black filmmakers to develop their 
work, whilst the public institutions such as BFI, the Arts Council, Greater London Council and 
Channel 4 provided financial support for exhibition and distribution.	  In addition, the late 70s and 




perceptions of police oppression and social disorder. That remains the case now, albeit in a much 
more sophisticated form, yet there have been very few depictions of black people in a political 
way on screen. 	  Race is not the political issue that it once was. Class has not replaced it, but 
religion has in the form of Islam; young Muslims have taken over this position of the ‘other’ in 
both radical and conservative discourse. Black characters have now been depoliticised in the 
name of post -Macpherson multiculturalism and whilst visible on screen, they are often reduced 
to peripheral characters or in professions where race is seldom mentioned. 
It’s true that by the late 90s black and Asian communities had become more established within 
British society. In broad terms, there was an emerging and confident third generation and a 
bigger ethnic minority general workforce in parts of the creative industries. There has been a 
great muddying of class and race identities taking place over the past 20 years or so. Socially, 
only the most extreme examples now stand out as being obvious. And maybe this is another 
problem; we can all identify the oppressors and the oppressed at the top and the bottom, but it is 
much harder to define, and represent those that exist in between.  Without such obvious identity 
cards of both class and race, it becomes far more arduous to produce distinctive narratives that 
recur in film or politics. 	  
Though no clear resolutions are visible, what is apparent is that it is the way these characters are 
selected and contextualised that determines whose interest is being served. It’s not solely an 
absence of ethnic minority characters from British film; the characters emerge, but in a range of 
modes that deny their full inclusion. To subscribe to current trends would be to accept that black 
characters can only occupy roles as the oppressed ‘other’ or the subject of white anxiety. What 
must be avoided is a series of unconvincing ethnic characters inserted into a narrative to fulfill 
diversity quotas. The specificity of race is unnecessary if it invokes tokenism by film and TV 
producers afraid of appearing racist in a liberal, artistic environment. 
 
It is suggested that the rift between black filmmakers and the British film establishment also 
stems from the fact that the decision makers are almost entirely white; problems 
can arise when commissioners see little economic or cultural benefit in financially supporting 
and commissioning the development of black filmmakers and a black film culture (Berkley 




and are thus not in a suitable position to effectively assess a film’s potential commercial and 
critical impact. Therefore, despite the changes made in the British film industry, it is suggested 
here that the vast majority of these changes have been maladroit. The film industry still does not 
represent the racial composition of the UK and takes a narrow view of where talent may be 
found. Existing recruitment practices are at the core of this issue, making it arduous for specific 
groups to consolidate a position in the industry. This has, and will continue to restrict the kinds 
of films that are produced in the UK and expanded the verticality between the British film 
industry and diverse audiences (Bhavnani 2007: 181). 
 
Unequivocally, Channel 4 has been a pivotal force in British cinema since the early 80s, making 
possible a significant number of black and Asian films in Britain, gradually been re-defined by 
cultural and ethnic hybridity. However, Channel 4’s multicultural department, initially 
aggrandised as fundamental to challenging Britain’s white middle class dominated industry, 
failed in its objective to develop a lasting black film production culture, and ultimately served as 
piecemeal tokenism, enabling the mainstream of the channel to continue its programming 
untouched by the increased demands for a balanced representation of ethnic minorities in the 
film and television industry, and by the changing face of British society.  	  
	  Further, the impact of the workshops is also a subject of ongoing controversy. For some, the 
workshops simply institutionalised black creativity and encouraged their co-opting into an 
impotent race relations film discourse devoid of any lasting cultural impact, for both black 
Britons and the wider British society. In the mid 90s it became apparent that Channel 4 had to 
pursue ratings, although it still had its experimental wing in the Independent Film and Video unit 
led by Alan Fountain. This move towards a much more commercial strand of filmmaking is also 
evident in their films depicting Black communities, such as Babymother (Julian Henriques, 
1998).  
The closure of the Multicultural Department in 2002 by Michael Jackson represented the 
acceptance of New Labour’s post-multiculturalism discourse within public service broadcasting. 
In 2000, a network of UK broadcasters including Channel 4 established the Cultural Diversity 
Network (CDN) specifically designed to promote cultural diversity both in front and behind the 




now rearticulated multiculturalism as part of a broader agenda in which ethnic diversity was just 
one element in the equation (Malik; 2007:6). 
                                              
                                             Diversity in TV and the media. It's a big subject - and a top priority for us  
                                             at Channel 4. After all, our job is to appeal to everyone, whatever their  
                                             culture, nationality, religious persuasion, physical and mental ability,  
                                             sexual orientation, race or age. 
 
                                             Channel 4 prides itself on the wide range of people it employs. Not only  
does this reflect its audience more accurately, it also promotes the variety  
of creative thinking and programming that have made Channel 4 what it is  
today. It's only by attracting people from the widest possible backgrounds  
with the most diverse range of attitudes, opinions and beliefs that we can  
keep producing the kind of challenging, engaging output you've come to  
expect from us.  In essence, we want to respect people for who not what  
they are. People should be judged on how they do their job and what they  
bring to the table, which is why we strive to create an atmosphere where  
everyone feels free to contribute without fear. This way, we can get the  
very best for everyone, whichever side of the screen you sit. 
 
                                             So we're constantly looking for ways to help more people from diverse  
backgrounds break into the industry. We're not just talking on-screen  
either, but all the other areas it takes to keep a media business going:  
production, creative, planning, press relations, commissioning, HR,  
finance, commercial, new media and so on. Our aim is to nurture new  
talent and original ideas; champion alternative voices and fresh  
perspectives; challenge people to see the world differently and inspire  
real change (Channel 4: 2013). 
 
The drive for an authentic, self actualising ethnic minority film practice was dominant at 
Channel 4 during a time when film culture and commerce had a much more benevolent 
relationship. However, under neoliberalism, this had to adhere to an economic logic, and it could 
not compete. Economic value was assigned to something not previously considered in economic 
terms. Profit became the ultimate horizon of significance, not the cultivation of a film culture by 




economic and commercial forces through the subjective interests of New Labour and its 
neoliberal agenda.  
So why is there a continued association in academia with Channel 4 with its original remit, and 
appeals to the Channel to once again provide spaces for the alternative voices in British film? It’s 
because Channel 4 was the first to articulate a commitment to ethnic minority filmmaking as an 
ideological view. We could trace multicultural discourses beyond Channel 4, at the BBC and 
ITV, but these did not have the same cultural impact. These are achievements from the past that 
must be celebrated, but that is the past; there are too many limitations to what’s current.  There 
has been an institutional transformation of Channel 4, and many may argue that Channel 4’s 
original remit is a relic of the 80’s. But it’s not nostalgic to have films that are made by and for 
disempowered communities that still these days have no meaningful representation. Naturally the 
style and approach and method will change over time, but the ambition should remain urgent and 
vital. What is present is a film and a broadcasting culture that is de-coupled from public mass 
opinion. The mainstream media seem to be remote from what people are actually saying and 
feeling. As an industry, they admit that they have found it arduous to reach out to ethnic minority 
and working class audiences, but are unable to produce a credible method of redressing this.	  
The UKFC was also guilty of failing to make a lasting impact on Black British cinema. What has 
been lamented by many is that there was no essentialised, specific fund for black and ethnic 
minority filmmakers to develop feature length films. At the time, the UKFC insisted that black 
filmmakers did not require a separate, ethnicised fund, as confidence existed amongst their board 
members that black film development could be included within the mainstream funding schemes. 
But those very gatekeepers made it harder for blacks to penetrate the mainstream to which they 
intended to open the doors.	  
A key difference from the GLC fund or the early Channel 4 period was that the UKFC demanded 
commercial returns on investment. Resources were managed by fund managers and not by 
cultural committees, and via a system of commissioning editors. In effect, these were public 
servants applying a studio system structure. The National Lottery money was not used in an 
innovative or risk taking way. From a black perspective, this was a major failure. This is not to 
suggest that cultural value of film was reduced to a simple question of commercial viability and 




New Labour, in the sense that there existed a need to justify government spending on culture 
other than in its instrumental use to health, education and defense.  
In addition, the diversity agenda became process led, as opposed to creativity led, focussed on 
damage limitation or reducing exposure to equal opportunities legislation.  The appointment of 
Marcia Williams, a barrister with a track record in implementing equal opportunities policy in 
the corporate sector, is evidence that diversity became a minimalist issue to hide behind, as 
opposed to encourage risk taking. It is argued here that trying to measure the cultural value of 
diversity in UK film became a bureaucratic process disconnected to the real activity of actually 
making films, whether or not the films are ostensibly commercial.  
Further, diversity became a whole genre in itself, moving away from equal opportunities 
specifically for ethnic minorities.	  	  Marcia Williams has explained that the UKFC’s use of the 
term ‘diversity’ included ‘equality of opportunity’, a central tenant of New Labour’s Third Way 
ideology. This broader definition was required as existing terms such as ‘cultural diversity’ were 
too intimately related with ethnicity. According to Williams, the UKFC wanted ‘diversity’ to 
express everything that co-opted all marginalised minorities, including sexual orientation, 
regional isolation and age. 
Diversity as a term had no pedigree prior to New Labour in our broadcasting and cultural 
institutions. Diversity became a way of talking about race but is actually disconnected to the 
main issue. It was a demonstration of cultural institutions playing games with terminology. 
Diversity became a meaningless term unconnected to equality, equality in access and 
representation and production. It’s no longer about the provision of and accessing the means of 
filmic production to minority groups, which is what was fought for by the unions, and the GLC 
and Channel 4 through the workshop movement - equality in access and representation and 
production. Tragically, post 1997 both ethnic minorities and the left were unable to provide 
alternative responses to this cultural discourse, and that gave New Labour’s diversity, with all its 







Many subscribe to the notion that Britain is now a post racial society where race and ethnicity 
are no longer a barrier to success, and individual character, application and endeavour are the 
determinants to life chances. However, Britain is a society where black and ethnic minorities 
continue to occupy the poorest areas of Britain in the most substandard council housing. 
Discrimination against people from ethnic groups is systematically evidenced at every stage of 
the criminal justice system; in some areas black people are nearly 8 times more likely to be 
stopped and searched by police than white people (Abercrombie 2000:536). In addition, blacks 
are more likely to receive longer custodial sentences than their white counterparts. We continue 
to have what can only be described as an inefficient educational system in which nearly 60% of 
black boys continually fail to reach the benchmarked 5 a-c grades at GCSE level and a high 
proportion are excluded. We have an employment market that continues to make it difficult for 
ethnic minorities to secure places in key decision making roles across a number of both public 
and private sectors, and continuing far right mobilisation in the form of the British National Party 
and the English Defence League, now is a period charged with difficulties of living as 
marginalized minorities in 21st century Britain. Racism persists because there has been no serious 
political effort to challenge the interconnections between the concept of race and the structures 
and institutions of the British state. There are people with stories to be told, and as a society we 
need that kind of film culture. But who will in valuate those projects? Where are this 
generation’s Mamoun Hassans, the Farrukh Dohndys, the Parminder Virs, the Yasmin Anwars, 
the Julian Henriques and the Isaac Juliens? And who will facilitate their ideas?	  
	  New Labour’s political and cultural veiling of racism through a mobilisation and privileging of 
the language of multiculturalism must be interrogated cinematically as this semantic movement 
has cultivated an inability and reluctance to openly engage with race, its genesis in European 
political thought and the consequences for individual and collectives lives in Britain. Current 
cinematic and televisual discourses still do not provide an adequate and in depth explanation of 
the inequalities produced in societies in which the racialised continue to be the targets of 





There are further shifts occurring. In Channel 4’s Top Boy (Yann Demange, 2011) and the 
BBC’s One Night (David Evans, 2012) television is now becoming the dominant outlet for black 
representation on screen. However, while heavily indebted to American TV shows like The Wire 
for its narrative framework,	  these recent British television dramas, which are still holistically in 
the hands of non-black writers and directors, show no sign of interest in genuine and concerted 
racial questions (Gaffney, F: 2011). What this represents is an anthropological expedition into 
the darkest corners and lowest parts of the class/race nexus in Britain. Though this continues to 
leave these writers and directors open to accusations of being patronising (and perhaps to some 
extent they are), they are nonetheless making dramas that show an attempt to represent ethnic 
minorities on TV in a manner other than dismissive or comic. However, they are able to do this 
because ethnic minorities effectively have no potent voice of their own within our cultural 
institutions. Frustration can and should be levelled at gatekeepers, be it black or white as they 
perpetuate this level of lack of awareness, lack of consciousness or political action, but the black 
writers and directors themselves must exercise a degree of independence, and reflect back to 
society what society is and not be compliant. 	  
A political cinema is the only way that black film practitioners can operate within the industry 
and against the government’s practices. However, it will not be possible for ethnic minority film 
practitioners to cultivate a new filmic movement to parallel that of the 1970’s and 1980’s, one 
that is capable of being firm, creative and determined enough to engage directly and effectively 
in the politics of ethnic minority existence, whilst the themes and issues that compose current 
films continue to be culturalised, separating them analytically from the very political economy 
that provides their conditions of existence.  
Attitudes and approaches need to change considerably before black film can be regarded as an 
integral aspect of British culture. The film and TV institutions are completely versed in notions 
of an all encompassing black identity, and this narrow-mindedness about representation, plus the 
fact that the very policy makers and Black Minority and Ethnic (BME) organisations put in place 
to inform ethnic minority cultural strategies are perpetually failing to find common ground on 
how to effectively address race equality and diversity, continues to overcome artistic ambition. 
Filmmakers must again be introduced to the idea that social realism has the potential to offer the 




bringing social unrest, unemployment and racial discrimination and tension to screen in a socio-
political form, with an unequivocal conviction as to who is culpable.  
But, before we can conceptualise what a polemic black British film culture could be, we must 
first view where black film culture of any discourse lies, particularly within the film programmes 
in our cultural institutions. As previously stated, our film institutions are generally reactive to the 
political mandates and frameworks given to them.  In a debate in the House of Commons in 
March 2011, Simon Hughes, Liberal Democrat MP for Bermondsey and Old Southwark raised 
the issue of ethnic diversity in British cinema with the Conservative Minister for Culture, stating 
that: 
As we celebrate the Baftas and the Oscars, I am sure that  
the Minister will have noticed that there are very few black 
and minority ethnic faces in front of the screen, and the  
work force behind the screen are similarly unrepresentative.  
Will he use his influence to ensure that when the British Film  
Institute, which is based on the south bank in my part of  
the world, takes over responsibilities, it understands the  
importance of diversity for the whole of the work force,  
and will he work with me to ensure that that is achieved? 
(Simon Hughes, March 2011) 
 
Edward Vaisey, Conservative Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries, 
responded with: 
                                                        I absolutely agree with the Right Hon. Gentleman. I am certainly happy 
to work with him and the British Film Institute to ensure that that  
happens and that we make significant progress (Edward Vaisey, March 2011). 
 
What followed was The Film Policy Review, commissioned by Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport (DCMS) and produced by an eight-strong independent panel chaired by Lord Chris 
Smith. The review made several recommendations constructed to ensure that the film industry 





The principal objectives for the Review were: 
 
1. To identify market failures preventing the creation of a more successful and fully 
integrated British film industry and, where possible, to use policy to help address these 
obstacles and assist in building a model which is adaptable enough to work effectively in 
a rapidly changing global marketplace. 
 
2. To determine how best to set Policy directions for Lottery funding, and to deploy Lottery 
and Grant-in Aid funding generally to support the growth of a more successful UK film 
sector to the benefit of the public and the industry. 
 
3. To identify ways to develop and retain UK talent to support this model; by building on 
our inherently British creativity and on existing skills strategies to maximise development 
of new and diverse talent across entrepreneurial, technical and creative disciplines. 
 
4. To help determine how best to increase audience demand for film, including independent 
British film, the BFI will lead work which will aim to maximise the impact of film 
education, in particular by looking at ways to consolidate existing initiatives.  This work 
will also aim to increase access UK-wide to our rich screen heritage, as well as inspiring 
new generations from all backgrounds to learn about, and participate in, film and film 
culture. However, in ‘The Diversity Challenge’ section in the UK Film Policy Review 
published in early 2012, a mere five lines from a 111-page report are dedicated to the 
issue of diversity: 
Due in part to the informality of its employment practices,  
the UK film industry has a tendency to over-representation  
of white males and under-representation of women and  
people from diverse groups. For example, in a city (London)  
where 24% of the workforce are from minority ethnic  
groups, the film production workforce is only 7% BAME.  
This disadvantage has persisted despite a decade of  





Thus, the statement made in the House of Commons hasn’t assumed any tangible shape. From 
this, developing a black film culture may continue to be an uphill task because the cultural 
institutions and the politicians that inform them place a completely different value system on 
ethnic minority film and arts. It's not an intrinsic part of their cultural agenda.  
 
In October 2012, the BFI launched Film Forever  - Supporting UK Film 2012-2017. This 
publication, informed by the Film Policy Review, demonstrated where and how their £98.1 
million income over this period will be spent. Diversity has been included into a BFI Research 
and Diversity Section, with a combined annual budget of £1.2 million. The publication stated 
that: 
 
The Diversity funds will help promote equal access,  
participation and strengthening cultural diversity. It  
will also enhance access for people with sensory  
impairments and fund pilots for disabled people.  
(BFI Film Forever, 2013) 
 
From this £1.2 million, just £200,000 p.a has been dedicated to diversity, which as I have stated 
has become a hotch potch of discourses including disability, gender, sexuality and race. Diversity 
now seems to be an optional accessory to the main aims of the film industry and it’s clear that 
the development of a black/ethnic minority film culture cannot be reconciled under overt 
commercialism. It is testimony to the utter vacuousness of our diversity discourse in film.  Any 
serious examination of inequality in the film industry, from the Annan Report onwards must 
conclude that it an ideological gambit designed to obscure the immense racio- social divisions 
and inequalities within the film industry. Embracing this diversity discourse effectively means 
we no longer have anything genuine to articulate about these inequalities, their structural causes 








The BFI provided further clarity on their diversity by announcing both a Diversity Fund and 
Diversity strategy to be implemented in 2013: 
 
                                      The BFI want to take more of a leadership role in regard to diversity, 
not just within the BFI but in the film sector more broadly. We are  
committed to a £200,000 a year Diversity Fund. £200,000 a year is  
not a great amount in the grand scheme of things, so the fundamental  
thing that we are trying to work out is how we make sure that every  
bit of activity going on at the BFI has a mind-set towards making sure  
that what we do is inclusive and, that will be different in each area  
and we are trying to work out what we mean by diversity and  
equality, what are the principles that as an organisation we should be  
putting in place, and what are the mechanics that should feed  
down, in term of monitoring so that we can live up to what are  
golden ambitions are.  
 
We are working to get a clear framework with each (BFI) team do find  
what are the gaps in this area, what does the evidence tell us what we  
are missing and what can we do to make a meaningful difference in  
those areas. This will cut across the educational activity, advocacy and  
leadership, working with the wider film sector, the workforce, and  
working with all the people who make film to make sure that there  
are guidelines, that we are giving money to a reflective range of projects  
and people, not just the most obvious or usual suspects (BFI Diversity Strategy, 2013). 
 
In terms of the strategy’s execution, the problem may lie with its framework. This approach may 
prove problematic to some extent as there remains a distinctive ethical issue in influencing a 
creative practice or film policy on the premise of someone’s race or colour and creating a quota, 
which as we have read, has proved abortive with previous attempts. 
So if there is a situation where there are not enough black and ethnic minority people in the film 
industry, or being funded by the film industry and may contribute to developing a distinctive 
black and ethic minority film culture in a society or industry where there could but is not a full 
representation of a multi ethnic society, how do you artificially or unilaterally create a situation 




actually address the problem?  The paramount concern with this issue is ultimately agendas are 
being served that are not indexed to the wellbeing of the targeted groups or the industry. The BFI 
outlined their ideological framework for their definition of diversity by stating: 
We start with the premise that our mission is that everyone can have a  
cultural connection with film, and our activities should be reflective  
of the UK population as a whole. We’ve started with the Equalities Act  
definition, so age, gender, ethnicity ect, there are some other  
characteristics more relevant to film such as socio-economic  
background, nationality and regionality on account of the criticisms  
of the film industry being very London centric, so making sure our  
activities cover the regions. But one of the critical things is that we  
take action based on evidence, where there are particular areas of  
underrepresentation, and making sure that the huge 5-19 programme  
we are delivering has genuine reach. Making sure all our big  
programmes don’t have any barriers to any people, but the key is  
finding areas of underrepresentation, and seeing what we can do to  
address those. We are hoping to announce the full fund and the  
strategy together in the summer (BFI Diversity Strategy, 2013). 
 
In 2013, the CDN changed their name from Cultural Diversity Network to Creative Diversity 
Network, and the shift from multiculturalism to cultural diversity to creative diversity, which 
does not name specific communities, must be us used as a point of evidence as the film industry 
is adopting this term as a concept. While there may be a belief that this term makes both an 
ethical argument as well as a economic one as creativity, wherever it originates from drives 
innovation, the shift from cultural to creative diversity has given the opportunity for institutions 
to escape their responsibility in regard to developing a clear principle as to who they are 
targeting and what the intended impact will be. 
If we are to analyse this issue from a top down perspective, the accusation that must underpin all 
diversity schemes is that there are certain areas in the creative industries that remain 
discriminative and prejudicing opportunities. It is highly ambiguous to suggest that this is not a 
premise that is in operation in the confines of managing a cultural institution in Britain, as the 




from Creative England to the BFI, and what is required is to get to the root of why and that is 
what contemporary ideas of creative diversity do not do.  
We can now look at the African Odysseys film programme at the BFI to contextualise this 
argument. There can be acknowledgement of what African Odysseys is trying to achieve, but the 
fact remains that the BFI as an institution appeals overwhelmingly to a certain section of British 
society, i.e. the cultural elite. There is a real desire for the African Odysseys programmes to 
attract more than the black opinion formers, the film intelligentsia, and middle class liberals, but 
its current form may prevent the films from achieving any kind of significant cultural impact 
outside a rarefied, educated and self-congratulatory circle already converted. But this is an age-
old problem with British arts and culture, and any change in this is related with raising levels 
of consciousness and then interest. It can be argued that the current 16-35 age groups interests do 
not appear to be channeled towards concrete socio-political engagement and the African 
Odysseys programmes tend towards polemical film content. So the challenge for the BFI is how 
to break through prevailing ignorance and disinterest at all levels, but it begins specifically with 
the general curriculum, broadcasters and arts institutions. Minority-ethnic communities need to 
be encouraged and given the funding to engage in filmmaking, but parallel to this, audiences 
needs to broaden their cultural palate. 
 
Part of the problem is also that film programmers must negotiate with the default philistinism 
from risk adverse bureaucrats in our cultural institutions. To subscribe to notions that our cultural 
institutions possess a genuine desire for filmic diversity is disconnected from the de facto 
practices within institutions. It’s by coercion that diversity continues to be implemented in our 
institution’s cultural programmes, which indicates exactly why it has remained piecemeal.   
 
If black British filmmaking, currently congruent with notions of post racialism, is to successfully 
refute legitimate charges of being maladroit, ineffective and apolitical it must venture into the 
world of concrete socio-political engagement. If black filmmaking needs to be re-politicized, 
then social realism is the cinematic device, the genre, or even the approach, with which to 
achieve it. It must provide a politics capable of coherently presenting racial discrimination, ideas 
and stimulating activity, inclusive dialogue and mobilisation. However, the difficulty is that, with 




relatively thin on the ground, having being denied the chance to establish long-lasting careers, 
and even a ground breaking director such as Horace Ove is still obscure within the various 
histories of British cinema. Who then is (or can be) the authentic filmic voices, or custodians, of 



























The aim of this thesis is to draw together the numerous important filmic, sociological and 
political ideas and themes that were explored in this thesis for the purpose of offering overall 
conclusions. The principle objectives of this investigation were to propose a new means of 
orientation to the problems associated with the on-screen representation and social exclusion in 
the British film industry and to underscore the usefulness of adopting new filmic solutions to 
present contemporary social issues. Specifically, this was an investigation into the 
depoliticisation and decontextualiation of social realism, within the context of both race and 
class, and the socio-cultural discourses that produced the changes within the filmic approach. 
The practical dimension of this thesis was to produce an original feature length screenplay that 
identified the socio-political enquiries absent in contemporary social realism, extracting the 
necessary sociological approaches argued in the theoretical chapters that emphasise the 
relationship between protagonist and state institutions, and executing within the screenplay the 
appropriate narrative devices for this. While this study was a socio–cultural and textual analysis, 
it is unavoidable that its findings have ideological and political implications.  
This body of research has informed the practised based part of this Ph.D., identifying the 
narratives and the cultural economy in which the practical work is facilitated and invaluated. 
With specific regard to the practice of screenwriting, in placing the government institutions at the 
centre of the narrative conflict against the protagonist, this is narrative technique will enunciate 
the political and more crucially, replicate the social reality the practitioner is attempting to 
depict.   
The characterisation of the protagonist has a correlation with the overall Ph.D. thesis, in that 
social realism as it stands has other prerogatives in mind than encouraging a rethinking of 
government policy. The screenplay for this Ph.D., An Unsuitable Woman, is an attempt to return 
to a method of story telling which puts the antagonous relationship between citizen and state at 
the centre of the story. The issue in question is fostering and the bureaucratic legislation, which 
prevents potential mothers - like our protagonist - from doing so. However, in order to make this 
argument come alive beyond the script, and highlight the injustice implicit in this particular 




excellent mother being denied the chance because of a past crime. Thus, the theoretical and the 
practical are in tandem, informing each other. 
This thesis has taken on a wide and varied body of research from traditional film studies, 
sociology and politics. For the most part, these accounts of British social realism, some of which 
are very informative and interesting indeed, are nevertheless unable to offer new perspectives on 
some of the central problems and issues faced in British film today. All but Hallam (2010) were 
written without reference to thorough perspectives within the class/race nexus. None were 
underpinned by the desire to answer critical socio-political questions. The objective of this thesis 
was to offer a more adequate and reality-congruent picture of British film, past and present. The 
focus was on gaining an understanding of social exclusion within a film culture and on screen 
representations that emerge as a direct result, analysing the history of black film and its 
relationship with broadcasters and institutions in order to find the roots of its exclusivity, 
exploring the industry’s development in the light of wider political processes. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, a critique was offered of the New Labour cultural policy in 
specific regard to film policy, in relation to the Third Way. Evidence was presented to suggest 
that much of British film policy, and the UKFC policy specifically, was underpinned by 
objectives that reflected a commercial approach. In particular, UKFC policy tended to view the 
concepts of film as social practice in a reductive fashion, and gave insufficient attention and 
consideration to the socio-cultural returns on investment. This severely impacted the space for 
the development and commissioning of social realist films. 
As described in Chapter 1, the figuration of British film expanded markedly from around the 
beginning of the 21 century, mostly as a result of the global expansion of British film and the 
processes of commercialisation that were set in motion from the decrees, increased public 
funding and tax breaks from New Labour. BBC Films and FilmFour, two of the leading film 
production companies in Britain intimately entwined with the government, were constrained in 
relation to having to tally with these wider political developments.  
The growing ties of interdependence in the British film figuration had the consequence of 
limiting the extent to which Channel 4 could potentially continue the development of social 




Labour’s Ministers for Culture (first Chris Smith and later Tessa Jowell) came to develop a 
measure of political control over Channel 4, which had the effect of lessening its creative 
autonomy. Specifically, in 2002 new Chief Executive Mark Thompson called for the New 
Labour government to provide £60 million in financial assistance for the channel to allow it to 
compete commercially, his argument being that as “Channel Four often acted under its public 
service broadcasting remit rather than in commercial terms, the government ought to consider 
guaranteeing with funding”(Edwardes, 2002:1). Jowell denied this request, arguing that “it is not 
in our policy” to allocate public money to boost the channel. Further, she stated that she would 
not "punish the BBC" as this sum would have to be redirected from their license fee (Edwardes, 
2002:1). 
 
However, in 2007 Jowell agreed to subsidise Channel 4's digital switchover costs of £14 million 
directly from the BBC license fee, on the proviso that the channel adheres to its public service 
remit, stating that "Channel 4 has always been at its strongest when it has closely adhered to its 
public purpose: innovative, educational, distinctive and appealing to diverse audiences. These are 
the reasons it was created in the first place. Channel 4 has had an important role as a key source 
of public service competition, as well as a catalyst for the development of a world-beating 
independent sector and an important contributor to the wider creative economy” (Deans, 2007:1). 
She further justified spending public revenue on Channel Four (having previously refused the 
request) by predicting that without government investment the channel would not be in a position 
to carry out its public services remit, predicting that "Despite the profound changes ahead for the 
sector in the coming years, I remain convinced that the case for public service broadcasting will 
endure. However Channel 4's ability to deliver public service broadcasting in the future is likely 
to come under sustained pressure in just a few years” (Deans, 2007:1) 
 
Despite Jowell’s theory, it was argued in Chapter 1 that not only did New Labour fail to enforce 
this quid pro quo term with any conviction, but they actually encouraged and ushered in the 
commercialisation of the channel, no greater manifest than in the creation (and subsequent 
collapse) of FilmFour. As the figuration of British film became more complex due to the sectors 
globalization and commercialisation, there were a number of unintended consequences that the 




mode of production. The antipathy to public service, by both New Labour and the channel was 
undoubtedly the most problematic of all consequences of New Labour’s involvement with 
Channel 4. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, a critique was provided of the current stock of historical 
knowledge of film from a black and ethnic minority perspective. While leading individuals 
within film recognised the need for long-term planning and understood the inevitable slow 
progress of change, when it came to critical decision-making, they were restricted by the 
growing pressures of New Labour political discourse; they were constrained through ties of 
political interdependence. Creating the space for a body of films that told the experience of a 
marginalized BAME community would not capture the zeitgeist. Many, if not most, of the film 
industry’s recent schemes have been designed and introduced for the purposes of promoting 
cinema to new and diverse sections of the British public, not of developing already-existing 
BAME talent up to the elite level. These schemes have been criticised in this chapter for being 
based on and supported by inadequate knowledge and understanding of the specific groups that 
were targeted as well as the particular problems they sought to overcome. This analysis has 
revealed that the roots of and solutions to many of the film industry problems lay in an analysis 
of the qualitive changes in the black British experience. 
 
As argued in both Chapter 1 and 2, the BBC, Channel Four and the UKFC believed in a 
consensus of opinion from New Labour in regard to both class and race. While race politics 
could be tempered by surface level inclusion by BAME groups in the film industry, this was 
implemented not as much through conviction as expediency. Film policy therefore, became a 
form of realpolitik. I showed in Chapter 2 how as a consequence, policy makers in British film 
showed an inadequate appreciation and understanding of the needs of BAME groups, 
specifically because of an absence of representation from these groups in the actual decision-
making process. Cultural proximity then, should have been a requisite for the policy maker to be 
able to gain awareness of their inability both to identify the targeted groups and implement 
effective policy. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the UKFC were unable to bridge the gulf of 
detachment that would have enabled them to recognise their inadequate level of understanding, 




Many, if not most, of the initiatives launched by the UKFC and the BBC failed to reach and 
remedy the genesis of the problem, and actually led to a whole host of consequences for British 
social realism, these were shown across Chapter 2. Despite this, the UKFC continued to believe, 
with their current level of understanding, that they could implement successful measures to 
create diversity in British film. This inadequacy was based on their poor conceptualisation of the 
very groups and individuals they sought to change; that is, filmmakers, producers and BAME 
committees.  
In the early 2000’s the film industry began to make considerable profits from a mixed economy 
of new government and public investments, which should have had the consequence of affording 
the UKFC an increasing amount of revenue to invest back into British film development at all 
levels. Growing UKFC profits and an increasingly proactive transatlantic-thinking perspective 
thus afforded the UKFC opportunities to put more focus on large, high production value films. 
Since the late 90’s, as the film industry’s profits increased considerably, the UKFC’s focus also 
shifted more towards the development of a much more transatlantic film culture, aided by the tax 
breaks afforded by Gordon Brown’s Treasury. Community, regional and voluntary-run film 
organisations and production companies, on the other hand, were not bestowed to the same 
extent by these commercial processes.  
In relation to black British cinema, diversity has now become a term that cannot be subscribed to 
with any kind of precision. Further, it is clear that the relationship between those who endorse 
the contemporary understanding of diversity, the BBC, Channel Four, the BFI, Creative England 
and the DMCS is complex and underpinned by ties of functional interdependence. While these 
institutions consistently present different objectives, they have developed to become functionally 
reliant on each other. Of course, this relationship has come to bring problems to the idea of 
diversity in terms of the way it manifests itself. There are many different ways to produce 
genuine diversity in British film, what matters is creating the necessary political will and specific 
language to pursue any of them. Race and class still matter, regardless of whether it’s neutralised 
by employing language such as creative diversity or social exclusion.  
The real question however, is not who is approaching social realism right or wrong but rather 




and more crucially, a film culture to function most effectively. There are at least two reasons for 
this. First, the more closely a national cinema represents the composition of society as a whole, 
the more balanced its policies are likely to be. This means that it is not just important to include 
the working class and ethnic minorities, but also to ensure broad representation. Second, a cross 
class and ethnic film industry should, all other things being equal, tend to address more of the 
concerns that apply exclusively or disproportionately to them. Of course, working class, black 
and Asian filmmakers don't always bring up issues that are important to black and Asian, and the 
working class, and white and middle class practitioners don't always exclude these concerns. But 
working class, black and ethnic minority filmic practitioners are more likely create a cinema that 
affects their own demographics’ concerns. 
However, it may prove to be an impossible challenge to try to reconcile a remit to provide public 
service broadcasting of a certain political position with a commitment to commercialism by 
advocating a varying synthesis neoliberalism. It’s not fully compatible. On the specific issue of 
diversity in British cinema its undeniable that if you withdraw funding from minority groups, the 
culture your are trying to cultivate is going to be damaged. Generally, the successful 
implementation of any scheme designed to change what is rooted as part of a particular film 
culture requires a sound base of knowledge of the subject matter, its development over history 
and an understanding of the objectives and motivations of the various practitioners and 
institutions and stakeholders that are implicated within the complicated process of 
implementation. The process of rethinking policy, however, is constrained by two important 
factors, firstly, the need for short, medium and long-term solutions; and, secondly, the need to 
acknowledge and build upon existing policy. 
 
"We are all products of our environment". This tagline from Ben Drew aka Plan B’s debut film 
Ill Manors gives the impression that we are about to embark on a realistic, polemical account of 
life on the periphery of Britain’s underclass. However, by not interrogating the antagonistic 
oppressive political system that usher in these ills, what the film proved to be was a missed 
opportunity at a time when it could have maximum effect. Ill Manors ultimately represented a 





Naturally, it is not fair to hold filmmakers responsible for every incorrect application and 
demonstration of working class and ethnic minority existence in film. But this approach comes at 
a cost. The exaggerated behavioural aspects of this demographic, argued by the Tories as the 
genesis of social problems, will distort the political agenda. Secondly, by staying above the fry of 
socio-political and ideological conflict, the films seem to command the guilty applause and 
unequivocal acceptance of liberals, who seem to be using the films such as Fish Tank, Bullet Boy 
and more recently Ill Manors as the article of faith when contextualising social problems.  Of 
course, social realism has hinted at a comprehensive ideology. Ken loach’s films drew its power 
from its association with the political left.  However, the sheer scale of government investment in 
the film sector afforded New Labour a greater influence on how British film was to be organised. 
As argued in Chapter 1 via a textual analysis of key filmic texts, the disappearance of polticised 
working class voices in British cinema were distinctive qualities of a class based industry, 
paradoxically operating within the Third Way philosophy of a classless society.  The developing 
social character of British film at the start of the 21th century therefore, came to be influenced by 
aspects of both New Labour’s commercial interests in the film sector and its middle-class 
ideologies. 
Film is more than just a visual experience. It can be a site of a realistic portrayal of society, that 
can affect political imagination, shaping, and to some extent limiting the kind of social change 
that can be achieved.  This is why we all find comprehensive, detailed, filmic political 
engagement so compelling. But in order to achieve this, we need to look to the details of political 
institutions and public policy.  The important opposition is between government and society, not 
the individual and his or her moral or cultural code. 
Georg Lukacs - in a famous essay called Narrate or Describe, made the distinction between 
naturalism and realism. The former is obsessed with details but has no grasp of the social 
dynamics of the life it is portraying. The latter, explores the social relationships within a 
narrative structure that allows the momentum of the contradictions within the fictional world to 
build into revealing action. From this theory, British social realism has clearly abandoned its 





The narrative message that personal behaviour determines life chances is indicative of the 
pervasive discourse of meritocracy. The problem with such arguments is that they exaggerate the 
cultural differences between the poor and other social groups and place too great an emphasis on 
cultural practices as an explanation of their disadvantage, reducing reality to a conflict between 
working class characters and their behavioural decisions. The landscape of social inequality in 
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